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Abstract
The thesis proposes measuring social capital by means of Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and 
presents international social capital estimates for the late-nineteenth century in the form of a Social 
Development Index (SDI) for 1870 and 1890. The analysis is based on a nineteenth-century international 
database containing a wide range of socio-economic variables. These indicators are compared to mid­
twentieth century social indicators, facilitating the study of the evolution of social capital in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. One of the conclusions that arise from the PhD thesis is the persistence of social 
indicators in the medium term. In the very long run, a significant decline in the relative position of the 
Western European countries and the United States is found.
The new series are then used as empirical evidence to show that comparative social evolution trajectories 
can improve economic performance predictions. In fact, the results show that the relationship between 
social development and per capita income already existed in the late-nineteenth century. This relationship 
upholds after controlling for foreign trade volume and structure, urbanization, education, quality of 
institutions, political stability, government expenditure, population growth, and climate.
Finally, the thesis presents an application of the proposed SDI into an Economic Geography framework. In 
particular, it shows how a better definition of the formal and informal institutional setup can help testing 
economic geography hypothesis on international trade. In order to do this, indicators of access to markets 
are calculated for 1994 and other benchmark years going back to 1962 making use of bilateral trade data. 
Then, the proposed alternative socio-institutional measures illustrate how the importance of access to 
markets is not unconditional on the institutional setup. Poor government effectiveness undermines the 
positive benefits of geographical location. Only when a country reaches a certain threshold of institutional 
quality can it effectively benefit from location.
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Chapter 1
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL CAPITAL
13
1 .1. INTRODUCTION
Social capital is important. The classical thinkers were already giving importance to 
living in a community rather than in isolation. Giambattista Vico illustrates the power of 
society in the following passage: ‘[society] makes national defence, commerce, and 
politics, and thereby causes the strength, the wealth, and the wisdom of the republics; 
(...) society thus causes the civil happiness to emerge. (...) [Men] who are entirely 
occupied by the pursuit of their private utility are transformed into a civil order which 
permits men to live in human society’ (Vico in Scienza Nuova, paragraphs 132-33, from 
Hirschman, 1977:17). Such is the power of society; this device makes man work for the 
common good while they paradoxically pursue their own benefit. In Montesquieu’s 
words, ‘it turns out that everyone contributes to the general welfare while thinking that 
he works for his own interests’ (Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Book III, Ch VII, as cited 
in Hirschman, 1977: 10).
Indeed, social arrangements play an important role in security, knowledge and 
education, and the protection of property rights. Society can generate the adequate 
atmosphere for economic prosperity, as the development of countries who have 
historically promoted these values shows. Western European countries have been 
careful in ensuring security across history, from feudalism to nowadays. Exemplifying 
further the importance of social arrangements, one of the key elements of the recent 
growth experience in South East Asia has been the role of the state in providing 
education. Finally, the United States of America are a clear example of early protection 
of the property rights, which, among other things, boosted the rate of innovation with 
the help of the patent laws. John Stuart Mill emphasised this positive role of the social 
arrangements, as well has their role in generating positive attitudes toward work and 
saving (Mill, 1909:108-110).
John Stuart Mill emphasised also the benefits from trade (Mill, 1909:581). However, 
‘the spirit of liberty appears (...) to depend chiefly upon two circumstances: first, the 
condition of the people relative to the distribution of property, and the means of 
subsistence: secondly, the facility with which the several members of society are 
enabled to associate and to act in concert with one another’ (Lehmann, 1960: 330-1). 
Notice that Lehmann gives as much importance to the distribution of wealth and 
availability of resources as to people interactions; so the relevance of the latter is not a
14
new idea. Nevertheless, it has been recently recovered, reshaped, redefined, and put at 
the steak for discussion.
1. II. SOCIAL CAPITAL: DEFINITION
The importance of the structure of society and of the interactions among its agents has 
been recognised as a relevant factor in the performance of economies. The social links 
between citizens can be encompassed under the concept of ‘social capital’ (DiPasquale 
and Glaeser, 1999: 355). In the words of the political scientist Robert Putnam, social 
capital ‘refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms, and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’ (Putnam, 
1993: 167). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink define networks as “‘forms of 
organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of 
communication and exchange” [Keck and Sikkink, 1998:8]. These networks may 
include not only conventional NGOs, but also local social movements, foundations, the 
media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, parts of regional 
and international intergovernmental organizations, and parts of the executive and/or 
parliamentary branches of governments’ (Brecher, Costello, and Smith, 2000:83). In 
Woolcock’s (1998) opinion, however, these features are not social capital, but rather the 
consequences thereof. He adds that the concept can be read in several ways.
Woolcock argues that there are four dimensions of social capital: the size and scope of 
horizontal associations; social integration, the nature of social ties within communities; 
the relationship between civil society and the state; and, the quality of governing 
institutions. However, he agrees that it should be collapsed and understood as a single 
variable. Fine cites a statement made by Woolcock on the World Bank’s email 
discussion site on social capital:
‘Several critics, not without justification, have voiced their concern that 
collapsing an entire discipline into a single variable (especially one with such 
economic overtones) is a travesty, but there are others who are pleased that 
mainstream sociological ideas are finally being given their due at the highest 
levels’(Fine, 2001:139).
As a way of summarising the various proposed definitions, social capital can be 
understood in the abstract as the quality or health of the interactions within civil society.
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Despite its recent re-definition and re-contextualisation, the concept of social capital is 
nothing new. Putman acknowledges the fact that the concept was described well before 
his influential 1993 book. The term social capital turns out to have been independently 
invented at least six times over the twentieth century, each time to call attention to the 
ways in which our lives are made more productive by social ties’ (Putnam 2000:19). 
However, one has to bear in mind that some of the claims on social capital are 
retrospective claims, which affirm that ‘writers (...) really were talking about social 
capital when they thought they were writing about something else’ (Harriss, 2001:75).
The ‘six times’ Putnam acknowledges are the following, starting by L. J. Hanifan in 
1916, who studied the importance of the community involvement for the well- 
functioning of schools. A forty years gap separates Hanifan from the book co-authored 
by John Seely, Alexander Sim, and Elizabeth Loosley in 1956, Crestwood Heights: A 
Study o f the Culture o f Suburban Life. Keeping on the line of the study of urban 
societies and neighbourliness, Jane Jacobs presented her work on 1961. It was not until 
the mid-seventies when Glenn Loury rediscovered social capital once more, writing 
about the determinants of income differences between members of different ethnic 
groups (Loury, 1977). Loury’s discovery attracted the attention of the most influential 
of the six, James Coleman, who defines social capital according to Loury’s vision as 
‘the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organisation 
and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child or young person’ 
(Coleman, 1990: 300). The sixth, according to Putnam, was the Marxist theorist Pierre 
Bordieu who underlined the relevance of social networks in the 1980s. In fact, as 
noticed by Harriss (2001), Karl Marx already envisaged capital as a social relation. 
Thus, the twentieth century term ‘social capital’ is conceptually not that far from Marx’s 
broad view of ‘capital’ itself.
Due to the relatively recent usage of the term ‘social capital’, it might be misunderstood 
or mixed with other close concepts. To avoid confusion, it is important to make clear 
the difference between social capital and institutions. Personal interrelations or 
interactions are the action while institutions (regulations and conventions) are the 
framework in which the actions are embedded. At the same time, interactions contain or 
make use of the stock of social capital available in a society. In a few words;
16
interactions making use o f social capital may take place within the institutional 
framework.
It is convenient to underline the double dimensionality behind the combination o f the 
two concepts above: institutions and interactions.
1) On the one hand, institutions might be either formal or informal. Formal 
institutions are the ones established and governed by law. Informal institutions 
are the networks or groups of people which are spontaneously generated and still 
host action on a regular basis. These may or may not have written rules and, if  
this is the case, these would be voluntarily joined.
2) On the other hand, interactions may occur at and between different 
hierarchical levels. Vertical interrelations or interactions are typically at the 
basis of formal institutions, since superior hierarchies have the power and 
acquired rights to dictate the law, which is a necessary requirement to create a 
formal institution. Horizontal organisations are typically informal; they are not 
forced upon individuals by law but joined spontaneously and voluntarily instead.
See figure 1.1 for a schematic explanation.
Figure 1.1 - Double overlapping dimensionality of 
institutions and interactions
Institutions Formal
nforma
Vertical
Horizonta
Interactions
Institutions can be either formal or informal. Interactions can be either 
vertical or horizontal. Social capital typically lies within the informal 
and horizontal frameworks.
This double dimensionality both defines and classifies the space o f events. Social 
capital typically finds its place within the horizontal interactions and informal type of
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institutions. To avoid restricting myself to the recently created ‘social capital’ branding, 
I will also refer to ‘social capability’ or ‘social development’ as broader, less 
encapsulated terms for the same idea.
1. III. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
The next pages summarise a selection of cases in which social ties or civic virtues have 
contributed towards a positive outcome in several ways. Section III. 1 relates social 
capital to some empirical studies in economics. Section III.2 provides some examples of 
the importance of social ties in the distant past. Historical evidence has started to be 
slowly incorporated into economic theory and this indeed could now be the way to go.
1. III.l. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The relevance of social capital reflects the importance of people. Economic 
organisations are managed by people, and it is through their interactions that economy 
works. Among all the schools of thought trying to explain development and economic 
growth, one stream presents some interesting interactions between sociology and long- 
run economic development; particularly focusing on social capabilities, as identified by 
Abramovitz (1986:387-8).
There is some empirical evidence that social capital has had significant influence on 
economic growth. Studies conducted by Easterly and Levine (1997), and Temple and 
Johnson (1998) aimed at determining the macroeconomic consequences of social 
arrangements. They indicate that some disappointing policy outcomes have their roots 
in the nature of societies. La Porta et al. (1997) find some effect of social capability on 
growth for the period 1970-93; Knack and Keefer (1997) focus on the period 1980-92, 
and find a stronger link: If the level of trust increases by 10 percent, growth is, on 
average, 0.8 percent higher per year. This is a very considerable effect. Therefore, it 
stands clear from the existing research that social capital has some economic 
consequences, and it makes the difference as far as economic growth is concerned.
Following on the potential lines of influence of social capability, its effects on financial 
development had been empirically tested for Italy by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales. 
Using microeconomic data on households and firms, they prove that ‘in areas of the
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country with high levels of social trust, households invest less in cash and more in 
stock, use more checks, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of 
informal credit. (...) Firms also have more access to credit and are more likely to have 
multiple shareholders’,(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2000: 0). Their empirics also 
suggest that trust seems to be less important in areas with poor legal systems and more 
educated people. Therefore, ‘social capital is likely to be very important in explaining 
the success (or lack thereof) of developing countries’ (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2000: 34).
Inquiring about the mechanism behind the economic effects of social capital, one 
important line of research is its role in making institutions work well, through a 
reduction of transaction costs; ‘(that is, the costs of monitoring and enforcing 
agreements), and thus in enabling agents more efficiently to surmount problems of 
opportunism and shirking’ (Putnam, 93:166). Harriss recalls Coleman’s example of 
traders in a Cairo market ‘who share information about customers -  he shows how the 
reciprocity and trust which may be an aspect of social relations are of value because 
they help to reduce many of the costs of transaction, through the communication of 
information and the kinds of insurance that are created in social networks’ (Harriss, 
2001:5). This could potentially explain why institutions work better in some places than 
in others. Institutions, as technology, may be replicated, but yet they achieve different 
levels of efficiency in different places. This depends among other factors upon the 
social capability of the society in question. Thus, one of the products of social capital is 
that it helps institutions work well.
In order to capture social capability in the empirics, we need first to understand how it is 
generated. A lot has been done about its effects, but very little into its causes. It is 
important to understand what influences social capital itself and, hence, much more 
investigation needs to be done into the causes that give rise to different levels of social 
capital. What can the differences in social capital be attributed to? As showed in Making 
Democracy Work, “ ‘civic involvement 1900s” predicts “socio-economic development 
1970s” more strongly than does “socio-economic development 1900s”’(Harriss, 
2001:21). ‘A region’s chances of achieving socio-economic development during this 
century have depended less on its initial socio-economic endowments than on its civic 
endowments. In so far as we can judge (...) the contemporary correlation between civics 
and economics reflects primarily the impact of civics on economics, not the reverse’
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(Putnam, 1993: 157). The direction of the causality is hard to prove, but Putnam’s 
research is a good piece of evidence pointing at the existing impact of society into 
economics.
The process itself of the generation of social capital could be explored further in a 
posterior stage via modelling. Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) present a simple 
model of optimal investment that explains individual’s decision to invest in the creation 
of social capital. Also, a general equilibrium model is presented by Zak and Knack 
(2001), where agents have the opportunity to either trust others agents or to invest in 
verifying other people’s actions. So, there are some initiatives focusing on explaining 
the mechanism generating social capital and enquiring about causality. This thesis, 
however, focuses on the measurement issues and impact on economic development at 
the macro level instead.
Let us take the growth regressions literature as the initial framework, in which social 
capability still has to find its place. The comprehensive paper by Bleaney and 
Nishiyama (2002) constitutes a compendium of the most significant advances in the 
1990s growth literature that try to incorporate new variables to the growth regressions. 
They build up a new benchmark model, which they call an ‘encompassing model’, that 
arises from a selection of the most significant variables coming from three different 
previous non-nested models: Barro (1997), —an updated version of his influential work 
in 1991—, Easterly and Levine (1997), and Sachs and Warner (1997). They also test the 
non-nestedness of these three, which is confirmed.
The variables that Bleaney and Nishiyama include in their encompassing model are 
referring to the initial per capita income (taking 1965 as the year of reference), 
openness, life expectancy, schooling, institutional quality, democracy, government 
savings, primary products exports, climate and active population growth. This model 
passed several robustness tests, including the incorporation of regional dummy 
variables. So, the influence of these variables on economic performance has already 
been tested and given approval, but most of the mechanisms that lead to interactions and 
intermediate links are still unexplored. Here is where social capital might have a role 
and it is therefore worth exploring it.
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1. III. 2. SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE DISTAN PAST: SOME HISTORICAL 
EXAMPLES AND NATURAL EXPERIMENTS
Is it worthwhile making the effort to try to capture such an abstract variable? In order to 
answer this question, the following paragraphs expose a series of historical examples 
and natural experiments which illustrate how social capital may matter.
The next historical example shows how informal links between people of different 
villages could have been the key to the winning warfare strategy leading to the 
foundation of the Zulu state. The origin of the Zulu state by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century in south-eastern Africa shows how it is possible to detach by other 
means than technological. ‘Among the dozens of Zulu chiefdoms, the Mtetwa chiefdom 
enjoyed no advantage whatsoever of technology, writing, or germs over the other 
chiefdoms, which it nevertheless succeeded in defeating. Its advantage laid solely in the 
spheres of government and ideology’ (Diamond, 1997:292). The chief of the Mtetwa, 
called Dingiswayo,
‘developed a superior centralised military organisation by drafting young men 
from all villages and grouping them into regiments by age rather than by their 
village. He also developed superior centralised political organisation by 
abstaining from slaughter as he conquered other chiefdoms, leaving the 
conquered chiefs family intact, and limiting himself to replacing the 
conquered chief himself with a relative willing to cooperate with Dingiswayo’ 
(Diamond, 1997: 290).
Whether Dingiswayo mixed people from different villages on purpose or just as part of 
a military logistic tactic, his advantage laid specifically in creating links among people 
belonging to different villages, building in this way mutual trust and cooperation instead 
of promoting rivalry. It is a pity that Diamond skips to underline this point in his 
argumentation, arguing just superiority in political centralisation.
‘Among large tribes, those with stronger big-men and hence greater centralisation tend 
to have an advantage over those with less centralisation’ (Diamond, 1997:288). This 
advantage consists not only of political and military superiority, but also of better 
economic organisation and possible higher levels of social capability. To give an 
example of the latter, ‘water control systems (...) appear to have been associated with
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centralised political organisation in some (...) areas of the world, including the Indus 
Valley of the Indian subcontinent, the Yellow and Yangtze Valleys of China, the Maya 
lowlands of Mesoamerica, and the coastal desert of Peru’. Given the fact that both the 
Maya lowlands and highlands were part of the same civilisation, why did the former 
develop water control systems while the latter did not? ‘Detailed archaeological studies 
have shown that complex irrigation systems did not accompany the rise of centralised 
bureaucracies but followed after a considerable lag. That is, political centralisation arose 
for some other reason and then permitted construction of complex irrigation systems’ 
(Diamond, 1997:23). This makes us wonder whether political centralisation pushed 
society towards higher levels of trust and social capital, which endowed society with a 
greater ease for coordinated actions.
Here is another example of how social capital is required to establish the foundations to 
make institutions work. We know from Clifford Geertz (1962) reports from Java 
peasants that ‘rotating credit associations are [were] often found in conjunction with 
cooperatives and other forms of mutual aid and solidarity. In part, this is [was] because 
all these forms of voluntary cooperation are [were] fed by the same underlying stock of 
social capital’ (Putnam, 1993:169).
On the contrary, a fragmented society may deter important regions from significant 
economic growth. ‘New Guinea has by far the highest concentration of languages in the 
world: 1,000 out of the world’s 6,000 languages, crammed into an area only slightly 
larger than that of Texas, and divided into dozens of language families and isolated 
languages as different from each other as English is from Chinese’. ‘Difficulties of 
terrain, combined with the state of intermittent warfare that characterised relations 
between New Guinea bands or villages, account for traditional New Guinea’s linguistic, 
cultural, and political fragmentation’ (Diamond, 1997: 306). We could argue a similar 
situation in twentieth-century Europe: ‘Difficulties of terrain, combined with the state of 
intermittent warfare’. Though fragmentation is much lower than in New Guinea we can 
still think that this could have contributed to the dominance of larger unified nations 
such as the United States in the twentieth century, or China in the twenty-first century, 
according to prospective growth rates.
Recent studies have moved towards natural experiments, such as Costa and Kahn 
(2007) and Fisman and Miguel (2006). The first finds that friendship and other links
22
such as kinship or place of origin favoured survival of prisoners of war captured in 1863 
during the American Civil War. The second makes use of diplomatic immunity in order 
to test for civic virtues, beyond any legal enforcement. Fisman and Miguel find out that 
diplomats coming from high corruption countries have a stronger tendency to violate 
parking norms when visiting New York City. These are two examples of how social ties 
or identities do actually influence behaviour.
1. IV. SOCIAL CAPITAL MEASUREMENT
‘It is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that 
societies devise than describe and be precise about the informal ways by which 
human beings have structured human interaction. But although they defy (...) 
neat specification and it is extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests of 
their significance, they are important’ (North, 1990:36).
In this passage, Douglass North points out the importance of informal organisations and 
modus operandi of human activity. However, he does not take this statement further, he 
does not explore the phenomenon in more detail.
The duty of the social scientist is to analyse the social phenomena. No matter how 
imperfect the measurement of social phenomena is, these should be subject to non- 
quantitative as well as quantitative analysis. So, even if the quantitative analysis 
procedure is far from optimal, it might still reveal some interesting stylised facts or links 
that invite us to look for further detailed evidence and improve the procedure itself. It is 
the case, indeed of the social arrangements. In other words, taking North more seriously 
than he did himself could constitute a contribution to the theory of institutions and 
growth.
Taking North’s forceful statement together with the argumentation above, we can start 
by concluding that there is a strong enough theoretical basis which encourages us to 
pursue further quantitative study of social capital. There are some recent studies relating 
social capital to economic development. Still, the study of social capital from a long run 
perspective is just starting and deserves more effort, especially from a quantitative 
perspective. Researchers need to bear in mind that definition and measurement walk 
hand by hand. In order to be able to carry on some statistical study on social capital,
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there is not enough by stating a definition. It is necessary to obtain a quantitative 
measure.
The abstract character of the notion makes social capital very difficult to quantify in the 
empirics. Social capital is neither an implement nor can it be found in isolated 
individuals. Rather, it is an intangible collective good. Unlike other qualitative 
variables, social capital is not trivially dividable in different conceptual components, nor 
is it possible to be transformed into a yes/no variable. For instance, democracy can be 
set as an attribute of a certain political regime. It is a qualitative attribute, and can 
therefore be transformed into a 0-1 variable to become a ready-to-use variable for 
statistical analysis. On the contrary, all societies possess social capital to a certain 
extent. Some measurement proposals have been made with the final goal of linking 
social capital — or another closely related variables, which could act as a proxy—, to 
economic performance. However, no proposal enjoys general acceptance amongst 
social scientists.
The first related cross-section quantitative study was undertaken in the 1960’s by 
Adelman and Morris, (see 1965 and 1967 publications). They started from the idea that 
some societies may be inherently more suited to entrepreneurship and economic 
development. Societies evolve in a variety of dimensions, such as family relations, the 
extent of communications, the importance of the middle class, and social mobility. 
Departing from this idea, they used a series of socio-economic variables in a cross­
country historical investigation in order to explain different patterns of development. In 
fact, moving to more recent studies, Temple and Johnson (1998) have proposed the use 
of the social development index elaborated by Adelman and Morris as a proxy for social 
capital. Other empirical work has focused on international differences in the level of 
trust, and of civic co-operation. The measure of social capital that Putnam uses in his 
book Bowling Alone ‘is constructed -  like that of “civic community” in Making 
Democracy Work [his previous book]—by combining a number of indices (of 
“community organizational life”, “engagement in public affaires”, “community 
volunteerism”, “informal socializing” and of “social trust”) which are themselves highly 
intercorrelated’ (Harriss, 2001:55). Papers like that of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
focus more narrowly on the level of trust for the United States in the period 1974-1994. 
The level of trust is established by the General Social Surveys (Davis and Smith, 1994), 
which asked to the respondents whether they believed or not that most people can be
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itrusted. Other alternatives are experiments where civic virtues are tested by, for 
(example, “losing” a wallet with fifty dollars in different cities and counting the 
percentage of wallets being returned (Knack and Keefer, 1997). In their paper ‘Are 
{Homeowners Better Citizens?’, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) point at the importance 
•of being a homeowner for the involvement in the social initiatives aiming at the well- 
Ibeing of the local community. Thus, it shows clearly that many proposals are available, 
yet none enjoys general acceptance.
Some recent work is starting to pay attention to social capital or related concepts from a 
long run perspective. On the one hand, Putnam (2000) proposes to measure social 
capital in the past with things like newspaper readership or belonging to voluntary 
associations as a way to measure the level of interaction in a society. However, this is a 
study of the United States only and it is difficult to transfer to the distant past. On the 
other hand, Tabellini (2007) achieves a more global perspective by instrumenting 
culture with distant past institutions. He does not refer to social capital but to culture 
instead, though his definition of culture is very close to social capital. So there are some 
recent efforts to integrate social capital or related concepts like culture within the 
economic literature and bring some historical perspective at the same time. However, 
there is no homogeneous and/or consensuated measure or indicator. This project 
proposes an attempt towards international measurement of social capital at times where 
the current indicators based on surveys are not available.
1. V. A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Going back to the starting point, the Adelman and Morris work could shed some light 
on the questions in the agenda. Now that we can look at their analysis with several 
decades of distance, it appears to have not only the historical insights the authors were 
presenting but also more predictive power than they suspected. Their indicators for the 
1960s turned out to be apparently too pessimistic for Latin America and too optimistic 
for some Far Eastern countries, and so they moved along omitting some indicators 
(Adelman and Morris, 1967). At that time, they did not know the importance of their 
findings. Their method could have helped forecasting subsequent growth better than any 
other contemporary attempt. Temple and Johnson (1998) tell us that the socio-economic 
index constructed by Adelman and Morris for 1960 ‘could have helped researchers
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make much better forecasts of long-run growth rates’. So, it looks promising to bring 
their research further.
Adelman and Morris’ research methodology can be applied to social capital 
measurement because it establishes a procedure for generating a social index. They 
created a social index for 1960, and they also used a very similar approach in their 
studies on comparative economic development in the nineteenth century, but much 
more can be done. Their nineteenth century database, which was constructed and 
initially explored with the intention of explaining economic development has 
possibilities for being useful in the creation of an international social index for the 
nineteenth century.
1. V.l.WIDENING OF THE TOOLKIT: DUAL QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY
One of the objectives is to present the quantitative results in a readable way for 
historians. As Nicoli Nattrass once wrote,
‘historians and sociologists tend not to read specialist economic journal and when 
they encounter arguments with economic content are alienated by the terminology 
and underlying methodology. For their part many economists have contributed to 
this by regarding sociology and history as unscientific and largely irrelevant to 
economic issues, ( ...)’. (Nattrass, 1991: 655).
The use of quantitative methods in economic history was popularised around half a 
century ago. I strongly agree with Mitchell’s statement: ‘Statistics are used nowadays 
(...) as a major raw material of much economic history, especially of economic growth. 
(...) The subject is by its very nature concerned with quantities, (...) though no sensible 
historian would ever claim that statistics can tell the whole story’ (Mitchell, 1998: vii). 
The inverse is also true; economic historians must utilise historical reasoning, but there 
is a certain reluctance to accept plain grammatical arguments from the most economic- 
theory oriented focuses. I would like to give to my thesis a reconciling approach.
As far as economists are concerned, the methodology with which economic growth 
research has generally been addressed has been narrow-ranged. The main weaknesses
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Ihave typically been the use of a self-restrictive methodology and the lack of historical 
perspective.
Empirical macroeconomists ’ methodology can be typically encapsulated in one of two 
itypes: model calibration or econometric regressions. Real Business Cycle literature and 
contemporary monetarist economists use model calibration. The representative paper by 
Barro (1991), and the more recent Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) are examples of the 
empirical growth regressions’ literature, related to our subject. Growth regressions 
consist on running multiple regressions of growth rates on a list of variables in order to 
identify which ones are more correlated with economic growth. This generalised 
technique is able to identify which variables move together, provided the researcher did 
not omit any important variable in the multiple regression. Infinitely many variables 
cannot be included, since the data sample has a limited amount of degrees of freedom. 
Therefore, the researcher needs to choose between the trade off of including extra 
variables and allowing for more degrees of freedom. An important limitation of the 
regression analysis is that a specific functional form needs to be specified. In most of 
the growth regressions, the functional form of the regression remains restricted to a 
merely linear or at most quadratic form. Therefore, the growth regressions technique is 
helpful and broadly utilised, but used alone could lead to a narrow view of the 
interrelations amongst variables.
I would like to propose the re-introduction of a third empirical toolbox: the principal 
components analysis; which was first used in development studies by Adelman and 
Morris (1965). This approach is not meant to substitute the traditional approaches, but is 
intended to provide a complementary perspective for the better understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms and interrelations amongst variables. I defend it as especially 
appropriate for the historical understanding of complex socio-economic relations.
The re-introduction of the principal components analysis, in addition to the use of the 
traditional econometric tools, endows this project with a dual quantitative methodology. 
In this way, I proceed in two steps, the first step being the principal components 
analysis and the second one being the econometric regression analysis. The dual 
methodology undoubtedly enriches the project beyond the scope of any one­
dimensional quantitative methodology.
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I would like to remark that the principal components analysis’ technique (PCA) is not 
intended for hypothesis testing. Instead, it is designed for building hypothesis, since it 
allows the researcher a lack of a priori model specification in the first instance. 
Therefore, in this first quantitative stage we can enjoy doing without the self-restrictive 
a priori, which are the basis of econometric estimation and hypothesis testing. Instead, a 
statistical software deals with a set of interrelated variables in which everything affects 
everything, and extracts the relevant hidden dimensions. The job of the economic 
historian beyond the statistician is to provide the initial set of variables and be able to 
interpret the results.
In our case, econometric regression analysis will focus on a selection of variables 
arising from a studied combination of both the theoretical and historical survey, and the 
results obtained from the principal component analysis. Alike in the principal 
component analysis, equations in regression analysis are not produced by the software 
programme, but are part of the input; equations are derived from theory. New 
hypotheses are more than likely to appear while processing the data and after 
interpreting the first quantitative results.
Due to the complexity of the calculations with a large dataset, we want to make use of 
computer support. A number of statistical packages have been designed for the practical 
implementation of these techniques. These are able to process the numerical 
calculations as well as producing self-explanatory graphs.
Finally, I would like to add a few words on the numerical representation of the chosen 
variables. Some variables are very easy to represent numerically because they are 
numerical in nature, like income or annual percentage of growth of the economic 
activity. Others are qualitative in nature, which is frequently the case in sociology and 
history. These can be represented by indices (weighted average of a set of defining 
features that can be quantified), for instance institutional quality and social capital; or 
dummy variables (0-1 variables, where a given observation takes the value 0 if a certain 
statement is false and 1 if it is true), such as democracy. We make use of dummy 
variables in order to numerically represent qualitative variables that can be represented 
with a limited number of categories, such as political regime, continent or climate. This 
technical device allows capturing different effects of social capital on economic growth 
depending on climate, for instance. Another example: If we introduce a dummy variable
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indicating ‘wartime’, we will be able to obtain a completely new set of coefficients 
under this circumstance.
1. V.2. WIDENING THE HISTORICAL HORIZON
As far as the historical perspective is concerned, the generalised use of the Penn World 
tables, —constructed initially by Heston and Summers (1991)—, has limited the time 
span of most of the studies to a maximum of forty to fifty years. When we think of a 
long run empirical work, the homogeneity and accessibility of these tables do not 
compensate for the fact that they do not start until the post Second World War period.
The database constructed by Adelman and Morris contains a wide range of socio­
economic variables, with data from the nineteenth century. As this database was 
constructed forty years ago, it is possible to update it with more recently available 
material. The immediate consequence would be more than doubling the conventional 
time span for this type of study. Together with the contemporary studies in social 
capital, we could encompass more than one hundred years of data (with gaps), hence 
achieving a much broader historical perspective.
1. V.3. HOW IS THE NEW PERSPECTIVE ACHIEVED?
The first task will consist of reconstructing and updating the database from Adelman 
and Morris. After digitalising it, the possibility of compiling data that has recently 
become available from posterior historical country studies is considered. The new 
database will allow the generation of a new social index for the nineteenth century and 
testing the theory about the economic impact of social capabilities in a way that has 
never been done. First, we face the question of whether growth trajectories support the 
hypothesis relating economic development to social capabilities in the past. Then, a 
final part of the thesis shows that a social index for the past can be useful in economic 
theory explorations. In fact, the index proves useful in helping to test economic theory 
hypothesis in historical perspective.
It is very important to understand that we are in front of a global project. It is not a case 
study or a few isolated case studies. Case studies are only utilised for the sake of 
argumentation, illustration, and inspiration of the general laws put to the test. As
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Diamond put it, ‘prediction in history, as in other historical sciences, is most feasible on 
large spatial scales and over long times, when the unique features of millions of small- 
scale brief events become averaged out’ (Diamond, 1997: 424). Given the global 
theoretical nature of the hypothesis, this seems more appropriate. The intention of the 
thesis is to provide a cross-country global overview at several time cuts.
This exploration aims at instrumenting the quantification of social arrangements. 
Amongst the interesting conclusions that may arise, could be the finding of new 
historical considerations entering the process. This would partly be accomplished thanks 
to the enlargement of the time period concerned, and partly thanks to the generation of 
new empirical results supporting the theory. Both dimensions potentially lead to the 
discovery of new underlying facts about the way the economy works and has worked in 
the past. The final result is the enlargement of the body of knowledge about 
relationships among variables.
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Chapter 2 
DATABASE
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2 .1. INTRODUCTION
In chapter 1 the objectives of the project and the theory behind it have been outlined. 
The project’s primary data source is the database constructed by Morris and Adelman 
(1988). This chapter describes in detail and revises the data, presenting the new version 
of the database and discussing the amendments made.
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2. II briefly describes the database and 
reviews some suggestions for improvement that have been made in the literature. 
Section 2. Ill gives a detailed account of the variables in the data, their source, and the 
precise construction of any derived variables.
2. II. INTRODUCING THE DATABASE
Morris and Adelman (1988) provide an extensive socio-economic database for a wide 
range of countries for the period 1850 to 1914. This highly valuable database has not 
received the attention it deserves. In this section, we will first give an overview of the 
database (subsection 2.II.1); a second subsection (subsection 2.II.2) discusses some 
specific comments that it provoked.
2. II. 1. OVERVIEW OF THE DATABASE
The basis of the data used for the construction of the Social Development Index for the 
late nineteenth century is a database provided by Adelman and Morris. The extensive 
data appendix accompanying their 1988 book summarises an investigation that lasted 
more than twenty years. It contains cross-sectional data for 23 countries from all 
continents and referring to 35 summary variables. These variables depict the socio­
economic structure of the observed countries between 1850 and 1914. Three sub­
periods are distinguished in the original database: 1850-1870, 1870-1890, and 1890- 
1914. Cross-sectional data are supplied for every sub-period. The variables in levels and 
proportions refer to the initial year of each period, while those capturing change or 
characteristics refer to the whole 20 year period.
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A complete list of variables is as follows:
Economic variables:
level of per capita income 
change in per capita income 
percentage of labour in agriculture 
abundance of agricultural resources 
growth of exports 
shift in structure of export sector 
change in average real wages in industry 
change in average real wages in agriculture 
Technological variables:
development of techniques in industry 
improvement in industrial techniques 
improvement in industrial techniques, lagged 
development of techniques in agriculture 
improvement in agricultural techniques 
improvement in agricultural techniques, lagged 
Transportation variables:
development of inland transportation 
improvement in transportation, lagged 
Demographic variables: 
total population 
population growth, lagged 
net immigration 
Educational variables: 
illiteracy
spread of primary education, lagged 
Land institutional variables:
- predominant form of land tenure 
Concentration of land holdings 
Favourableness of land institutions 
Social variables:
Urbanisation
Attitudes toward entrepreneurship
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Political variables:
Economic role of government 
Character of political leadership 
- National representative institutions 
Political stability 
Foreign economic dependence 
Colonial status 
Market institutional variables:
Development of market institutions 
Spread of market institutions 
Spread of market institutions, lagged
The purpose of the classification above is to facilitate further discussion. The 
classification does not play a role in the calculations of the main index, although this 
classification is used later in the thesis for some sub-group calculations. The 
classification of the authors has been modified: Their “economic” variables are divided 
in this thesis into three categories: transportation, technology, and purely economic; 
while Morris and Adelman (1988) do not make this distinction and place all these three 
under a single category instead. As to scaling, all variables in the Adelman and Morris’ 
database are categorical; every category is represented by a letter ranging from A (top 
category) to I (bottom category) , a set of potentially nine categories. The number of 
categories ranges from 4 to 9, depending on the variable. For more subtle distinctions 
between two categories, occasionally, we find the plus (+) or minus (-) sign added to the 
label; for instance, A+ or B-. A detailed variable-by-variable description is given in 
section III below.
The authors used this database to explore the different patterns of economic 
development amongst sub-groups of countries between the mid-nineteenth century and 
the First World War. A characteristic feature of this database is that, apart from purely 
economic measures, it contains a wide range of political, institutional, and social 
indicators. This feature makes the data particularly suitable for the construction of a 
Social Development Index (SDI).
Apart from containing a wide range of variables that are of interest here, the database 
also contains a wide range of countries including all continents. In particular, both
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relatively rich and relatively poor countries are included, from different geographical 
locations. The inclusion of poor countries is crucial to avoid cross-country regression 
selection bias. Selection bias occurs if subjects (in this case: countries) in the sample 
used in a statistical analysis are special in some characteristics that are unobserved to 
the researcher. As a result, the subjects in the sample are not representative for the 
population under study. An archetypical example of selection bias is the catch-up 
growth study based on OECD statistics. Inclusion of OECD countries alone introduces a 
selection bias. The sample of countries in the Adelman and Morris database is diverse 
enough to believe that there is not a problem of selection bias. It is important to note 
that not all variables for all countries are observed for all years in the period. As a result, 
the set of countries for which complete data are available may well be a non-random 
sample from the original database. Adelman and Morris avoided this potential problem 
by using a wide enough time intervals of 20 years instead of a one-year time periods. 
For the second half of the nineteenth century, constructing a measurement for a period 
of 20 years is feasible for a large set of countries, thus allowing for the inclusion of a 
good number of subjects. The countries they eventually include vary over a range of 
development stages and geographical regions, thereby avoiding selection bias.
The list of countries is as follows:
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Belgium
4 Brazil
12 India
13 Italy
14 Japan
15 Netherlands
5 Burma 16 New Zealand
6 Canada 17 Norway
18 Russia7 China
8 Denmark 19 Spain
20 Sweden9 Egypt
10 France
11 Germany
21 Switzerland
22 United Kingdom 
23 United States
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2. II. 2. POLLARD’S REVIEW ON THE DATABASE
Sidney Pollard published a review of Morris and Adelman (1988), in which he 
describes some potential sources of improvement. This section discusses Pollard’s 
criticisms to Morris and Adelman (1988).
Pollard sympathises with the effort to measure what had always been vague theorisation 
(Pollard, 1988:699), and acknowledges the need to make explicit what development 
theories say implicitly {op. cit.:670). The most valuable contributions of his review are 
suggestions for improvement of the database. We find three of them particularly useful 
for further discussion:
Firstly, the appropriateness of using the country as the geographical unit of measure is 
questioned. Can small countries like Belgium be compared with large countries like 
Russia or China at the same level? Given that industrialisation was more regional than 
national, the optimal geographical unit of measure seems to be the region instead of the 
country, especially for large countries. Taking the country as the unit of study implies 
that regional particularities are compounded into the national average, neglecting 
interesting regional features.
The limitations imposed by taking the country as geographical unit of analysis are 
acknowledged by Morris and Adelman (1988:62) and almost universally present in 
statistical development studies. Although regional differences have been fruitfully 
exploited in many economic historical case studies, regional data is simply not generally 
available for all the variables, countries and periods to be considered in the analysis. 
Also, using the country as geographical unit of analysis allows comparing the results 
with related work that generally uses countries as units.
Secondly, Pollard disagrees with assigning scores to political and organisational 
characteristics, which implies that Adelman and Morris would find some forms of 
organisation better than others. I find ranking to be fundamental for the Adelman and 
Morris’ investigation, because their aim is precisely to explore whether some socio­
political organisations might be more favourable to economic development than others. 
Likewise, ranking political and organisational characteristic is fundamental for this
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investigation as well. Suppressing scores would completely change the nature of the 
investigation. There is no need to impose an a priori hypothesis, as Pollards’ critique 
implies; it is the statistical technique which distinguishes whether those characteristics 
are positively or negatively associated to other variables in the database. Furthermore, 
political indicators have been incorporated to the development literature during the 
1990’s. To sum up, the introduction of qualitative variables into a quantitative study is 
enriching, not impoverishing.
And thirdly, Pollard finds a bias in the choice of variables towards the institutional ones. 
The Adelman and Morris database has a large number of institutional variables, 
compared to other international historical databases like those of Mitchell (2003a, 
2003b, 2003c) or Maddison (2003). I agree with Pollard that in a study that aims at 
exploring patterns of economic development, the inclusion of many institutional 
variables biases the result towards the importance of their role. In this study, conversely, 
the ability to develop institutions is crucial to understand the level of development of 
the society, and, therefore, serves for the purpose of contributing to construct a social 
development index.
As a conclusion to section II, the introduction to the database, one can say that the 
Adelman and Morris database has unique characteristics from which an economist 
looking for social influences in historical perspective can certainly profit. These are: 
The database describes the situation of the economy in the late nineteenth century in 
conjunction with a detailed picture of the institutional framework, and some interesting 
social attitudes in different countries around the world.
2. III. REVISION OF THE DATABASE
This part of the chapter explains in detail the revision of the data, including re- 
codification of the entire database, criteria used in data selection and other data 
transformations, and discussion of some of the more broadly used additional sources. 
The last and longest part is an extensive variable-by-variable description of the data.
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2. III. 1. DIGITALISATION, TEMPORAL DIMENSION AND CODIFICATION
In order to carry out a statistical analysis, it is necessary to digitalise the database. 
Conversations with Irma Adelman revealed that the existing digital versions of the 
database are now lost. Moreover, the disappeared old files were written in now obsolete 
formats. Thus, the task of recovering the database in currently operative digital format is 
essential. The way this task has been done is typing the data into a computer directly 
from the published paperback. Some considerations have been taken into account and 
are explained below.
Regarding periodisation, recall that three sub-periods are distinguished in the original 
database: 1850-1870, 1870-1890, and 1890-1914. Cross-sectional data are supplied for 
every sub-period. The new database creates time cuts at the 4 limiting years, with the 
exception of the last period, which end has been replaced by 1910 for two reasons: First, 
to give homogeneity to the time periods (all of 20 years); and, second, because of 
convenience in data sourcing other than Adelman and Morris. So, the time cuts are 1850, 
1870, 1890, and 1910. When extracting information from this database, it has been 
taken into account that the variables in levels and proportions refer to the initial year of 
each period, while those capturing change or characteristics refer to the whole 20 year 
period. When assigning a value referring to a variable expressing change or a 
characteristic, it refers to the preceding 20 year period.
In addition to the data corresponding to the 4 limiting years defining the three sub­
periods appearing in the final tables of Morris and Adelman (1988), it has been possible 
to add data for an additional year, 1830, for a limited number of variables. The variables 
available for 1830 are those for which the database incorporates a lag referring to the 
preceding 20 year period. These are improvement in industrial techniques, improvement 
in agricultural techniques, improvement in transportation, population growth, spread of 
primary education, and spread of market institutions. Although they have been compiled, 
these are not included in the calculations due to limitations in the number of variables 
available.
The final format of the data in Morris and Adelman (1988) is a list of 35 variables for 
every one of the 23 countries and the 3 sub-periods aforementioned. Every one of these 
variables has an ordinal codification ranging from A to D, A to E, etcetera, until A to I,
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depending on the number of categories of the given variable. The number of categories 
of every variable is arbitrarily assigned in the Adelman and Morris database and 
depends on the degree of possibilities to differentiate between categories, according 
variable-specific characteristics. The number of categories of every variable is 
explained in detail in the list of variables below one-by-one.
It is important to note, though, that, despite the fact that the number of categories has 
been kept the same and varies from variable to variable, the range of variation is now 
the same across all categorical variables in the database. This has been achieved thanks 
to a change in the codification of all variables into a uniform one. Indeed, exploring the 
codification in more detail reveals that Morris and Adelman (1988) initially used a 
numerical scoring scheme from 0 to 100 running parallel to the alphabetical scale, and 
then translated numerical scores into letters in order to make the variables categorical. 
This facilitated the allocation of countries in one category or another. Sometimes, when 
a country was falling in between two categories, pluses or minuses were assigned (A- or 
B+). However, for the purpose of this piece of research there is no need of grouping 
countries into certain categories prior to the statistical analysis. As long as they have an 
ordinal score for every variable that is enough. For this reason, it is feasible to 
recuperate the parallel numerical scale, which runs from 0 to 100 and gives uniformity 
in the range of variation across all variables as well as increases precision and facilitates 
the statistical analysis.
2. III. 2. GENERAL CRITERIA USED TO SELECT, MERGE 
AND TRANSFORM DATA
Incorporating information to the Morris and Adelman (1988) database proceeding from 
other international databases requires setting some homogeneous criteria. We dealt with 
the following difficulties: source selection, changing country boundaries, heterogeneity 
of definitions, and missing data.
The fact that the database is constructed from several sources comes with some 
associated problems. All sources have their weak and strong points. One simply would 
like to select the best variables from each of the databases but it is hazardous to combine 
these data sources. The main criterion for choosing the preferred source is reliability 
(see discussion of sources below). Once chosen, we stick to a single source for each
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variable.
Another important topic is re-labelling of countries and removal or modification of 
some borders, which makes some countries require special attention and care in data 
entry. Fortunately, the main sources of data are intended for long-term historical 
comparisons, so they already supply data on a constant-borders basis (see, for instance, 
Maddison, 2003). In our database, Russia and the United Kingdom have been 
considered a single unit throughout; West and East Germany have been unified into 
Germany throughout. Burma or Myanmar is referred to as Burma throughout.
Another difficulty in data merging is heterogeneity of reporting criteria. The same 
information may be reported in different ways. For instance, the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of a particular country may be presented in per capita terms in one source and in 
levels in another, or it may be expressed in current prices in one source and indexed by 
a constant base-year in another. Another example is the varying definition of external 
trade, which depends on whether goods in transit where reported as trade or not, 
amongst other things. In the literature, Mitchell and Maddison are particularly aware of 
these complications and are careful to state their choices with clarity. We have paid 
special attention to the homogeneity of reporting criteria. Choices are clearly stated in 
each variable’s description.
Finally, some variables are not available for certain countries and/or years; therefore a 
blank is created. Our policy has been making the most out of the data, within reasonable 
limits. In particular, when a data was missing for a given year it has been replaced by 
the one corresponding to the closest year available, unless this year happened to be 
closer to he next reporting year. When an intermediate year is missing in a series that is 
complete or quasi-complete, or which does not show drastic changes, we calculate an 
estimate by interpolation of the preceding and following figures, assuming a constant 
rate of growth. Finally, for the cases where no close alternative year was available or the 
series did not show enough continuity and stability for interpolation no account has 
been reported.
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2. III. 3. ADDITIONAL DATA SOURCES
Information from several additional sources has been incorporated into the database. 
Since the database was published in 1988, a substantial amount of new material has 
appeared. It is worthwhile to describe the main available international historical 
statistics that have been explored for updating this database:
Maddison
Angus Maddison, in his book Monitoring the world economy, 1820-1992, provides a 
broad array of estimates which describe ‘virtually the entire world over the period from 
1820 to 1992’ (Maddison, 1995:15). The dataset includes basic macroeconomic 
variables: population, GDP, trade, government spending, education, transportation, 
employment, working hours, and productivity. An advantage is that ‘the estimates are 
adjusted to eliminate the influence of changes in national boundaries’, which is of 
special interest for long-term studies (Maddison, 1995:17). The president of the OECD 
Development Centre in 1995, Jean Bonvin, tells us in the preface that these data are of 
particular interest for economic historians and growth economists, since they document 
long-term growth trends. This makes this database especially suitable for this project.
Maddison provides some information about the reliability of the data. He reveals that 
‘amongst OECD countries, the weakest long-term GDP estimates are for Greece, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland and Turkey’ (Maddison, 1995:17-18). Of 
these countries, only New Zealand and Switzerland are in our sample. For China, 
Maddison offers a separate case study in Chinese Economic Performance in the Long 
Run. His more recent book, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, initially 
intended as a revision of his earlier work, eventually exceeded the status of revision; it 
includes many more series and goes back much farther in time. We used Maddison’s 
data for the series on per capita GDP and population statistics. We also considered the 
suggestions for improvement of GDP measures given in Leandro Prados (2000), which 
entail a different Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) approach. Eventually we use the 
estimates from Maddison. More on this in the separate section on GDP below.
Finally, The World Economy (Maddison, 2006) brings together the two volumes on the 
world economy: Volume I: A Millennial Perspective and volume 2: Historical Statistics
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(Maddison, 2001 and 2003 respectively).
Bairoch
The book edited by Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer (1981), Disparities in Economic 
Development since the Industrial Revolution provides a limited number of tables of 
comparative statistics illustrating international inequalities in development. The book 
devotes special attention to Third World countries and former colonies for varied 
periods of time, which is a statistical rarity. This is also true for other publications by 
Bairoch, like Diagnostic de VEvolution Economique du Tiers-Monde, 1900-1968 
(English version entitled The Economic Development o f the Third World since 1900).
Bairoch’s data are not completely reliable, as the process of calculation is not 
completely spelled out. In this respect, Maddison’s data can be considered superior. 
Nevertheless, Bairoch computes industrialisation levels for the 1970's and 1980's that 
are not currently available from any other source. Similarly, La Population Active et Sa 
Structure (Bairoch, 1968) continues to be the main source for the labour structure of the 
active population by sectors, as it is shown in Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c; see for 
instance Mitchell, 2003a: 143).
Mitchell
A major source for our economic variables has been the regularly updated International 
Historical Statistics compiled by Brian R. Mitchell. Mitchell gathers a wide range of 
variables referring to population, migration, wages, sectoral production figures, and 
transport and communications, among others, dating back to 1750. The last edition of 
the three volumes, covering respectively Africa, Asia and Oceania, the Americas, and 
Europe, were published in 2003 (Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c).
We have used Mitchell’s statistics for updating most of the economic variables in the 
database. There are three main advantages in using Mitchell as a data source. The first 
advantage is that his statistics are regularly updated, as mentioned above. The second 
advantage is reliability, as official sources were used. Finally, he approaches the data 
collection with the necessary care and precaution. To illustrate the latter, let us cite 
some examples:
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‘Statistics are used nowadays (...) as a major raw material of much economic 
history, especially of economic growth. (...) [T]he subject is by its very nature 
concerned with quantities, (...) though no sensible historian would ever claim 
that statistics can tell the whole story.’ (Mitchell, 1998a: vii).
Mitchell acknowledges that his data were conceived to be an answer to the increasing 
interest in comparative development, and provides long time-series into a comparable 
format. He is very careful not to fall in common pitfalls, like problems of definition. His 
awareness of the problem of ‘the existence of data which seem to relate to the same 
things in different countries or at different times, but which do not in fact do so’ is 
illustrated in the next examples {ibid.):
‘[I]n some times and places exports include bullion, in others they do not. Pig 
iron can include or exclude ferro-alloys; bank deposits may include those of 
other banks or they may not; com output can be measured by volume or by 
weight; and so on’ {ibid.).
Thus, Mitchell shows awareness of heterogeneity of definition problems across space 
and time, while promising to warn us when these occur. He is equally aware of possible 
understatement or overstatement of some statistics, due to some perverse incentives not 
to reveal the information truthfully, as in the cases of ‘registration of one’s true age if 
one was a young man liable to military service, and the smuggling of dutiable 
imports’(o/7. cit.:viii). Mitchell claims that, in general, statistics become more reliable at 
the end of the nineteenth century, when some countries began collecting statistics for its 
own sake, not with any direct fiscal or military aim. The first century of Mitchell’s data, 
corresponding to 1750-1850 should hence be considered less reliable, but falls outside 
our period of study. For our period of study (1850-2000), in general, we consider 
Mitchell’s data reliable and up to date, and we have relied heavily on them for the 
reconstruction of many economic indicators.
3. III. 4. VARIABLES
A discussion of all variables in the database follows, detailing how they were 
constructed as well as describing the changes we incorporated, if any. In order to 
facilitate comparison with Morris and Adelman (1988), the classification of the
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variables used in this section corresponds to the one used in their data appendix (see in 
Morris and Adelman, 1988:223-5).
Economic influences
Many of the variables are under the title “economic influences”, thought they do not
refer to purely economic aspects, but also to technology adoption and improvements in
transportation. A list of all the economic-related variables in the database follows:
Level of per capita income
Rate of change in per capita income
Percentage of labour in agriculture
Rate of growth of exports
Degree of shift in structure of export sector
Change in average real wages in industry
Change in average real wages in agricultural poor
- Development of techniques in industry 
Rate of improvement in industrial techniques
Rate of improvement in industrial techniques, lagged
- Development of techniques in agriculture 
Improvement in agricultural techniques 
Improvement in agricultural techniques, lagged 
Relative abundance of agricultural resources 
Development of inland transportation
- Rate of improvement in inland transportation, lagged
We will discuss them in subgroups.
INCOME VARIABLES
Within the economic variables, we have a subset referring exclusively to income. These 
are:
Level of per capita income
- Rate of change in per capita income
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Per Capita GDP (Level o f  Per Capita Income)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the variable that we will discuss most extensively, 
since it has received a vast amount of attention in the literature ever since Adelman and 
Morris constructed their database circa the 1970s.
When Adelman and Morris built their database during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, per 
capita income point estimates would still not be well established for many countries. 
Income variables were ‘substantially changed’ over the period between the publication 
of their first papers until the publication of their book in 1988, due to new investigations 
in per capita income being published (Morris and Adelman, 1988:225). A lack of 
consensus on how to deal with the problematic issues arising from the calculation of 
income, led them to use per capita income brackets instead of point estimates. They 
made sure that their final income variable was less sensitive to variations simply by 
taking broad enough income brackets (six in total). Their main sources were Bairoch 
(1976), Maddison (1979), and Mulhall’s Dictionary o f Statistics (1899). For the 
countries absent in these publications (Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Canada, China, Egypt, 
India, and New Zealand) they relied on comparisons of country studies.
Nowadays, point estimates are available for all countries in the sample and much has 
been published on how to calculate and re-calculate them. Though the debate is still 
alive, point estimates are no longer the exception but the norm in both cross-country and 
inter-temporal comparisons. Therefore, although the Adelman and Morris’ classification 
is valid and informative, there is an argument for replacing it by more precise per capita 
GDP point estimates. Various alternatives are available; each of them having associated 
advantages and caveats. Maddison’s is possibly the most well- established series on 
international historical per capita GDP estimates. He considers all sources and 
measurement alternatives available, and discusses them carefully. The variable that we 
use is based on Maddison (2003). In order to further defend this choice, an exploration 
of the alternatives follows.
GDP is the most broadly used amongst the income/produce indicators. Most economic 
databases contain GDP, and it has been progressively adopted as the reference indicator 
of economic activity amongst economists and economic historians. Surprisingly, even 
its closest relative, Gross National Product (GNP), is way far less used nowadays. GDP
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accounts for the output produced within a given country, whereas GNP refers to 
produce by nationals, not necessarily within the borders. There is no reason to break the 
tacit consensus, and so GDP is the income indicator we use here as well.
GDP, however, may not always be available, or be only available with considerable 
measurement error. In this case, Jeffrey Williamson proposes to account for economic 
activity from the income side. He suggests that examining wages and relative factor 
prices may give a better idea of economic activity than GDP series in that case. 
Williamson’s data appendices provide series for different regions of the world: The 
Mediterranean, Asia and Latin America (Williamson, 1999, 2000a, and 2000b).
Given that Maddison provides us with GDP series for a wide range of countries and 
years, the only reason for replacing it by Williamson's income based approximations is 
that GDP in Maddison's would be severely misestimated. Actually, even if there would 
be some degree of measurement error, there is no a priori need to replace it by another 
variable that is also an approximation. As Williamson points out, wage series can serve 
as a replacement for GDP when the latter is not available or strongly unreliable, no 
matter how respectable his series may be.
Moreover, there is an inconvenience in using Williamson’s series for the database we 
are re-constructing here. The use of wages in the calculation of income (and, therefore, 
the rate of change of income) may complicate the joint statistical analysis with other 
variables already in the database, namely the rate of change of wages in agriculture and 
in industry respectively. For instance, any regression analysis that explains a certain 
variable with all the above mentioned wage measures included as conditioning 
variables, would suffer from large standard errors of the estimates of the parameters due 
to multicollinearity1. Also, inclusion of all the above mentioned wage variables in a 
principal components analysis would fail to generate substantially separated income- 
based dimension due to the strong correlation of this variable with the other two wage 
variables. This is another reason to prefer here the production approach to GDP.
1 Multicolineary problems appear when we include into a regression two or more variables that are highly 
or perfectly correlated with each other. They are, in essence, the same variable; hence their effect on the 
dependent variable cannot be separately identified.
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Now that we have discussed our preference for GDP and, in particular, its production 
approach, it is necessary to deal with a series of problems that emerge when comparing 
GDP measures across different countries and time periods, in particular those related to 
purchasing power parity (PPP) and exchange rate adjustment.
First, we need to make the distinction between nominal and real GDP. Nominal GDP 
accounts for the total value added in a country during a given year, evaluated at current 
prices. Since prices change from one year to another, as a measure of production, 
nominal GDP in one year cannot be compared to nominal GDP in another year without 
first transforming the two of them into a common price set. Real GDP has been devised 
in order to allow for comparisons of output over time, by means of evaluating 
production at a constant price level corresponding to an arbitrary year. Note that the 
values taken by real GDP depend on the choice of the base year. It is necessary to use 
real GDP, as opposed to nominal, in order to enable comparisons across time.
The invaluable advantage of having series that are comparable over time comes at a cost. 
Relative prices of goods and services within an economy vary over time. By using very 
distant PPPs, in particular those of 1990 as in Maddison (2003), for conversions to 
comparable real GDP in the nineteenth century, we are implicitly assuming that relative 
prices of goods and services in say 1890 are the same as those in 1990. Leandro Prados 
comments: ‘Unfortunately, by accepting a distant PPP as the point of reference, the 
procedure, as pioneered by Bairoch (1976) and Maddison (1982), introduces distortions 
and ambiguities in inter-temporal comparisons’, since the composition of production, 
consumption and relative prices all vary as growth occurs (Prados de la Escosura, 
2000:3-4). The problem is that even if we evaluate production at a constant price set in 
order to facilitate inter-temporal comparisons, the resulting real GDP might not give us 
straightforward indication of the standard of living at a given point in time. This is due 
to the fact that relative prices change over time. For instance, owning a horse in the 
nineteenth century does not mean the same as owning a horse nowadays, since a horse 
in the nineteenth century was much more valuable in relative terms than it is today. In 
the same way, owning a very basic radio set does not have the same relative price in 
comparison to other goods and services as it had several decades ago. The whole set of 
ratios of prices of one good to another has changed. Thus, evaluating output at a fixed 
set of prices can lead to misleading interpretations of the standard of living.
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This is a complicated topic to handle, where correcting one bias normally implies 
introducing another. Biases are an especially delicate issue in comparative studies, since 
they can lead to changes in the relative position of income of the different countries.
Chained price indices avoid the problem of setting a constant price level corresponding 
to an arbitrary base year. A new methodology was devised by Summers and Heston 
(1988) in order to avoid changing both levels and growth rates of all past and present 
real GDP every time the base year was updated. The maxima for the chained system 
would be: Write history just once! The rate of change of real GDP between two 
consecutive years is calculated by taking as common price level the average price level 
of the two years. Then, the resulting rate of growth is reflecting the real change in 
production. A time series for real GDP is constructed by “chaining” the resulting real 
rates of growth. This methodology was adopted by the United States governmental 
economic reports in 1995, and it has been used ever since. It is more complicated to 
compute than the indices used before 1995, but the GDP series are more stable.
To deal with the associated complexities of the calculation of the chain price index, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) introduced a ‘dollar-denominated real output 
series that are based on (...) the new indexes but that have the computational simplicity 
of constant-dollar series’ (Landefeld and Parker, 1997). Indeed, ‘[t]hese annual changes 
are "chained" (multiplied) together to form a time series that allows for the effects of 
changes in relative prices and in the composition of output over time’ {ibid.). The rates 
of real growth are correct, but we need to establish a base year in any case, from which 
to start multiplying growth back and forth. For this matter, the BEA introduced "chained 
1992 dollars". ‘[T]hey work well for periods close to the 1992 base year, but they may 
produce increasingly misleading results as one moves away from that year’ {ibid.). 
Thus, in the end, the need for a reference year when calculating GDP levels from the 
derived growth rates implies that biases cannot be completely avoided, and are worse as 
we move further back in time.
The source we use, Maddison (2003), incorporates the chained price index for recent 
United States data, as provided by the official accounts, and brings this methodology 
back to 1950. He does not bring it further back in time because doing so would imply 
such big drift from traditional history-especially for the interwar period- that he prefers 
to be conservative for the moment and maintain the fixed price index for years previous
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to 1950. Moreover, no other country but the United States has provided chained GDP 
for long periods in the past (Maddison, 2003:80).
Rate o f Change in Per Capita Income
In the same way six income brackets referred to the level of per capita income (see Per 
Capita Income), Adelman and Morris derived five different categories of change in per 
capita income, sorted by average annual rate of growth during a given 20 (or 20+) years 
period, i. e. estimated average rate of growth 1850-70, estimated average rate of growth 
1870-1890, and idem for 1890-1914. These categories range from ‘probably over 2 
percent average annual’ to ‘decline in per capita income’ (see table A3 in Morris and 
Adelman, 1988:252-3).
Growth estimates are based on fragmentary data. They use several different 
bibliographical sources for every country, and the placement of countries in the 
corresponding growth categories are based on a combination and contrasting of 
different primary (and some secondary) sources such as: GDP, GNP, GNP growth, 
value added by sectors and by productive enterprises, agricultural yields, movements in 
gross sectorial output, quantitative exports, growth of exports, indices of purchasing 
power of exports, the percentage of a particular good (cotton for Egypt) in the total 
sectorial production and in the total of exports, volume of foreign trade, output of the 
railway system, tax yields, population, employment, wages, market prices, labour 
inputs, energy inputs, growth of population involved in manufacturing, and qualitative 
information. They prove to be well-informed, and they have a good overview picture. 
Of course, to some extent, they had to make -and accept from sources- some 
assumptions about the basic structure of the economy, like, for instance, relative 
productivity levels across sectors or the rate of growth of population. Assumptions tend 
to be supported by qualitative information.
It stands clear from the previous discussion in Per Capita Income that a great deal of 
preciseness can be gained from using the new income variable discussed above for the 
calculation of average rates of growth. Again, we move from broad categorisation to 
point estimates.
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THE INDUSTRIALISATION VARIABLES
Within the economic variables, we have a subset of variables referring exclusively to 
industrialisation. These are:
Development of techniques in industry
- Rate of improvement in industrial techniques
- Rate of improvement in industrial techniques, lagged
Level o f Development o f  Techniques in Industry
Adelman and Morris account for the ‘replacement of preindustrial methods by 
mechanized methods’ with this variable (Morris and Adelman, 1988:97). Their sources 
are descriptive materials, such as: 
employment in factories 
average size of factories by employees 
output per worker
- value of output by factory 
horsepower per worker
- horsepower per enterprise
average horsepower in manufacturing 
size distribution of horsepower by enterprise
- relative importance of manufacturing 
concentration of factories 
distribution of enterprises by size
In order to facilitate cross-country comparisons they concentrated on consumer goods 
and machinery production only. Countries at a given year were allocated to one of seven 
ranking categories, starting with countries with mechanised textile spinning and 
weaving, consumer goods’ factory production, and machinery industry with 
interchangeable parts for the most technologically advanced. At the bottom end of the 
classification we find countries with no factories with inanimate power. Therefore, the 
classification of countries is based on the modes of production.
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Rate o f Improvement in Techniques in Industry
How fast is technology assimilated? The speed of adoption of new technologies may 
depend on several things. It is a matter of capabilities, adequacy, and starting level.
For the Social Development Index, we are interested in the capability element. There is 
an element of capability, in the sense that a society may be more ready than another to 
welcome new productive ideas and applications. Recall here the early patent laws of the 
United States, ahead of its time.
As far as adequacy is concerned, how adequate a certain production technique is to the 
environment and relative input ratios has nothing to do with capabilities. There are 
examples of slow technology adoption due to non-adequacy to the environment. For 
instance, the adoption of the plough in certain parts of Africa was retarded by the non­
suitability to the soil, plot features, and required animals.
Finally, other nations rather than England could also have started a productive 
revolution (not necessarily based on textile industry and the use of the steam engine), 
with machines and/or production modes adapted to its own environment. The argument 
is that many underdeveloped countries were rich in natural resources.
So, we shall assume that slow technology adoption is rooted at least partially in 
capabilities of the society. This is not to say that the geographical aspect is completely 
neutral. Another variable in the database, -namely the abundance of land (or land/labour 
ratio)-, is capturing (though imperfectly) the initial endowment of natural resources.
A much less neutral aspect is the starting point of technology. A country is likely to 
incorporate new techniques faster, the least is the initial level of technology, since the 
difference between the actual level and the potential level of the leader creates a gap for 
catching-up. Indeed, industrial techniques were incorporated faster in Germany or the 
United States than in the United Kingdom, especially at the end of the nineteenth 
century, thanks to the existence of a catching-up gap. So, the United Kingdom should be 
given more credit for adoption of new techniques in industry for breaking ground. This 
is done by taking into account the initial level of development of techniques in industry
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at the beginning of every 20 year period (see previous variable), which gives more 
relevance to countries that worked with the new production techniques first, i. e. the 
United Kingdom. Adelman and Morris already took into account the catching-up effect 
in the technological growth variable by ranking lower countries that started from a 
narrower base.
Their rate of improvement of techniques in industry ‘measures the rate of expansion of 
mechanised industry using inanimate power’, as explained by Morris and Adelman 
(1988:98). Countries where classified in seven categories, the best one being 
substantially industrialised countries (above 25 percent of industrial output) with an 
annual rate of growth of industrial output above 3 percent, of which most was factory 
production. Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States qualified for 
this category in one or more periods. Countries at the bottom of the classification only 
experienced hand-manufactures or artisan industry growth, if any at all. Argentina, 
Brazil, Burma, India, and New Zealand around mid-nineteenth century fall into this 
category. Information on which to base their classification was based in numerous 
sources and varies for every country.
Rate o f Improvement in Techniques in Industry, lagged
Adelman and Morris also considered a lagged version of the same variable for their 
comparative development purposes. This has not been incorporated into our analysis 
because of a lack of reasons to include it, especially given that the contemporaneous 
levels are already included in the database. Nevertheless, the information in this variable 
has been helpful to the extent that we have used the data corresponding to the period 
1830-1850 to further document the rate of improvement of techniques in industry.
THE AGRICULTURAL VARIABLES
This set of variables encompasses the level and rate of improvement of agricultural 
techniques. However, the focus is not only techniques, as in the case of industry. The 
agricultural variables are:
- Level of development of techniques in agriculture
- Rate of improvement in techniques in agriculture 
Percentage of the labour force in agriculture
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Relative abundance of agricultural resources
Level o f  Development o f  Techniques in Agriculture
The “level of development of techniques in agriculture” is a four-dimensional variable 
which captures the extent to which modem agricultural techniques were (or not) used. 
These techniques are:
Horse-drawn iron or steel machines 
Improved crop rotations 
Irrigation 
Fertilisers
All these techniques increase productivity, but some more than others. Adelman and 
Morris assigned different weight to each of them according to the probable contribution 
to productivity. They explain the ranking of importance in great detail. Some fragments 
follow:
‘Greatest importance was given to the adoption of labor-saving machinery. We 
concentrated on machinery used in harvesting since harvesting was usually the 
major production bottleneck. Improved iron and steel plows were weighted next 
most heavily (...). Next in importance were crop rotations, seed selection, 
irrigation systems, and fertilizers [apparently, all equally valued] (...). Weighted 
third most heavily was the spread of crop diversification and mixed animal-crop 
farming (...). The final type of improvement, the use of animal farming of 
enclosure, stock breeding, and supplementary feeding, was given significant 
weight in ranking countries where pastoral farming was very important’ (Morris 
and Adelman, 1988:226-7).
This detailed ranking of importance, paired with the information that existing literature 
revealed about whether a certain technique was or not utilised, give rise once more to a 
seven-folded categorisation. There is not evidence of them assigning specific figures as 
weights. It seems that they just had in mind the described ranking of importance when 
assigning a given country-year observation to a certain category. Therefore, it is 
difficult to contradict them, and also to reproduce their carefully studied decisions. They 
relied strongly, if not exclusively, in specific country literature. Once they finished their 
categorisation, they double-checked their results the previous comparative studies by
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Mulhall (1899), and Clark (1957). Thus, the Morris and Adelman (1988) classification 
for the level of development of techniques in agriculture is very careful and quite 
reliable.
Rate o f Improvement in Techniques in Agriculture
The rate of improvement of agricultural techniques is a variable with six categories, 
ranging from fast adoption of labour-saving machinery that significantly raised 
productivity to negligible improvements in a 20 years period. This variable is based on 
the rate of change of the variable above (level of development of techniques in 
agriculture).
Percentage o f the Labour Force in Agriculture
The original variable for the percentage of labour force in agriculture in Morris and 
Adelman (1988) has various problems. On the first place, they were dealing with 
estimates or guesstimates in most cases; ‘few are based on properly constructed census 
data’ (Morris and Adelman, 1988:227). Secondly, there was not a homogeneous 
definition of active population across countries. So, the authors present a table of 
estimates of labour force in agriculture which they did not use in the analysis, since it 
was heterogeneous and incomplete. Again, Adelman and Morris show common sense in 
not wanting to force point estimates when the quality of the data did not allow for it. 
Instead, as in per capita income, they used percentiles, i. e. percentage of agricultural 
labour force’ brackets. These brackets are:
More than 70 percent of the labour force engaged in agriculture,
61-70 percent,
51-60 percent,
41-50 percent,
31-40 percent,
21-30 percent, and 
20 percent or less of the labour force engaged in agriculture, 
giving rise to one category each. They used various sources; Clark (1957), Bairoch 
(1968), and Cipolla (1974) are widely referred to.
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Since Adelman and Morris constructed their database, there is enough new material to 
allow for a full update of this variable. The most recent series of international historical 
statistics by Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) gather point estimates of the 
percentage of economically active population in the primary sector of the economy 
(agriculture, forestry, and fishing) starting in the mid-nineteenth century until nowadays 
for many countries all over the world, including the countries in our sample. These stem 
as far as possible from official censuses and are harmonised to a greater extent than 
those available at the time Adelman and Morris constructed their database. It is worth 
noting that Mitchell’s statistics until the 1960s are mainly based on Bairoch (also 
consulted by Adelman and Morris), and he puts through the same complaints as 
Adelman and Morris about the series: multiple nomenclatures and lack of clear 
separability between agricultural and industrial working class for early periods. 
However, Mitchell emphasises that Bairoch and his team ‘made every possible effort to 
achieve international and intertemporal comparability’ (Mitchell, 2003c: 143). 
Moreover, Mitchell says, ‘the degree of precision has improved over the last forty 
years’ {ibid.). The biggest advantage of using Mitchell’s statistics instead is that they 
should bring, in principle, much more preciseness to the variable. Categories have been 
removed and replaced by point estimates.
Methodologically, Mitchell does not provide percentage data but totals in thousands of 
people. The percentage of active population working in the primary sector has been 
calculated by adding up all sectors and then calculating the proportion corresponding to 
the primary sector. In some cases, male and female data are available separately; these 
have been aggregated. For those years where Mitchell provides no data, the closest data 
point has been assigned instead, unless it is closer to the next period, in which case this 
source is not used. For those cases where Mitchell’s data was not available, the old 
Adelman and Morris point estimate has been used, including those for 1914, which they 
made available but were not included in the final tables for further study.
Analysing the result, few additions have been made, mainly modifications of existing 
data. Furthermore, for most of the countries, statistics remain practically the same. The 
resemblance between the data provided in the original tables in Morris and Adelman 
(1988) and Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) is remarkable. So, in this case, updating the 
information available for this variable was more a ratification than a radical change in 
numbers. This fact adds reliability to the original data.
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The resemblance in figures is due to the fact that both Mitchell, on the one hand, and 
Adelman and Morris, take the data from the same source: Bairoch (see for instance 
Mitchell 2003a: 143 for reference to Bairoch, 1968). In some cases the new data reflect a 
more advance stage of de-agriculturisation than the old data do. However, these small 
agricultural labour percentages go down and again up in the new data calculated from 
Mitchell, which is highly implausible. This may be due to the fact that some of the 
labour force percentages for some of the sectors are absent in Mitchell’s tables due to 
the lack of information rather than due to the narrow working force. For this reason, the 
old Adelman and Morris agricultural labour proportions seem more plausible. Thus, the 
point estimates taken from Adelman and Morris are preferred. Their unused tables 
showing point estimates substitute the bracket-estimates in the new variable.
Relative Abundance o f  Agricultural Resources
Many africanists refer to the land/labour ratio in their discussions about economic 
development. The same is true for economic historians referring to the success story of 
the United States and other resource-rich economies. In both cases, they point out how 
relevant the relative abundance of land is. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in the 
first case, it is used to explain failure while in the second case is to explain success. 
Which one is correct, then? In some cases, abundance of agricultural resources has 
turned countries into resource-exploited colonies, whereas in others it brought 
prosperity to their inhabitants. Which one occurred was in many cases a matter of 
politics and institutions, which we will deal with other variables. The relevant point here 
is that the abundance of resources matters.
Adelman and Morris produced five categories for the abundance of agricultural 
resources. With this variable, they intended to capture the relative abundance of 
farmland with respect to the size of the population. We did not use their categorisation, 
but rather the exact figures of the ratio of population to farmland that they provide, 
measured in population per square kilometre of standard farmland. The data are 
adjusted for quality of land. Units of “standard farm land” were defined by Colin Clark 
(1957) as units of land in the principal temperate or subtropical climate farming regions 
of the world. Then, land in other regions is weighted according to climate characteristics, 
in accordance with the potential of agricultural productivity (see Clark, 1957:305ff).
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Data on farmland correspond to the 1930s, being the climatic classification of the Earth 
that of Thomthwaite (1933). Farmland is assumed to be constant throughout the period, 
while population is adjusted.
THE TRANSPORTATION VARIABLES
Two variables in the database:
Level of development of inland transportation 
Rate of improvement in inland transportation, lagged
Level o f  Development o f Inland Transportation
This variable captures long and short distance established transportation networks. It 
represents the ease of mobility of people, which is essential to facilitate communication, 
connections, links of all sorts. The main sources are country studies. The sources used 
most across countries are Clapham (1936), Clough and Cole (1946), and Girard (1965). 
Adelman and Morris contrasted their classification of countries based on descriptive 
information with statistics in order to make sure they coincided. They emphasise that 
they carried substantial additional research in almost all countries in order to revise the 
classifications.
All the information compiled was then utilised in order to classify countries according 
to three criteria, by order of importance:
long-distance transportation between large urban centers 
interregional networks
all-weather feeder transportation within agricultural regions 
Provided transportation networks existed within each one of these criteria, they also 
examined the means of transportation, giving more importance to railways than to 
waterways, and more importance to waterways than to roads. Within roads, they gave 
more relevance to those suitable for carts or carriages than those only suitable for pack 
animals. Five categories arise from this classification. They can be succinctly 
summarised as follows, from best to worst:
Countries where the major urban centers and ports were linked by railways, all- 
weather roads and improved waterways. The agricultural sector was well served. 
Railways were less important than in the first category.
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Some populated area of the country was not served by the transportation system, 
roads for agricultural goods less well maintained, and institutional maintenance 
was not secured.
In addition to the previous category, railways did not provide links for internal 
trade.
In the last category, most of the populated areas were not well served, and the 
main transportation system were pack animals.
The alternative to Adelman and Morris is to account for specific amounts of laid railway 
lines, or transported passengers, instead of assigning degrees of ease of mobility. 
Instead of assigning every country and year to one of five categories, as Morris and 
Adelman (1988) did, there is also scope for assigning a precise numerical value linked 
to specific transportation dimensions. Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) presents a 
collection of seven transportation related indicators such as length of railway lines, or 
number of ships registered, which offer the possibility of assigning a figure instead of a 
belonging to a category. The transportation variables available from Mitchell are:
- Length of railway line open 
Freight traffic on railways 
Passenger traffic on railways
- Merchant ships registered
Inland navigation traffic (only available for Europe and North America).
Motor vehicles in use
Commercial aviation for Europe, and civil aviation traffic for the rest of the 
World.
The reporting of most of these variables starts before 1850; (we needed some statistics 
back from 1830 for the calculation of the variable below ‘rate of improvement in use of 
transportation’ -see ‘rate of improvement in inland transportation, lagged’). We exclude 
inland navigation traffic because data are only available for Europe and North America. 
So, water transportation is represented by the registered number of ships only. All the 
indicators would need to be in comparable units of measure so that they could be put 
side-by-side. The units of measure are kilometres for the length of railways, both 
millions of passengers and millions of passenger kilometres by rail, total number of 
merchant ships registered (all: sail, steam, and motor), thousands of motor vehicles in 
use (both private vehicles and commercial vehicles), and millions of passenger 
kilometres in aviation. It is a complicated task to confer homogeneity to a single
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indicator derived from all these different numerical scales. Of course, the number of 
motor vehicles, and specially aviation traffic start only well into the twentieth century. 
The indicator of motor vehicles in use is incorporated de facto in the 1914 cross-section, 
while the aviation indicator can only be incorporated from the 1929 cross-section 
onwards, which lays outside the period under study.
In this case, the categories devised by Adelman and Morris provide a more complete 
evaluation of the inland transportation possibilities. So there is no need to restrict 
ourselves to one or several punctual measures referring to a specific transportation 
system.
Rate o f Improvement in Inland Transportation, lagged
The original variable for the rate of improvement in inland transportation is a six- 
categories ranking classification for “breakthroughs” in the level of development of 
transportation systems. A breakthrough occurs when there is a drastic drop in the cost of 
travel. This happened, for instance, with the arrival of the railway, or the emergence of 
mass transatlantic shipments. Sources are different for every country, but the most 
important ones are Clough and Cole (1946), Mitchell (1973), and Girard (1965); these 
sources were revised and double-checked by Morris and Adelman (1988).
THE EXPORT VARIABLES
Morris and Adelman (1988) provide us with two variables referring to international 
trade; i.e., how much movement of goods and services there is with other countries. We 
are interested in two aspects:
- Rate of growth of total real exports 
Shift in structure of export sector
Rate o f Growth o f  Total Real Exports
The rate of growth of real exports in the original database captures the degree of 
incorporation of national products into an internationalised economy. Adelman and 
Morris provide several tables summarising their findings on the probable average rates 
of growth of real exports and exports in current prices for the 23 countries in the sample
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during varying intervals of time. These tables are worth appraisal, especially given the 
difficulties and uncertainties in calculation.
Difficulties in calculation arose principally from the uncertainty of price levels. 
Heterogeneity in the quality of price data affects the quality of the variable real exports 
via the adjustment of current values. In addition, there were some differences in the 
definition of exports. Definitional differences came from whether goods only partially 
produced in the country were included or not, and whether goods only in transit to 
another final destination were included or not2. As a result, the estimates would suffer 
from inconsistencies. For these reason, only four categories would be established. The 
classification is as follows, by order of probable average annual rate of growth of real 
exports during a given 20 year period:
over 4%, departing from a moderate or large base 
over 4%, departing from a very small base 
between 2% and 4% 
less than 2 %
As we can read from the categorisation, they took into account the departure point of a 
country, giving more relevance to growth once the country would already be established 
as an international exporter.
On top of the problems of calculation described, we encounter a major conceptual 
disadvantage in using the original Adelman and Morris’ rate of growth of exports. This 
is the fact that their indicator refers just to one side of external trade, i.e. exports; but 
does not account at all for the other side of external trade, namely imports. The way to 
solve these problems is taking an aggregate external trade indicator which accounts for 
both imports and exports, and is the least dependent possible on price levels.
Mitchell provides data on the current value of the aggregate external trade for every 
country. He also focuses on “special” trade only; this is, excluding goods that are in the 
country only in transit to another country. Differences in the definition of “special”
2 On the one hand, “special” trade refers only to goods that are either for internal use -in  the case of 
imports-, or produced, at least to some extent, within the country -in  the case o f exports-. On the other 
hand, “general” trade includes all the goods entering and leaving the country. Adelman and Morris 
wanted to focus on “special” exports, but this was not always possible due to variations in the definition 
o f exports.
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trade remain, but Mitchell does not seem as concerned about it as Adelman and Morris 
did. He argues that these sources of variation are unlikely to be of ‘great significance’ 
(Mitchell, 2003c:569). Instead, he shows a greater concern with the inability to capture 
smuggling, especially until mid-nineteenth century, where there was a generalised 
movement towards free trade. Therefore, the period of greatest concern is not affecting 
our sample. In Mitchell’s words: ‘By the time tariffs were once again raised, policing 
was much more effective than it had been earlier’ {ibid.). Mitchell considers his series 
reasonably accurate from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. His figures are 
expressed in millions of local currencies; for instance, the current value of aggregate 
external trade of the Netherlands in expressed in millions of gulden, etc.
One advantage of using Mitchell’s series is that both sides of international trade, 
imports and exports, are reported. So, there is the possibility of including both imports 
and exports in a joint measure for international movement of goods and services. 
Potentially, this could improve the reliability of the variable, enriching the 
meaningfulness (up to which extent a country at a particular moment in time is 
integrated into the global economy is reflected by both imports and exports). However, 
Mitchell’s data are expressed in current prices, and do require to be weighted by current 
GDP in order to achieve a comparable measure. This is, in principle, the idea of such an 
index; but current GDP series are far less complete than desirable. So, unfortunately, 
using Mitchell’s series on current GDP would create too many blanks to be operative. 
On the other hand, Maddison provides historical series for the value of exports at 
constant and comparable prices (million 1990 dollars) from 1820 (Maddison, 2006:360). 
The drawback is that only selected years are available. This can be solved, however, by 
interpolating. A constant annual rate of growth has been applied. Thus, Maddison’s 
constant prices per capita GDP, as appears in the variable INCOME, has been used 
instead, together with Maddison’s series for the value of aggregate exports.
If we divide the aggregate exports by GDP, we will get a measure of exports relative to 
GDP which is as least dependent on the level of prices as possible. The main advantage 
of using the new indicator is that dividing the value of exports by GDP makes it 
independent of price levels or changes in prices. Constant GDP series have been 
extracted from the same source for consistency. It is necessary to say though, that the 
new trade indicator has still some degree of dependence on price variations. Some 
inaccuracy in this measure could arise from the price structure of internationally traded
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goods with respect to non-traded ones. This potential source of inaccuracy has not been 
corrected. In other words, we assumed that the deflator of traded goods and that of 
locally produced goods are the same.
Shift in Structure o f Export Sector
During the second half of the nineteenth century (and thereafter), there was a change in 
the structure of demand from primary to manufactured goods. The “shift in the structure 
of export sector” measures the responsiveness of national producers to this change in 
the structure of demand. With the information available from specific country sources, 
Adelman and Morris classified countries at a given period under one of these four 
categories:
- Very strong shift in the structure of the export sector (above 10 percent change) 
Moderate shift (between 5 and 10 percent change)
Slight shift (between 2 and 5 percent change)
Negligible or no shift (less than 2 percent change)
These are mainly but not exclusively based on statistical data about the structure of 
exports at the beginning of each period, i.e. 1850, 1870, and 1890. When data were not 
satisfactory, descriptive sources were used. The breaking points between categories 
seem to be arbitrary.
The shift in the structure of the export sector accounts for how fast every country was 
able to adopt the patterns of modernisation in the exports’ structure.
THE WAGE VARIABLES
For the application concerning this project, namely finding differentials in social 
capabilities, real wage levels are satisfactory enough to provide us with a comparison of 
living standards across countries and time, beyond GDP. On the one hand, a completely 
new variable has been incorporated into the database, making use of recent literature, 
namely a real wage index. On the other hand, the wage variables in the original 
Adelman and Morris database have been kept since they do not make reference to wage 
levels; they focus on the movement of wages instead. Apparently, whether real wages 
were going upwards or downwards gave them more an indication of economic 
development than the level itself. Nevertheless, they provide no justification for this
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decision in their 1988 book, although it might be due to the difficulty to harmonise real 
wage levels across borders. Interestingly enough, they made the distinction between 
industrial and agricultural wages. The two wage variables in the original database are 
the following:
Direction of change in average real wages in industry
Direction of change in average real wages or income of employed agricultural
poor
These two variables give an indication of how fast was purchasing power climbing. So, 
we may want to preserve them in the data analysis, because they give an idea of the 
differentiated evolution of wages in industry and agriculture, which is still difficult to 
substitute by nowadays historical statistics.
Real Wages
This is a new variable. Jeffrey Williamson did an excellent work in the compilation of 
real wages for Third World countries across the world, for the period 1820-1940 
(Williamson, 1999, 2000a, and 2000b). The nominal wages are weighted by the Cost of 
Living Index, accessible from the same source. The data appendices are frequently 
revised and are available on-line at Williamson’s webpage. The latest available version 
of Williamson’s wages has been reported, for those case where it is available. This 
source has, however, two limitations: Firstly, a good part of the countries in our sample 
are not included in the study. Secondly, the wages are not separated by sectors, so we 
would have to make assumptions about the peasant/manufacturer ratio if we want two 
separated wage series for industrial workers and agricultural labourers. A new variable 
“wages” reports the average wage in that country at that point in time, regardless of in 
which sector it has been originated. This is why we may want to maintain as well the 
Adelman and Morris wage related variables, because they are an indicator of 
differentiated evolution in industrial and agricultural wages. Actually, Mitchell’s data 
on wages, which -although not available for all countries- have also the advantage of 
differentiating between agricultural and industrial wages (Mitchell 2003a, 2003b, and 
2003c). Unfortunately, one cannot re-construct sector-separated wage series for many 
countries in the sample. This is why up-to-date sector-separated wages by Mitchell are 
compiled in the new database, but not used for data analysis directly. An index on the 
level of real wages country by country a la Williamson has been used in the calculations. 
Still, Mitchell’s wage series have come to be very helpful in complementing the real
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wage series available from Williamson. Because Williamson’s wages are available for a 
reduced number of countries only, for most of the countries, wage estimates have been 
derived from Mitchell’s wages by sector, taking into account the percentage of workers 
in every sector. Since these are money wages, they have to be converted into real wages. 
For this purpose, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the same source (Mitchell 2003a, 
2003b, and 2003c) has been used for consistency.
Direction o f  Change in Average Real Wages in Industry
Complications in the calculation of homogeneous wage rates led to Adelman and 
Morris to classify real wages according to the probable direction of average change in 
every 20 years period, and whether the variation was weak or strong. Furthermore, they 
penalised volatility. These distinctions led to distinguish between five categories: 
strong upward movement 
upward movement, but not strong 
stable
- fluctuating with no trend 
downward movement
Incomplete series were an additional difficulty in the calculation of industrial wages. 
Incompleteness seems to be coming from partial reporting: either just one or two 
categories of industrial workers had their wage reported or it was reported for a brief 
period only (Morris and Adelman, 1988:231). It seems clear that a replacement of this 
variable by a historical real wage series would be beneficial. Up-to-date industrial wage 
series have been compiled in the new database, from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 
2003c), but there is not enough information to replace the Adelman and Morris proposal 
with an actual rate of change of real wage in industry.
Direction o f Change in Average Real Wages or Income o f  Employed Agricultural 
Poor
The procedure to classify country-period observations (for instance, Argentina 1850- 
1870) into different categories was exactly the same to that described above for real 
wages in industry (see ‘direction of change in average real wages in industry); thus 
leading to exactly the same possible categories in Morris and Adelman (1988). An
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additional complication, specific of agricultural wages, was the seasonality of 
agricultural labour. Ideally, agricultural wage changes would have been substituted by 
the actual rate of change of real wage estimates according to nowadays historical 
statistics. Up-to-date industrial wage series have been compiled in the new database, 
from Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c), but, unfortunately, only a few countries have 
enough information to replace the Adelman and Morris proposal with an actual rate of 
change of real wages in agriculture.
Demographic variables
Demographic variables capture movements of people, both the capacity of a society to 
grow in size as well as migratory moves. Three demographic variables summarise the 
data referred to population size and migration in the original database. This number has 
now been extended to four:
- total population
- population growth, lagged
- net immigration
- rate of net migration to total population growth 
Total Population
Maddison (2003) compiles statistics of population after 1950 from the International 
Programs Center, US Bureau of the Census, October 2002 (USBC www.census.govT 
except for China, India, and Indonesia; (the latter not in our sample). For the absent 
countries and estimates before 1950 he uses specific country sources detailed in 
Maddison (2003). The data available from the United Nations Population Division 
(UNDP) would have been the alternative source for population statistics. Maddison 
prefers the US Bureau of Census data over the UNPD ones because the former gives a 
more detailed account of short-term shocks. This is due to the fact that the United 
Nations interpolates between censuses. Therefore, USBC data capture ups and downs 
much better, while the UNPD data seems more suitable for studying long-run trends. 
We stick to Maddison’s population series. In particular, the August 2007 updated 
version of the data has been used (accessible on-line at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/T
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Population Growth, lagged
The cumulative growth of the population for the past 20 years has been derived from the 
variable above (total population) and expressed in percental terms. This is an 
improvement over the original population growth reported by Morris and Adelman 
(1988), since they based their estimates of population in unofficial sources in many 
cases.
Net Immigration
What Adelman and Morris called “net immigration” actually reports the rate of net 
migration to total population growth (following variable). They never reported levels of 
net immigration in their final tables. However, they constructed a table showing the 
information available from different sources regarding migration levels (Morris and 
Adelman, 1988: Table A32). Statistics on migrations were extracted mostly from 
Ferenczi (1929), Ashworth (1962), and Mitchell (1976). Unfortunately, they never 
made a decision on which sources to use in order to give a point estimate for net 
migration. They limited themselves to place countries in one of 6 categories. So, in a 
sense, this table is unfinished. In the light of the information they compiled, there is 
scope for providing point estimates of net migration. Different sources differ in 
periodisation and amounts, even for the same period; therefore, there is a task of 
addition for different sub-periods and selection of sources. When information from 
different sources does not coincide, the most recent source has been used. No further 
alterations have been made to this variable, since still nowadays statistics available on 
migration are fairly incomplete. Consequently, we would not expect substantial 
improvement. Emigration is reported with a negative sign.
Rate o f Net Migration to Total Population Growth
The rate of net migration to total population growth captures the direction and 
importance of migration compared to total population changes (Morris and Adelman, 
1988:232). The original Adelman and Morris database does not have a variable under 
such name; they called it “net immigration”, which now corresponds to a completely 
renovated variable. In the original database, six categories describe the importance of
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migration for changes in population, ranging from the cases where more than one-third 
of the increase in population was due to immigrants (European settler economies) to the 
cases where more than one-third of the population change was due to emigrants (some 
European countries during the last third of the nineteenth century).
This variable can be improved by reporting the exact estimated percentages instead of 
grouping the observations in six arbitrary categories. The percentages of migration over 
population change have been calculated from the figures on migratory movements 
summarised in Morris and Adelman (1988: Table A32), together with the population 
variables described above.
Human Capital
The stock of human capital in the epoque is represented by literacy, while the growth of 
human capital is represented by the spread of primary education. These two concepts 
(stock and flow) give rise to two variables:
Adult illiteracy
Rate of spread of primary education, lagged 
One extra variable has been added to the database, namely 
Quality of education 
Adult illiteracy
Adelman and Morris constructed a classification of countries according to the 
percentage of illiterate population. These percentages are based on specific-country 
sources. For this variable, we reverse the numeral re-codification. The variables range 
from A to J in the original, corresponding to 0 to 100 in the numeral scale. We have 
reversed this scaling to “from 100 to 0” in order to transform the illiteracy variable into 
literacy. Since we assign higher values to better outcomes, the transformation is 
intuitively more convenient.
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Rate o f spread ofprimary education, lagged
With respect to improvements on the primary education variable, the so called Barro- 
Lee Data Set gathers international measures of schooling years and schooling quality 
for 126 countries. Educational attainment is reported for different age groups and 
gender. Data are presented in five-year intervals for the period 1960-1990. Information 
in the Barro-Lee format is also available going back to the nineteenth century for most 
of the countries, consisting on university as well as primary and secondary school 
enrolment. Daniel Cohen presents a critic on the Barro and Lee dataset, and proposes a 
way to clean up the data. Further discussion on these data has been writen by Krueger 
and Lindahl, and Domenech.
As far as historical data sources are concerned, Peter Flora provides a detailed 
description of the literacy rates by regions in Western Europe for years previous to 
1960. This information has been constructed from the information available about army 
recruits and newly married people at the epoque. This database goes back to 1815 and it 
is conveniently split into different cohorts and genders. In State, Economy and Society 
in Western Europe 1815-1975 (vol I), Peter Flora provides the percentage of students 
enrolled in general, secondary and higher education, as a percentage of the total 
population.
Also Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) provides the number of children in schools, as 
well as the number of teachers. There are two advantages of using Mitchell’s data 
instead of Flora’s ones. First, the former contains data from all continents, while Flora 
refers exclusively to Western Europe. Second, Mitchell’s publications are more recent 
and updated. While Flora published his collection of Western European educational 
statistics in 1983 and remains as it stood (Flora, 1983), Mitchell has kept renewing and 
updating his collection of statistics, as well as adding more countries. For these reasons, 
Mitchell is the preferred source. The number of students in primary education is 
recorded. However, this variable cannot substitute the original one, because for many
3 There is a lot o f criticism on the Barro and Lee dataset, concerning the adequacy o f the way to measure 
human capital and the lack o f quality of the data. It is worthwhile to explore those criticisms, starting by 
those by Krueger and Lindahl (2000) and De la Fuente and Domenech (2000). Also of interest: Cohen 
and Soto (2001), who propose a way to polish the data.
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countries in the sample reporting does not start until 1870 and, therefore, rates of 
growth cannot be calculated for the period 1850-1870.
Quality o f Schooling
Morris and Adelman (1988) acknowledge they could not include the quality of 
education, though they do not mention the reasons. Nevertheless, it stands quite clear 
that the measurement of the quality of education is nothing but trivial. In fact, the issue 
remains unresolved in the literature. There is a lot of criticism on the Barro and Lee 
dataset, concerning the adequacy of the way to measure human capital and the lack of 
quality of the data. See Krueger and Lindahl (2000), De la Fuente and Domenech 
(2000), and Cohen and Soto (2001). Below, we propose an indicator for the quality of 
schooling.
On the one hand, we have the number of pupils in primary education (in thousands). 
This variable has been extracted from Mitchell’s international historical statistics. On 
the other hand, we have the number of teachers in primary education (in thousands), 
from the same source. The ratio of the two variables is a new variable representing the 
number pupils per teacher. In order to make it increasing with the quality of education, 
it is more intuitive to place the number of teacher in the numerator and the number of 
pupils in the denominator of the ratio.
A new variable (teachers per pupil) has been created by dividing the number of teachers 
by the number of students. The number of teachers per pupil intends to be an indicator 
of the quality of education, therefore adding the already noticed by Adelman and Morris 
missing aspect in the educational variables.
After compiling information for the number of students in primary education and the 
number of teachers for all possible countries in the sample, statistical analysis reveals 
that these two variables present a Pearson correlation of 0.953. i.e. the number of 
students and the number of teachers grew in the same proportion. Therefore the quality 
of education as proposed above was held practically constant throughout (on average). 
For this reason, it does not seem worrying that the amount of countries for which the 
new variable “quality of education” is available for the desired periods is rather limited. 
Because only about half of the sample is available, the variable “quality of education”
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has to be excluded from the principal components analysis, which requires full sample.
Socioinstitutional influences
Socio-institutional variables in the database are the following:
Urbanisation 
- Attitudes toward entrepreneurship
Urbanisation
The advantages of urbanisation for social interaction are numerous, amongst which we 
can mention: markets, higher mobility, or political participation. The variable 
“urbanisation” measures the proportion of the population living in cities of more than 
10,000 inhabitants. The exact percentage is not available in many instances; so, in this 
case, the Morris and Adelman (1988) classification scheme is convenient. The 
classification scheme of is as follows, in percentage of population living in towns of 
more than 10,000 inhabitants:
30% or more 
between 20% and 30% 
between 10% and 20% 
less than 10%
Most of the information comes from Weber (1967).
Attitudes toward Entrepreneurship
The social attitude toward entrepreneurship refers to whether or not the social elite 
regarded favourably or not entrepreneurial success. This is a purely qualitative variable; 
so it is not based on statistics, but on informed judgments. Adelman and Morris took 
informed judgements from the literature and constructed this variable by means of 
contrasting attitudes in different countries. They divided the spectrum of social 
recognition of economic activities into 4 levels of social recognition, with which they 
created six categories, each one identified by a series of social signals:
Category A: Social recognition was indicated by official recognition, 
intermarriage, and retention of successful industrial entrepreneurs in industry.
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Category C: Social recognition of entrepreneurial activity went to those who 
were already part of the elite.
Category E: Landowners and primary product exporters gained social 
recognition, but not mere accumulators of mercantile wealth.
Category F: Not common social recognition by the elite.
In categories B and D were some part of the country fitted in the previous category and 
some other part fitted in the following one.
The judgements made in the multiple sources consulted are difficult to refute as a whole, 
as well as it is difficult to reproduce or refute the classification made by Adelman and 
Morris. Consequently, no changes have been introduced in this variable, apart from 
numerical re-codification.
AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS
Agricultural institutions refer to land tenure, land concentration, and, in general, 
institutional variables that may end up affecting land productivity. Innumerable land 
reforms have been carried out in many countries, though most failed in a way or another. 
Some, however, did succeed and effectively changed the holding traditions and plot 
structure. The following variables summarise institutional aspects of agriculture:
Predominant form of land tenure and holding 
Concentration of landholdings
Favourableness of land system to adoption of improvements
Since all three variables are qualitative, we follow the original Adelman and Morris 
classification schemes for all of them.
Predominant Form o f Land Tenure and Holding
There is a single criterion for classification in this variable, and it is clearly stated: 
Systems of land tenure were classified according to the degree of control of the direct 
cultivator. This ranking principle is the one proposed by Boserup (1963). We find 
countries with predominant independent cultivators with full-right ownership at the top
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of the seven categories (for instance, Scandinavian countries). Centrally controlled 
agriculture with some form of servile labour appears at the bottom (Brazil, Egypt, and 
Russia around mid-nineteen century). The entire classification scheme runs as follows, 
from top to bottom:
Independent cultivators, with full-right ownership 
Idem, with some feudal obligations (taxes, kind or services)
Cultivators paying fix cash rent 
Short-term tenants 
Peasants with their own land, but subject to communal controls 
Centrally managed land, usually not by the owner, with hired workers 
Centrally managed land, usually not by the owner, with some form of servile labour
Sources for classification are mostly country-specific literature, which difficults a 
revision of this variable.
Concentration o f Landholdings
The original database has seven classification categories for the concentration of 
landholdings, based on the size of holdings. On the top category, the top 10% of 
landholders have at least 75% of the cultivable land. On the bottom categories, either 
holdings are very small, shared, or the predominant form is communal land. A 
simplified version of the classification is as follows:
The top 10% of landholders have at least 75% of the cultivable land 
Extreme concentration of landholdings, but not as much as the first category
Large holdings 
Middle-size holdings 
Small holdings 
Holdings are very small, or shared 
The predominant form is communal land
Also other secondary considerations enter the classification, such as, the form of labour. 
For full details, see Morris and Adelman (1988), table A38:413-416.
There are two aspects to have into account when studying concentration of 
landholdings:
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First, renewed tenure schemes and plot concentration has a direct effect on productivity, 
as shown in case studies below, but the direction of the effect does not always coincide. 
Land concentration raises productivity by means of scale effects; while some types of 
innovation spread more easily within a small plot structure. Moreover, the debate 
between hired versus family labour has also revealed some contradictory outcomes 
depending on the case study. Morris and Adelman pose some illustrative examples on 
this complexity in the following passage:
‘The relationships between land systems and productivity were complex: 
biological innovations often spread on small family holdings (Hayami and 
Ruttan 1971); mechanized techniques spread first to larger farms (Jensen 
[Denmark] 1937; Clapham [Germany] 1936). Independent family farms 
provided strong work incentives and cheap labor, but their limited assets made 
investment risky (Wright [United States] 1978). Larger-scale capitalist owners 
with wage labor could not always compete (Smith [Japan] 1959). However, in 
England, capitalist tenants with hired labor raised productivity significantly 
(Emle [Great Britain] 1936). In contrast with these cases, large-scale estate 
owners with aristocratic values accumulated wealth in land and slaves and were 
slow to adopt new techniques (Dovring 1965)’ (Morris and Adelman, 1988:45).
Thus, we cannot generalise. The overall direct effect of agricultural institutions on 
productivity is ambiguous and/or strongly depends on the case.
and
Second, renewed tenure schemes and plot concentration changes social relations in the 
countryside. Therefore it has an effect on social capital. Actually, the first social 
transformation comes from the economic system. As a matter of fact, traditional 
communal practices are lost with capitalism. This will eventually be reflected in the 
change in the agricultural institutions, which are forced to adapt to the economic 
environment. We will use the change in institutions as a reflection of the loss in 
communal behaviour, so traditional in agricultural practices. Communal practices were 
common in most parts of the world, especially before the marketing and export oriented 
exploitation, (for evidence see Fumival, 1931; Indian examples might be found in 
Mukerjee, 1972, among others). Non-capitalised agriculture (self-consumption oriented)
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tends to be more oriented to the benefit of the community, being this a group of families 
or neighbouring farms. Barter instead of monetary transactions potentiates gifts, 
communal labour, and sharing of yields, expecting some reciprocity. This tendency will 
progressively shrink as non-agricultural population increases. We would expect the 
most modem institutions to go in detriment of the common good tasks or attitudes. So, 
progress in agricultural institutions works counter-intuitively.
Currently, higher punctuation is assigned to higher concentration of land. For the 
reasons stated above, there could be an argument for reversal of punctuation. However, 
the effect of land concentration on productivity is still ambiguous.
Favourableness o f  Land System to Adoption o f Improvements
This variable is a combination of the previous two; weights for every country according 
to a priori judgement of the authors of the database. The specific weights were never 
given, so we have to accept their classification scheme. This time, they were able to 
differentiate up to nine different categories for classification. These are, from top to 
bottom:
Independent cultivators without extreme concentration of landholdings 
Tenants paying fix cash rents, without extreme concentration of landholdings
Family farms
Tenants paying fix cash rents on family-size holdings 
Centrally managed, with hired workers 
Peasants with extremely small holdings 
Short-term tenants 
Peasants with some form of communal control 
Large states with some form of servile labour
This long categorisation is remarkably detailed, and worth profiting from. It is difficult 
to find a qualitative variable like this one, with such a detailed classification. We stick 
to the suggestion by Adelman and Morris.
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POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Social and political structures go hand in hand. Their relationship has been traced back 
as far as the Middle Ages. Perry Anderson’s thesis (1974) is supported by Moore (1966) 
and Warren (1980): ‘Anderson (1974) emphasizes the importance to Europe of the 
feudal legacy of fragmented political authority. (...) Dispersal of sovereignty permitted 
a great diversity of populations and languages to persist. According to Anderson, a 
similar dispersion of absolute power within feudalism occurred in Japan’ (as reported 
by Morris and Adelman, 1988:47). This division of authority promoted a ‘vigorous and 
independent class of town dwellers’ (Moore, 1966:148), and ‘mutual engagement 
derived from feudal relations of vassalage’ (Morris and Adelman, 1988:47). This 
exemplifies how political systems may influence social structures.
At the same time, new social classes had some influence on political structures’ 
transformation. Anderson and Anderson (1967) argue that the post-industrial change in 
European political institutions is conducted by social pressures emerging from a 
transformation of the society, such as the emergence of the middle class. Quoting 
Morris and Adelman, ‘According to Anderson and Anderson (1967), industrialization 
and concomitant social changes in Europe induced political change. The growing 
middle class sought participation in political affairs, educational opportunities, and 
social advance for themselves and their children’ (Morris and Adelman, 1988:46). Karl 
Deutsch does not speak of social capital, though he speaks of ‘social mobilisation’. 
‘Deutsch (1953) argues that “social mobilization” (the breakdown of old commitments, 
making people available for new ones) pressured political practices and institutions to 
change’ {ibid.).
The examples above suggest that society and politics are interrelated. The World Bank 
has been producing aggregate good governance indicators for the last decade, starting 
1996. This is known as the Governance Matters database, which counts with the 
following indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. However, this is 
a relatively new project and, thus, does not count with past data indicators (see 
Kaufrnann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2007 for the last round, with data starting in 1996).
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The original Adelman and Morris database has a good collection of political indicators 
for the nineteenth century. These are:
Domestic economic role of government
Character of political leadership
Strength of national representative institutions
Political stability
Foreign economic dependence
Colonial status
To these, some additions arising from recent research have been incorporated, namely 
the polity index coming from the latest version of the Polity IV database, and the 
updated point estimates corresponding to government expenditure relative to GDP. On 
top of older research such as that of Banks and Textor (1963) or Banks (1971), other 
recent efforts such as that of Alesina and Perotti (1996) Sociopolitical Instability Index, 
Heinsz (2000) Political Constraints Index, and Roe and Siegel (2007) 30 year moving 
average of one of Banks (2005) indicators have been evaluated.
Domestic Economic Role o f Government
Morris and Adelman (1988) ranked all countries into five categories, according to the 
extent to which government expenditure contributed to domestic economic activity. 
Given that government expenditure figures are available, it seems an improvement to 
switch to public expenditure relative to GDP. Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, and 2003c) 
provides total central government expenditure, which can then be re-calculated as a 
proportion of GDP. A disadvantage of this strategy is that it does not differentiate 
between domestic and external public expenditure, as the Adelman and Morris indicator 
did. Nevertheless, the latter, departing from only five different categories, can really be 
made much more precise by taking public expenditure statistics. In any case, the 
objective of the database is different from that intended by Adelman and Morris. While 
they were interested into the effect of government expenditure into economic activity, 
public expenditure relative to GDP may be for us an indicator of how much citizens are 
willing to entrust to the government.
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Character o f Political Leadership
This variable features the socio-economic character of political leadership. Morris and 
Adelman (1988) identified four different categories for this variable, depending on 
which groups had power in the national government. These are, from top to bottom 
category:
Indigenous had the power, including direct representation in national parliaments 
Indigenous and elite shared the power, including direct representation 
National traditional elite had the power, but rising influence of new entrepreneurs 
National traditional or colonial elite had the power
The classification was based on descriptive information extracted from political and 
economic country-specific histories. There exist other classifications of the character of 
the governors, but the Morris and Adelman (1988) classification is quite unique, in the 
sense that no other alternative captures the same concept, relating elite to social origin.
With a technique adopted from the cross-cultural analysis, Banks and Textor created 
pair wise comparisons of 57 polity variables, referring to practically all countries in the 
world (Banks and Textor, 1963). Their book is published in 1963 and the data make 
reference to the epoque. However, their political modernisation variable refers a 
historical event: the influence of colonization.
The potentially relevant variable in Banks and Textor is the “political modernisation” 
variable. The classification is by historical type (Banks and Textor, 1963:77-88):
A. Early European or early European derived (early modernizing European 
society or offshoot)
B. Later European or later European derived (later modernizing European 
society or offshoot)
C. Non/European autochthonous (self-modernizing extra-European society).
D. Developed tutelary (developed society modernizing under tutelage).
E. Undeveloped tutelary (undeveloped society modernizing under tutelage).
Nevertheless, as one-shot historical event, it does not have any dynamic aspect, or 
process of change involved, as in the spirit of Adelman and Morris. The authors
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acknowledge this handicap and shelter in the difficulty in doing so (Banks and Textor, 
1963:7).
In later work, Banks (1971) compiles data describing politics, economy, population and 
communications starting as early as 1815 in some cases and running up until 1966. The 
type of data collected is similar in nature to the compilations by Mitchell discussed 
above, but different in sourcing. The main source for Banks was The Statesman's 
Yearbook, a yearly publication which offers an overview of the state of affairs in terms 
of political regime and economic situation of the economy for every country in the 
world since 1864. Banks and his team systematically compiled data from The 
Statesman’s Yearbook and additional sources and published the data tables as the Cross- 
Polity Time-Series Data in 1971 (Banks, 1971). The potentially relevant variables in 
Banks (1971) and its classification are as follows:
Type of Regime
(1) Civilian
(2) Military- Civilian
(3) Military
(4) Other 
Head of State
(1) Monarch
(2) President
(3) Military
(4) Other
Effective executive (Type) - Same typology as Head of State; who exercises primarily 
influence in shaping the decisions of the nation.
These measures are far too general and in no way related to the social character of the 
leadership. No inspected alternative is superior to Morris and Adelman (1988) in terms 
of capturing social integration.
Finally, the Polity IV project developed by the Center for International Development 
and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the George Mason University and the University 
of Maryland does an excellent job. Subsequent versions of this international historical 
database have been constantly revised, and the fourth version contains records of basic
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institutional characteristics from 1800 to 2004, on a yearly basis. Actually, the most 
interesting candidate in the polity database, is no longer included in recent version, and 
one has to go back to the second version, Polity II, in order to find the “scope of 
government action” variable. This variable ‘is a measure of the extent to which the state 
uses its powers of regulation and command to direct social and economic activity’ 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2005:35). Although this variable is not exactly the same as 
Adelman and Morris tried to capture, it goes in the same direction, relating the 
authorities to the level of involvement in the society. ‘It is a continuum which refers to 
the extent to which all levels of government combined -national, regional, and local- 
attempt to regulate and organize the economic and social life of the citizens and subjects 
of the state’ {op. cit.: 37). Nevertheless, and despite the broad coverage of this variable, 
the scope of government action as in the polity database has been excluded from the 
principal components analysis due to poor variability of the data. The original variable 
socio-economic character of political leadership, also satisfying and conceptually very 
close, has been used instead.
Strength o f National Representative Institutions
This variable in the database is an index constructed from 3 indicators (all information 
from country-specific political histories):
1. The extent of legislative power of the parliament - In the nineteenth century, the 
existence and strength of a parliament was a strong indication for separation of 
powers.
2. The extent of popular suffrage, which is the most direct indicator of 
representativeness of the government.
3. The weight of opposition parties.
1 and 2 were strongly positively correlated in the nineteenth century. Countries with 
separation of powers tended to require a more accessible minimum of property 
qualifications to become a voter. Adelman and Morris did not make use of the extensive 
international list of political characteristics in Banks (1971) at any point in the 
construction of this variable. They made use of individual country histories instead 
(Morris and Adelman, 1988:237 and Table A44:441-6). However, Banks (1971) 
international political variables are worth exploring. Banks (1971) potentially relevant 
variables and its classification are the following:
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Effective executive (selection)
(1) Direct election
(2) Indirect election
(3) Nonelective 
Parliamentary responsibility
(0) irrelevant
(1) absent
(2) incomplete
(3) complete 
Legislative effectiveness
(0) none
(1) ineffective
(2) partially effective
(3) effective 
Legislative selection
(0) none
(1) nonelective
(2) elective
Legislative elections (number per year)
Banks’ database constitutes quite a good effort; it is a systematic account of general 
political features. But, firstly, it is not a significant improvement over Morris and 
Adelman (1988) in terms of content. The main difference between the two is sourcing: 
While Adelman and Morris surveyed country histories, Banks systematically scrutinises 
The Statesmans ’ Yearbook. Secondly, there are more precise representativeness 
indicators arising from more recent research.
Nowadays, it is common to find the use of a simple democracy dummy as an indicator 
of the representativeness of the government. Neverthesless, the Adelman and Morris 
indicator is no doubt more sophisticated. The original variable in the database is broader 
in content and more detailed in range of categories.
At this respect, the Polity IV project records openness of political institutions in a more 
precise 0 to 10 democracy score. The polity data archive incorporates some of the 
variables created by Banks. This is preferable to a simple democracy dummy and also to
84
Banks (1971) because it is more precise. With comparison to Morris and Adelman 
(1988), the Polity IV democracy score is narrower in content, representing a very 
particular aspect. However, the Polity IV data archive combines the democracy score 
with an autocracy score (closeness of political institutions) with the same range of 
variation, generating a -10 to 10 scale called polity variable. A variation of this variable 
called POLITY2 is preferred, because it assigns normal range polity scores to 
observations corresponding exceptional situations. A disadvantage of using this 
alternative is that periods of interruption such as foreign occupancy due to war are left 
blank; and we need full record for the principal components analysis. Luckily enough, 
no observations of interest fall under that category.
Political Stability
The Adelman and Morris indicator for political stability encompasses three different 
aspects in a single index. These three aspects are the following:
Continuity in national political decision making 
- Intense non-violent political strife 
Domestic violence
Adelman and Morris combined these three features into four categories, which describe 
their political stability indicator. The four categories are the following:
Continuity No strife No violence
Category A yes yes yes
Category B no some yes
Category C no some no
Category D no no no
All information necessary was compiled from political histories.
Staying aside from the nowadays popular political instability indicators, the Adelman 
and Morris variable does not include democracy in their indicator; this leaves open the 
possibility of treating democracy as a singular differentiated feature, and it is indeed 
treated as a separate variable. Representativeness of the government is included in the 
former variable (strength of national representative institutions), which is, on the other 
hand, a broader concept than democracy alone. Still, we may want to do a brief survey
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of what sort of political stability indicators are the most common in current research.
In current research, the most widely used indicator for political stability is the one 
introduced by Alesina and Perotti (1996). This index is called the Socio-political 
Instability index, and comprises political and mass assassinations, coup attempts 
(whether successful or not) and a democracy dummy. The time span of their indicator 
runs from 1960 to 1982. As Roe and Siegel point out, “this has been a widely used and 
respected measure of political instability” (Roe and Siegel ,2007:16). One reason why 
this index is not used here is that it is only available for recent decades. In addition to 
the time span constraints, this index is not necessarily more adequate than the original 
one devised by Adelman and Morris. In comparison, they are very similar in content, 
the only significant difference being the use of a democracy dummy by Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) instead of a continuity in policy making indicator in the index devised by 
Morris and Adelman (1988), as one of the 3 aspects considered. The latter might seem 
even more adequate, especially given the fact that democracy has already been taken 
into account in the former variable “strength of national representative institutions”.
An early starting collection of data is that pioneered by Arthur Banks. Some of his 
political indicators start as early as 1815, and could potentially be relevant here. His 
book Cross-Polity Time-Series Data compiles -among other things- political indicators 
(Banks, 1971). Some of the materials overlap with the Adelman and Morris database. 
The latest version is an on-line resource, the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive 
(Banks, 2005). A 30 year moving average of one of the variables in this data archive 
was used by Roe and Siegel (2007) as an indicator of political instability. The variable 
in question is named government crises, originally available since 1919 from Banks 
(2005); it refers to “any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the downfall 
of the present regime” (Banks, 2005, http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net/, list of 
variables). This variable is conceptually interesting, but it starts after World War I, just 
after the period under study. Likewise happens with a relevant variable in an earlier 
version of his work: variable 27 in the aforementioned Banks and Textor (1963) is 
“governmental stability”. It is classified making historical reference to the First and 
Second World Wars; so it is not possible to apply Banks and Textor classification to the 
present study.
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On the other hand, the continuously updated Polity IV Project offers the DURABLE 
variable, which provides the age of regime, in years. This is a very simple measure of 
political stability, which is a desirable characteristic. However, young regimes do not 
necessarily have to be destabilising. This is especially true in the case of colonies 
earning some degree of independence, like transfer of powers, or cases of formation of 
nation-states, especially common in the period under study. So, the DURABLE variable 
is not the preferred one. The Adelman and Morrris political stability variable 
encompasses several aspects directly referring to society, in particular referring to civil 
unrest, which are especially relevant when getting a picture of the quality of society. 
Thus, the latter is preferred.
Finally, in recent literature, there is a completely new alternative arising from the work 
of Witold Heinsz. According to Heinsz and Zelner (Measures of Political Risk), 
accounting for democracy and political stability is not enough to create the right 
atmosphere to attract investors in a country, ‘but rather the ability of the government to 
craft a credible commitment to an existing policy regime’ (Heinsz and Zelner, Measures 
o f Political Risk, online resource:4). So, the trust of investors in a country depends on 
what investors perceive or expect, rather than on what investors actually observe. With 
this in mind, they propose ‘a measure that is objectively derived with the explicit goal 
of measuring the likelihood of changes in the policy regime’ {ibid.). This is known as 
the Political Constraints Index (POLCON) and rates from 0 to 1 the extent to which a 
political actor is constraint in their decision making. The procedure is explained in 
detail in Heinsz (2000). The ultimate objective of this index turns out to be exactly the 
same as the political instability variable devised by Adelman and Morris, which 
encompasses information on civil and political tensions as well as political turnover 
(Morris and Adelman, 1988:237).
There are two reasons to prefer keeping the original variable in the Adelman and Morris 
database instead of the more sophisticated Heinsz index here. Firstly, the social 
character of the Adelman and Morris variable against the strictly political Heinsz 
variable is more appropriate to the context of capturing social change. Secondly, despite 
the extraordinary work of Heinsz in compiling data starting as early as 1815 for some 
cases, his index is still limited in the number of years available for the period required. 
So, a newly generated variable necessarily filling the blanks due to methodological 
requirements would forcefully have to rely on far too many assumptions.
87
Foreign Economic Dependence
The degree of foreign economic dependence reported by Morris and Adelman (1988) is 
an aggregate measure of seven indicators, all of which are can take the value “heavy”, 
“moderate”, or “modest”. The seven indicators are the following:
Primary exports dominate the export sector 
Foreign ownership and control of factory industry 
Importance of expatriate and government economic initiatives
- Foreigners’ control of trade, distribution, and related financial services 
Dependence of expanding sectors on specialised foreign skills
- Dependence of the government on foreign loans
- Foreign capital financed domestic investment 
(See Morris and Adelman, 1988: 156-7).
With the answer to this seven indicators, Adelman and Morris could classify 
observations into one of seven categories:
Heavy dependence in all indicators 
Heavily dependent production structures 
Moderately dependent production structures 
Moderate dependence in average 
Little dependence
Independent production structures; only with countries at the same level for the rest
No dependency features
There are no specific weights given to the different aspects of economic dependency. 
However, status of dependence of production structures was prioritised over the rest. 
We inverted the numerical re-codification, in order to assign higher punctuations to 
economic independence, unlike the original. This transformation makes the variable 
more intuitive.
Colonial Status
Colonial status is another qualitative variable that was categorised by Morris and 
Adelman (1988). The six categories in this case run from being a colony to being a
colonial power. These are:
Colonies run by expatriates 
Colonies run by settlers 
Political independent but under strong colonial power
Neutral 
Modest colonial holdings 
Major colonial holdings
The source used for classification was the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
MARKET INSTITUTIONS
How much did the market institutions evolve in this period? Adelman and Morris did 
extensive previous work on the measurement of market institutions. Earlier to the 
publication of the database we are working with, they prepared twelve classificatory 
indicators for the level and spread of market institutions (Adelman and Morris, 1978). 
Morris and Adelman (1988) summarises previous work in this area in only three 
variables:
Development of market institutions 
Spread of market institutions 
Spread of market institutions, lagged
Development o f Market Institutions
The nineteenth century is characterised among other things by the development of 
markets. The variables under the name of market institutions summarise the 
development of the market system. Examples of nineteenth century market 
developments are illustrated in the following passage:
‘Historical case studies suggest several (...) features of market systems in the 
nineteenth century. Formal, settled markets replaced migratory or occasional 
ones. Specialized institutions evolved for commodity exchange and for 
mobilizing labor, land, and capital -for example, staple goods exchanges, joint 
stock companies, and land mortgage and investment banks. Finally, market 
institutions expanded the geographical area of their activities, reaching
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nationwide scope in countries with more developed systems’. However, ‘The 
spread of market institutions (...) was uneven outside Europe and the United 
States. In some areas, national institutions evolved for only a limited range of 
export or government-subsidized goods. In others, colonial powers dominated 
export marketing systems while domestic institutions for goods and factors 
remained rudimentary’ (Morris and Adelman, 1988:63).
Polanyi (1944) underlines that social changes are a pre-requisite for markets. ‘Polanyi 
saw labor as “embedded” in a series of quite “natural” social relationships that made the 
construction of market institutions and impersonal exchange extremely difficult. 
However, the advance of capitalism and the commodification of labor created 
“disembedded” markets’ (Blyth, 2002:3). So, before formal markets, natural social 
relationships were a necessary pre-requisite for exchange. The arrival of the market 
facilitated exchange. Mark Blyth has recently reinterpreted Polanyi’s thesis on twentieth 
century institutional transformations. He argues that whether we operate under the old 
or the new institutions does not make such a big difference in term of embeddedness 
(Blyth, 2002:4). This idea had been previously underlined by Ruggie (1982), Helleiner 
(1994), McNamara (1998), and Kirshner (1999). All of them termed Polanyi’s 
description of the ‘great transformation’ ‘embedded liberalism’. Translated into our 
terminology, this means that the view that market institutions do need social capital to 
work is recaptured.
Morris and Adelman (1988) provide a composite indicator, which is the result of a 
single-principal component analysis including the following market indicators:
Level of development of domestic commodity markets 
Level of development of domestic labour markets 
Level of development of domestic capital markets 
Level of development of domestic land markets 
These indicators are based on previous publications (Adelman and Morris, 1978). We 
have not used classification schemes for the level of development of market institutions. 
Instead, we directly used the scores of the composite index.
One observation should be made about the suitability of the principal component 
analysis used to build the composite indicator:
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‘Developments within different market types proved interconnected. The 
growth of national goods markets coincided with widespread wage labor, 
specialized capital institutions, and monetized land transactions. The dualistic 
development of commodity markets was associated with dualistic factor market 
expansion (Morris and Adelman, 1988:67).
So, market developments move together. Development in one sector or region 
stimulates development in others; therefore, there will be no problems of trade off in the 
development of markets indicator.
Spread o f Market Institutions
The rate of spread of market institutions is a composite index derived with the same 
technique as the level of development of market institutions (previous variable). The 
single indicators used for this composite index were the following:
Rate of spread of domestic commodity markets 
Rate of spread of domestic labour markets 
Rate of spread of domestic capital markets 
Rate of spread of domestic land markets 
Details for these indicators can be found in Adelman and Morris (1978). The four single 
markets produce a single-principal component analysis, which scores are the compound 
index. As in the previous variable, we skip the classification and take instead directly 
the compound index scores.
Spread o f Market Institutions, lagged
This variable is simply a lagged variable of the previous one.
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2. IV. OVERVIEW SUMMARY
This chapter is a review of the Adelman and Morris database for the nineteenth century. 
Its particularities and adequacy for the project are discussed. Some useful comments 
made by other authors are also compiled and examined.
It has been possible to improve the original Morris and Adelman (1988) database in 
several ways. First, these data were not available in nowadays-readable electronic 
format. They should have been digitalised. Second, the original authors used a rather 
peculiar codification of the variables. They have been recodified in a format more 
convenient for statistical analysis. Third, Morris and Adelman (1988) data appendix 
provided some extra variables not listed in their final tables. These extra variables were 
all alternatives to the ones eventually included in the final tables, and therefore, should 
be (and have been) considered. And fourth, a vast amount of new material has appeared 
since the publication of the original database in 1988. There was enough new material 
to update it with the new information coming from various more recent data sources. 
Overall, a completely renewed database arises.
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APPENDIX 2.A
Recoding 
value to
LIST OF COUNTRIES
of variable 'country' into 'countryn' in order to assign a 
every country:
COUNTRY COUNTRYN
Old Value New Value Value Label
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Burma
Canada
China
Denmark
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Belgium
4 Brazil
5 Burma
6 Canada
7 China
8 Denmark
9 Egypt
10 France
11 Germany
12 India
13 Italy
14 Japan
15 Netherlands
16 New Zealand
17 Norway
18 Russia
19 Spain
2 0 Sweden
2 1 Switzerland
2 2 UK
2 3 US
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APPENDIX 2.B
LIST OF VARIABLES
This is the list of variables in the database, in the same thematic order that has been 
used above in the main text of the chapter.
There are 73 variables in total in the new database, out of which 3 operate as strings 
(COUNTRY, YEAR, COUNTRYEAR) and 70 are numerical (all the rest), 35 of which 
are included in the principal components analysis. This is a list of the complete database, 
including operative variables and those not used for the principal components analysis, 
which are signed with a star *. Principal components analysis and results are explained 
in detail in the next chapter.
Strings:
COUNTRY = List of 23 countries above.
YEAR = For every country, the new database accommodates data for several time cuts: 
1830, 1850, 1870, 1890, and 1910. 1870 and 1890 are complete; 1850 and 
1910 are mostly complete, with just a few blanks; 1830 is has been added to 
keep record of the few variables available for that time cut, however, most are 
blanks.
COUNTRYEAR = This variable is a combination of country and year. It identifies 
observations.
Numerical variables are as follows:
*INCGROUP = Classification for level of per capita income. Re-codification: Enhanced 
precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to range A to F in Morris and Adelman 
(1988). Point estimates (INCOME) used instead in the computations. 
*INCOMEAM = Index of level of per capita income (UK 1890=100). Information 
summarised by Morris and Adelman in the variable INCGROUP. Point 
estimates (INCOME) used instead in the computations.
INCOME = GDP per capita as in Maddison (2003), updated with the latest version 
dated August 2007 (available from http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/).
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Note: No blanks are allowed for the principal components analysis. As a result 
of this need for filling in the blanks, some missing data have been interpolated, 
and, in exceptional cases, extrapolated when needed at a constant annual growth 
rate.
*INCOMGRAM = Classification for rate of change in per capita income in the past 20 
years. Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to 
D- in the original.
INCOMEGR = GDP per capita growth derived from INCOME.
INDUTECH = Level of development of techniques in industry. Re-codification: 
Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to F in the original. 
INDTECGR = Classification for rate of improvement of techniques in industry (lagged, 
referred to the last 20 years). Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 
corresponding to A to G in the original database.
AGRITECH = Classification for level of development of techniques in agriculture. Re- 
codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to G in the 
original.
AGRTECGR = Classification for rate of improvement of techniques in agriculture. Re- 
codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to F in the 
original.
AGRILGRP = Classification for percentage of labour force in agriculture. Re­
codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to G in the 
original.
*AGRICLAB = Percentage of labour force in agriculture (calculated from Mitchell, 
2003a, 2003b, and 2003c).
Notes: - Percentage of total population used when percentage of active 
population not available.
- Male and female labour force has been aggregated.
- Oscillations in actually reported years in many cases. Special cases: India and 
Italy 1890, with estimation actually corresponding to 1901. Russia and 
Switzerland 1890 is for 1900. China 1910 corresponds to 1930 figure. Russia 
1910 is actually the figure corresponding to 1926.
- Morris and Adelman (1988: Table A9) used when no close estimate was 
available from Mitchell. From this table, most recent study used when 
discrepancies between sources.
*INDLAB = Percentage of labour force in industry (calculated from Mitchell, 2003a,
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2003b, and 2003c). We are only going to make use of this variable as a weight 
in special cases in order to calculate wages.
Notes: - This is not a complete series, it contains only the observations we need 
for further computations.
- The amount of male population working in “commerce, finance, etc” and 
“transport & communications” in Sweden 1890 (necessary to calculate the 
percentage of people working in industry) has been interpolated from the 1880 
and the 1900 figure, at a constant growth rate.
- The amount of people working in the manufacturing industries and 
construction in the USA 1830 (necessary to calculate the percentage of labour 
force in industry) has been interpolated with the figures corresponding to 1820 
and 1840, at a constant growth rate.
*TOTALAND = Total land area in thousands of squared kilometres (Source: Clark, 
1957: Table 33). Recovered from Morris and Adelman, 1988: Table A14, 
although it is not used in the calculations. FARMLAND is used instead because 
total land area does not take into account the varying quality of land, while farm 
land does.
*FARMLAND = Farmland in thousands of squared kilometres (Source: Clark, 1957: 
Table 33). Recovered from Morris and Adelman, 1988: Table A14. This 
variable is necessary for the calculation of POPXFARM.
POPXFARM = Population per square kilometres of farmland. Calculated from POP and 
FARMLAND. This variable corresponds to the “relative abundance of 
agricultural resources”, as described in the main text.
INTRANSP = Level of development of inland transportation. Re-codification: 
Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to E in the original.
TRANSPGR = Classification scheme for rate of improvement of inland transportation 
(lagged). Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A 
to E in the original.
*XGRGROUP = Classification scheme for rate of growth of total real exports. Re­
codification: Enhanced precision scale 100 to 0 corresponding to A to D in the 
original. TRADE used instead.
*AVGXGR = Average annual rate of growth of real exports (%). Recovered from 
Morris and Adelman (1988: Table A 18). TRADE used instead.
*AVGXGRP = Average annual rate of growth of exports in current prices (%). 
Recovered from Morris and Adelman (1988: Table A 18). Real exports
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classification preferred in the original; this allows comparisons.
’’"EXPORTS = Value of exports at constant prices (derived from Maddison, 2006: Table 
F-2).
Notes: -The case of Burma is very difficult because there are no data for this 
period. According to per capita GDP at constant prices, Burma’s economy 
seems to have been completely stagnated over the period under study. There is 
no reason to think that exports would have behaved differently. During this 
period, per capita GDP at constant prices moved between 500 and 600 
international dollars of 1990. That is about the same level Burma’s economy 
oscillated between 1957 and 1973. So let us use exports data corresponding to 
this period in order to calculate the export to GDP ratio, about 250 international 
dollars of 1990.
*CURRENTX = Current aggregate external trade, in millions of local currency (from 
Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c). This variable is necessary to calculate 
relative trade (TRADE).
Notes: - For countries where current GDP exists for some years but not for all, 
the gaps have been filled by assuming the same rate of conversion from current 
to real GDP as the closest existing years present with Maddison’s real GDP.
- Canada 1950 corresponds to 1967, since the latter is the first date available (but 
so is CURRENTGDP, so no mismatch in the calculation of TRADE); Argentina 
1950 corresponds to 1964 for the same reason.
- Russia 1830 has been transformed to the new paper rubles for homogeneity 
with posterior figures at a rate of 4 to 1, as suggested by Mitchell (2003a:585).
- Switzerland 1870 has been extrapolated from 1885 (first year available) and 
1890 at constant annual growth rate.
- Germany 1870 has been extrapolated from 1880 (first year available) and 1890 
at a constant growth rate.
- Italy 1850 corresponds to 1861.
*CURRENTGDP = Current GDP, in millions of local currency (from Mitchell, 2003a, 
2003b, and 2003c). This variable is necessary to calculate relative trade 
(TRADECURR and GOVREL).
Notes: -USA and Canada’s figures correspond to GNP.
- Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland’s figures correspond 
to net national product (NNP).
- Italy and Sweden 1850 has been extrapolated from 1961 (first year available)
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and 1870 at a constant annual growth rate.
- Netherlands 1890 has been extrapolated from 1900 (first year available) and 
1910 at a constant growth rate.
- Spain 1890 has been extrapolated from 1901 (first year available) and 1910 at a 
constant annual growth rate.
- Switzerland 1910 corresponds to the 1913 level.
*TRADECURR = Volume of exports relative to GDP, evaluated at current prices.
CURRENTX/CURRENTGDP. TRADE preferred instead.
TRADE = Volume of exports relative to GDP, evaluated at constant prices. 
EXPORTS/INCOME. This variable measures the degree of internationalisation 
of the economy, substituting the rate of growth of exports.
Note: For the cases where exports data are not available nor can they be 
estimated safely, the Adelman and Morris scale for export growth group 
classification (XGRGROUP) is followed, assigning an average if there are 
different exports ratios falling under the same classification score. These 
countries are Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, and Sweden.
SHIFTX = Classification for degree of shift in structure of export sector. Re­
codification: Enhanced precision scale from 100 to 0 replacing the original A to 
D.
INDWCHAN = Classification for direction of change in average real wages in industry. 
Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale from 100 to 0 corresponding to A to 
E in the original.
AGRWCHAN = Classification for direction of change in average real wages or income 
of the employed agricultural poor. Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale 
from 100 to 0 corresponding to A to E in the original.
*INDWCURR = Index of wages in industry (Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Variable 
used to calculate INDW. 1900 = 100 like Williamson’s most generalised base 
year for wages, for harmonisation purposes. Industrial wages include extractive 
industry, manufacturing industry, and construction. Sub-sectoral wages have 
been averaged out. Male and female wages have been aggregated.
Notes: - Except for the last observation corresponding to 1910, Australian data 
correspond to a simple average of wages in New South Wales and Victoria. The 
base year for the Australian series has been harmonised to 1900, departing from 
1890 = 100 for all observations except the last one corresponding to 1910, for 
which the original base year was 1960 = 100.
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- USA wage index has been homogenised to 1900 = 100, departing from 3 
different base years for different sub-periods: 1830 = 100 until 1860, 1865 = 100 
from 1860 until 1900, and 1955 =100 starting 1890 for some sub-sector onwards. 
The were 2 components available for the observation corresponding to 1890, the 
wage for all non-farming employees (with base year 1955) and the wage strictly 
for manufacturing (with base year 1955). These two have been transformed to a 
common base year 1900 = 100 and then averaged out.
- USA 1870 corresponds to an average of all non-farm employees.
- Belgium 1830 has been extrapolated from 1843 and 1850, following the steady 
tendency.
- Canada required 2 changes of base, one for 1890 data (from base year 1891 = 
100) and one for 1910 data (from base year 1955 = 100), both to a common base 
year 1900 = 100.
*AGRWCURR = Wages in agriculture (Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Variable used 
to calculate AGRW. 1900 = 100 like Williamson’s most generalised base year 
for wages, for harmonisation purposes.
Note: - For Australia, there has been a change of base index in the money wage 
from 1955 = 100 to 1900.
- UK data correspond to England and Wales.
- USA required a change of base year from 1909 = 100 to year 1900. 
*WHPRICES = Wholesale prices, base year 1913 (1914 in some cases) =100 (from
Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c).
Notes: - Change of base year for Japan from 1868 to 1913.
- New Zealand 1870 set up to 95, level similar to 1890. Prices do not show 
tendency to escalate (1910 level is even lower than 1890).
- France, change of base year from 1901-10 to 1913.
- UK 1830, change of base year from 1821-5 to 1913.
- Denmark, change of base year from 1891-1900 to 1913.
- Netherlands, change of base year from 1953 to 1913.
- Australia and Canada, change of base year from 1938 to 1913.
*CPI = Consumer Price Index 1913 (1914 in some cases) = 1 0 0  (Mitchell, 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c).
Notes: - Belgium 1830 corresponds to 1835.
- France 1830 corresponds to 1840.
- Australia and Italy 1850 corresponds to 1861.
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- Netherlands 1870 corresponds to 1880.
- Norway 1890 corresponds to 1901.
- UK suffers a change of base year from 1851 to 1914 in 1872. All UK price 
indices have been converted to 1914 base year.
- Canada 1890 corresponds to 1900.
- Argentina, Burma, Egypt, India, Japan and Spain 1910 correspond to 1913.
- Brazil 1910 corresponds to 1912.
- Australia and New Zealand appear with 1938 as base year in Mitchell 
(2003c:961). A change of base year has been performed (new base year 1913).
* PRICES = Consumer Price Index 1913 (1914 in some cases) = 100, substituted by 
wholesale prices when CPI not available for all necessary years (Mitchell, 2003a, 
2003b, 2003c). Variable used to calculate INDW and AGRW.
- Canada and Switzerland 1830 to 1870, estimated CPI keeping the same 
wholesale to consumer prices proportion than in the period 1890-1910.
- Norway 1870 set up at 85 (1890 level), in light of the stability of prices.
*INDW = Real wage index in industry. INDWCURR/PRICES*100. This is, the index
of nominal wages has been divided by the price index, and then multiplied by 
100 in order to go back to the original scale of the variables.
*AGRW = Real wage index in agriculture. AGRWCURR/PRICES*100. This is, the 
index of nominal wages has been divided by the price index, and then multiplied 
by 100 in order to go back to the original scale of the variables.
*WEIGHTEDW = Weighted average of real industrial wages (INDW) and real 
agricultural wages (AGRW), weights according to the proportion of workers in 
each sector (INDLAB and AGRICLAB, respectively). This variable 
complements the variable WAGES for all those countries where Williamson’s 
wage series are not available.
WAGES = real wages (Williamson, 1999, 2000a, and 2000b). When these are not 
available, they have been calculated from Mitchell’s current wages by sector and 
corrected by the consumer price index (Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). If wages 
for more than one sector available, these are a weighted average (weights 
according to the proportion of workers in each sector).
Notes: - Egypt 1850 corresponds to 1858.
- Argentina 1850 corresponds to 1864.
- Wages for Brazil 1830 and 1850 are for Rio de Janeiro; from then onwards 
they are a simple average of Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco.
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- Germany 1870 has been extrapolated.
- New Zealand 1870 and 1890 have been set to 1910 level, due to the lack of 
data. Though there is no warranty that the real wage was constant, the continued 
stability of prices during this period justifies the decision.
- China 1870 and 1890 have been estimated keeping the average proportion of 
growth of the rest of countries in the sample.
- For Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland we cannot make an informed 
decision, so an arbitrary real wage index of 100 has been assigned for 1900 
(following Williamson), and then the average growth rate of real wages in the 
sample has been applied.
*POPGROUP = Classification for total population. Numerical codification: From 100 
to 0 corresponding to A to G. The revision incorporates the previously unused 
table for 1914. Also available for 1830 (table A25 in Morris and Adelman, 
1988:386). POP from more recent sources used instead.
POP = Total population in thousands (from Maddison, 2003), updated with his revised 
version dated August 2007 (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/). Figures for non- 
available years have been interpolated at constant growth rate.
*POPGRGRP = Classification for rate of population growth in the last 20 years. 
Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to F. POPGR used 
instead.
POPGR = Cumulative population growth in the last 20 years (%). It has been calculated 
from total population (POP).
*POPGRN = Total population growth, in levels (thousands). Calculated from total 
population (POP). This variable is necessary to calculate the rate of migration 
over total population growth (MITOPOPGR).
*IMMIGRP = Classification for net immigration. Numerical codification: From 100 to 
0 corresponding to A to F. IMMI used instead.
IMMI = Net migration, in thousands (immigration with positive sign and emigration 
with negative sign). Source: Own calculations from Morris and Adelman (1988: 
Table A32). For cases where no statistics are available, we rely on the 
IMMIGRP classification, combined with the figures available for other years, to 
provide an estimate.
MITOPOPGR = Rate of net migration over total population growth (%). This variable 
has been calculated from net migration (IMMI) and total population growth, in 
levels (POPGRN).
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LIT = Classification of extent of adult literacy. Re-codification: Enhanced precision 
scale from 0 to 100 corresponding to A to J in the original. Notice that the order 
of the numerical classification has been reversed in order to transform the 
illiteracy variable into literacy. This is intuitively convenient since we assign 
higher values to better outcomes in this way.
PRIMEDGR = Classification for rate of spread of primary education in the past 20 
years. Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to E.
*NPUPILS = Number of pupils in schools, in thousands (from Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, 
and 2003c). This variable is necessary to calculate QEDU.
Note: - Sweden 1850 and Argentina 1870 correspond to own calculations, 
trusting the steady tendencies.
*NTEACHERS = Number of teachers in schools, in thousands (from Mitchell, 2003a, 
2003b, and 2003c). This variable is necessary to calculate QEDU.
*NSECOND = Number of students in secondary education, in thousands (from Mitchell, 
2003a, 2003b, and 2003c).
Note: For countries where there is no records of secondary schooling and 
primary school numbers are very low, we assume negligible secondary 
schooling.
*QEDUSEC = Secondary education students per thousand pupils in primary education. 
(NSECOND/NPUPILS)*1000. This variable has been devised to address the 
quality of education issue for Africa, Asia and Oceania, where there are no 
records of number of teachers. The way to address this problem has been to 
monitor the rate of students enrolled in secondary school to the number of pupils 
in primary school. The higher the proportion of secondary school with respect to 
primary one, the higher the quality of education.
Note: Changes in this variable do not coincide with changes in the number of 
teachers per thousand pupils (QEDU) (correlation between the two is to be 
around 0); so it has to be regarded as an alternative.
*QEDU = Teachers per thousand pupils. (NTEACHERS/NPUPILS)*1000, this is, the 
ratio of teachers to pupils multiplied by a thousand.
Notes: - Closest year used when particular year not available, trying to match 
number of teachers and number of students corresponding to the same year.
- UK data correspond to England and Wales.
- For some countries, figures include also secondary schooling, due to the 
inability to separate primary from secondary school records. The distortion
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introduced should be fairly small, since secondary schooling at that time still 
represented a small proportion of the total.
LANDTENU = Classification for predominant form of land tenure and holding.
Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to G.
LANDCONC = Classification for concentration of landholdings. Numerical 
codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to G.
LANDADOP = Classification for favourableness of land system to adoption of
improvements. Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to I. 
URBANI = Classification for extent of urbanisation. Numerical codification: From 100 
to 0 corresponding to A to D.
ENTREP = Classification for favourableness of attitudes towards entrepreneurship.
Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to F.
*GOVT = Classification for extent of domestic economic role of government in the past 
20 years. Numerical codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to E. 
GOVREL used instead.
*GOVTOTAL = Total central government expenditure, in millions of the local currency 
(from Mitchell, 2003a, 2003b, and 2003c). This variable is used to calculate 
public expenditure relative to GDP (GOVREL).
Notes: - Russia 1830 using the exchange rate of 26.3 paper rubles for a silver
ruble for that year according to Lindert (2006:Table 3).
- Sweden 1870 has been extrapolated trusting the very stable progression in the 
government spending.
GOVREL = Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Calculated as 
GOVTOTAL/CURRENTGDP* 100.
Note: - For cases where there is not enough data, either on government 
expenditure or current GDP, the old Adelman and Morris score for domestic 
economic role of the government (GOVT) has been replaced by a government 
expenditure level corresponding to the percentile matching with the original 
Adelman and Morris score.
SOCIOPOL = Classification for socioeconomic character of national political 
leadership in the past 20 years. From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to D.
* SCOPE = scope of government action. Source: Polity II (no longer available in later 
versions of the polity project). Even though it has been compiled and recorded in 
the database, this variable has been excluded from the principal components 
analysis due to poor variability of the data. The original variable socio-economic
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character of political leadership (SOCIOPOL), has been used instead for the 
quantitative analysis.
Notes: - The polity II database uses 3-digit country codes. The codes are 
available from Gurr (1997, Appendix A:52-68).
- Argentina 1830 corresponds to 1835.
- Australia 1870 and 1890 correspond to 1901, where recording starts.
- Belgium 1830 corresponds to 1831, where recording starts.
- British colonies or British settlements, Australia 1830 and 1850, Burma, India, 
Canada 1830 and 1850, and Egypt 1890 and 1910, have been assigned UK 
scores.
- Denmark 1910 corresponds to the score before and after the disruptive period, 
which was the same score (before and until 1900, and 1915 and after).
- France 1870 corresponds to 1869.
- New Zealand 1850 corresponds to 1857.
- Spain 1870 corresponds to the score before and after the 2-year disruption.
- Sweden 1910 corresponds to the score before and after the disruption.
- Switzerland 1870 corresponds to the score before and after the interruption of 
data.
- Germany before becoming a nation-state corresponds to the average of Baden, 
Bavaria, Saxony, and Wuerttemburg.
- Italy before becoming a nation-state corresponds to the average of Modena, 
Parma, Sardinia, Tuscany and Two Sicilies.
*REPRESEN = Classification for strength of national political institutions in the past 20 
years. From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to D.
POLITY2 = Revised Polity variable score, ranging from -10 to 10. Source: Polity IV, 
variable under the same name.
Notes: - Australia was given score 10 throughout the entire twentieth century in 
the Polity IV database. Therefore, the best guess for unavailable previous years 
is score 10.
- Burma was administered as a province of India until 1938, and gained 
independence from the Commonwealth in 1948 (source: The CIA Factbook), 
when the Polity IV database states reporting as Myanmar. In the case of New 
Zealand (see below), we see that prolonged periods of occupation in the 
nineteenth century do not seem to be disruptive for the polity scores; so, as for 
India, the scores assigned are those corresponding to the metropolis. And,
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indeed, British and Burma scores remain close for a long time after 
independence until 1961, when the first military regime started (ibid.).
- Canada data for years prior to 1867 have been assigned value 4, which 
corresponds to the 1867-1887 score.
- Polity IV reporting for Egypt starts in 1922, at the time of partial independence 
from the UK. At that time, Egyptian score for the polity variable is 4 while the 
British score has been 8 since the turn of century. It seems reasonable then to 
assign Egypt 1910 the 1922 score. Previous scores for Egypt have had to be 
arbitrary, but follow the same proportion to the British score as that of the time 
of partial independence. The Turkish (previous invader) score remain at its 
minimum value -10 throughout the nineteenth century. But during the Ottoman 
occupation of Egypt the Mamluck continued governing the country (source: The 
CIA World Factbook), so there are no reasons to believe that Egypt would have 
had such low polity scores. Proportions to the British score have been kept 
throughout.
- Germany 1830 and 1850 correspond to Prussia.
- India has been given the same scores as the metropolis. They still show a very 
close score since time of independence, when separate Indian records start in the 
Polity IV database.
- Italy 1830 and 1850 correspond to the invariant nineteenth century score 
starting at the time of unification, 1861.
- The same score, 10, is given in the Polity IV database for New Zealand from 
1857 to 1875, with no records before the initial date of this period. A series of 
land wars between the first colonizers, the Maoris, and the newly arrived British 
colonizers took place between 1843 and 1872 (source: The CIA World 
Factbook). However, this fact seems not to have affected the polity score at all. 
Therefore, the same score is maintained for 1830 and 1850, corresponding to the 
years surrounding the arrival of the first British colonizers.
- Switzerland 1830 has been assigned a score of 10, in views of the stunning 
homogeneity of the series.
POLSTABI = Classification for extent of political stability in the past 20 years.
Codification: From 100 to 0 corresponding to A to D.
FOREIGND = Classification for degree of foreign economic dependence in the past 20 
years. Inverted numerical Re-codification: Enhanced precision scale From 0 to 
100 corresponding to A to G. We assign a higher punctuation to economic
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independence, unlike the original. This eases the conceptualisation of the 
variable, since economic dependence is taken to be negative.
COLSTAT = Classification for colonial status. Numerical Re-codification: Enhanced 
precision scale Inverted from 0 to 100 corresponding to A to F.
Finally, the market institutional development variables come from an earlier study by 
the same authors. They selected the following three composite indicators, which 
summarise the level of institutional development of markets. For a detailed explanation, 
visit Adelman and Morris (1978).
MKTDEV = Component scores for composite indicator of level of development of 
market institutions up to the given date.
MKTDEVGR = Component scores for composite indicator of rate of spread of market 
institutions in the last 20 years.
MKTDVGRL = Component scores for composite indicator of rate of spread of market 
institutions in the last 20 years (lagged); i. e., the observation corresponding to 
1850 is capturing the spread of market institutions from 1830 to 1850.
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TABLES
Table 2.1. Value of Exports at Constant Prices (35 Countries), 1820-1913 (million 1990 dollars)
1820 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1913
(my own 
calculations)
(my own 
calculations)
(my own 
calculations)
(my own 
calculations)
Austria 47 74,39 186,39 467 923,73 1827,16 2024
Belgium 92 147,28 377,47 967,43 2479,42 6354,51 7318
Denmark 152,00 314 648,65 1339,95 1494
Finland 144,62 310 664,50 1424,41 1597
France 487 722,99 1593,47 3512 6046,01 10408,39 11292
Germany 3021,48 6761 15128,74 33852,80 38200
Italy 339 448,94 787,37 1380,91 2421,88 4247,55 4621
Netherlands 1126,33 1727 2648,00 4060,17 4329
Norway 119,42 223 416,43 777,63 854
Sweden 2670
Switzerland 147 220,13 493,65 1107 2379,14 5113,20 5735
United Kingdom 1125 1813,25 4710,49 12237 21067,07 36268,81 39348
Total n.a. 16080,94 30396 57454,17 108599,22 119482
Australia 178,74 455 1158,24 2948,41 3392
Canada 325,28 724 1611,44 3586,66 4044
United States 251 397,33 995,66 2495 6445,09 16648,96 19196
Total n.a. 1462,23 3674 9231,29 23194,52 26632
Spain 137 197,36 409,58 850 1684,08 3336,63 3697
USSR n.a. 6666
Argentina 80,55 222 611,81 1686,09 1963
Brazil 590,48 854 1235,13 1786,34 1888
Chile 84,89 166 324,62 634,81 702
Colombia 76,74 114 169,36 251,61 267
Mexico 83,85 242 698,42 2015,67 2363
Peru 145,50 202 280,47 389,36 409
Venezuela n.a. 1374
Total 2126 4152,19 8109,45 8966
Bangladesh - -
Burma - -
China 838,39 1398 2331,14 3887,14 4197
India 2170,61 3466 5534,46 8837,34 9480
Japan 51
Pakistan - -
Philippines 55 95,47 165,71 180
South Korea 0 0 171
Taiwan - 70
Thailand 88 196,51 438,80 495
Total 5230 9114,92 15885,62 17266
Source: Maddison (2006:Table F-2) and own calculations
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Table 2.2. Correlations between Education Variables
Literacy Primedgr N pupils N teachers N second Qsec edu Q edu
Literacy Pearson Correlation 1 .668(**) .176 .150 -.350 -.281 .146
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .225 .446 .058 .102 .459
N 69 69 49 28 30 35 28
Primary Pearson Correlation .668(**) 1 .154 .000 -.109 -.329 -.268
Education Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .290 .999 .568 .053 .168
Growth N 69 69 49 28 30 35 28
Number of Pearson Correlation .176 .154 1 ,953(**) .741(**) .009 -.029
pupils Sig. (2-tailed) .225 .290 .000 .000 .951 .851
N 49 49 73 43 45 54 43
Number of Pearson Correlation .150 .000 ,953(**) 1 .667(**) .040 .113
teachers Sig. (2-tailed) .446 .999 .000 .000 .820 .469
N 28 28 43 43 27 35 43
Number in Pearson Correlation -.350 -.109 .741(**) .667(**) 1 .454(**) -.046
secondary Sig. (2-tailed) .058 .568 .000 .000 .002 .820
N 30 30 45 27 47 45 27
Quality sec Pearson Correlation -.281 -.329 .009 .040 .454(**) 1 -.087
education Sig. (2-tailed) .102 .053 .951 .820 .002 .621
N 35 35 54 35 45 54 35
Quality Pearson Correlation .146 -.268 -.029 .113 -.046 -.087 1
education Sig. (2-tailed) .459 .168 .851 .469 .820 .621
N 28 28 43 43 27 35 43
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 2.3. Percentiles of Total Central Government 
Expenditure Relative to GDP
countryear Govrel Cumulativepercent
Switzerl 1850 .37 1.5
India 1830 .83 3.0
Switzerl 1870 .94 4.5
Inferred value
(China 1870 1.06 5
China 1890
China 1910)
Switzerl 1890 1.31 6.0
India 1850 1.31 7.5
Belgium 1830 1.43 9.0
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Inferred value
(Burma 1870
Burma 1890 1.52 10
New Zeal 1870
Norway 1870
Norway 1890)
US 1850 1.55 10.4
US 1830 1.61 11.9
US 1910 1.97 13.4
Switzerl 1910 2.30 14.9
India 1870 2.42 16.4
US 1890 2.43 17.9
Japan 1870 2.60 19.4
India 1890 3.24 20.9
Canada 1870 3.93 22.4
Belgium 1850 4.03 23.9
India 1910 4.19 25.4
US 1870 4.22 26.9
Canada 1890 4.91 28.4
Belgium 1870 5.04 29.9
Inferred value
(Argentina 1870
Argentina 1890
Argentina 1910
Burma 1910 5.09 30
Egypt 1870
Egypt 1890
New Zeal 1890
Russia 1870)
Canada 1910 5.71 31.3
Germany 1890 5.72 32.8
Spain 1850 6.02 34.3
UK 1870 6.30 35.8
Denmark 1890 6.42 37.3
Germany 1910 6.60 38.8
Denmark 1870 6.73 40.3
UK 1890 6.77 41.8
Sweden 1890 6.80 43.3
Sweden 1870 6.83 44.8
Australia 1910 6.90 46.3
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Denmark 1910 6.92 47.8
Brazil 1830 6.94 49.3
Inferred value
(Norway 1910 7.05 50
Russia 1890)
Sweden 1910 7.16 50.7
Australia 1850 7.31 52.2
Netherlan 1850 7.53 53.7
Belgium 1890 7.62 55.2
Japan 1890 7.77 56.7
UK 1910 8.19 58.2
Netherlan 1910 8.26 59.7
Netherlan 1870 8.90 61.2
Spain 1910 8.98 62.7
France 1830 9.59 64.2
Australia 1870 10.16 65.7
Spain 1890 10.29 67.2
UK 1850 10.30 68.7
Inferred value
(Egypt 1910 10.32 70
Russia 1910)
France 1850 10.32 70.1
France 1910 10.56 71.6
Brazil 1850 10.74 73.1
Germany 1870 10.93 74.6
Spain 1870 11.27 76.1
France 1890 11.36 77.6
UK 1830 11.82 79.1
Netherlan 1890 12.39 80.6
Belgium 1910 12.75 82.1
Brazil 1910 13.00 83.6
Inferred value 13.22 85
(New Zeal 1910)
France 1870 13.24 85.1
Italy 1870 13.28 86.6
Italy 1910 13.75 88.1
Italy 1890 14.57 89.6
Italy 1850 14.71 91.0
Denmark 1850 16.19 92.5
Australia 1890 17.57 94.0
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Brazil 1890 25.70 95.5
Brazil 1870 28.98 97.0
Japan 1910 31.16 98.5
Australia 1830 34.59 100.0
Sources: Govrel is total central government expenditure as a 
percentage to GDP, derived from M itchell (2003a:886-908, 
2003b:664-78, and 2 0 03c:816-25). V alues in bold are inferred 
from the percentiles, corresponding to dom estic econom ic role o f  
the government (Morris and Adelman: 1988: Table A42).
Histogram of Total Government Expenditure Relative to GDP
2 0 -
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Chapter 3 
A SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX  
FOR THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
118
Is Social Capital Persistent? Comparative Measurement in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
ABSTRACT
Recently, there has been a growing interest in social capital and in the difficulties 
related to its measurement. This paper proposes to measure social capital by means of 
principal components analysis and presents the first available international social capital 
estimates for the nineteenth century. The analysis is based on a nineteenth-century 
international database containing a wide range of socio-economic variables. Social 
capital indicators are constructed for the years 1870 and 1890. Interestingly enough, 
these indicators are comparable to mid-twentieth century social indicators. 
This facilitates the study of the evolution of social capital between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In the very long run, one can find a significant decline in the 
relative position of the European countries and the United States.
JEL classification codes: Z13,N 01,O ll
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3 .1. INTRODUCTION
A recent stream in the economics literature argues that history affects economic 
performance through institutions. Perhaps the most well-known paper is that by 
Acemoglu, Jonhson, and Robinson (2001), where they argue that different colonial 
origins led to different sets of institutions, and the latter gave rise to different economic 
outcomes. But, what happens when we look at colonisers instead of colonised 
countries? Is there nothing to say? Guido Tabellini (2007) conducts an empirical 
investigation on differential economic performance in the European regions, and links 
this fact to deep cultural roots, based on trust, respect and confidence built up centuries 
ago. Both these branches represent two separated parts of the world. On the one hand, 
the colonisers acquiring their culture through centuries of social interaction; on the other 
hand, the colonisers, inheriting the institutional bequest transferred by the colonisers. 
Now, is it possible to conduct a historical investigation with a sample of countries 
representing all regions of the world? And, more importantly, can one reach a 
generalised conclusion of whether culture and institutions are deterministic or not so 
when it comes to economic performance? This chapter proposes an international index 
for social capital in the nineteenth century -very close to Tabellini’s definition of 
culture-, which comprises a varied sample of countries around the world, including 
both colonised and colonisers. The next chapter enquires about its potential economic 
influence.
Recapitulating, the first chapter provided a definition of social capital and embedded it 
in the economics literature, the way it has been studied until now. In a phrase, social 
capital is the quality of the civil society, or the civic values. It should interest 
economists because it is indeed a form of capital1. Social capital has been shown to 
have had an effect in economic performance for the recent decades, but there are some 
indications that it could also have been relevant in the distant past. Chapter 1 gives 
some historical examples that set the ground to believe that it is promising to give social 
capital a long run approach. Actually, in his investigation for the European regions, 
Tabellini (2007) concludes that economic outcomes have their root in historically 
fundamented attitudes towards trust, respect for others and self-determination. 
Nevertheless, it is hard to device quantitative tests. The second chapter presents a 
completely renovated version of an old socio-economic database, which is going to turn
1 See chapter 1- introduction
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useful in the estimation of social development levels towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. This chapter motivates and explains the statistical methodology used for that 
purpose, and presents the new series. Also, it compares the new (referring to the past) to 
the existing (more recent) indicators and assesses the viability and performance of the 
different measurement alternatives.
More challenging questions are: How does social capital evolve over time and across 
countries? Is it path dependent? Adding some time dimension to the study of social 
capital looks promising. Section 3.II compares three different proposed measures of 
social capital for the second half of the twentieth century, and looks at the relationships 
between them. Section 3.Ill turns the attention into historical data and presents a new 
social capital index for the late nineteenth century. In Section 3.IV, we are able to look 
at the inter-temporal evolution of social capital thanks to the newly created index, 
together with the more recent measurement alternatives. Finally, section 3.V succinctly 
concludes.
3. II. COMPARISON OF CONTEMPORARY ALTERNATIVES
Of all the possible ways to try to measure social capital, several empirical proposals are 
available, but yet none enjoys general acceptance. Therefore, it is convenient to start 
with a comparison amongst the most popular measuring alternatives. The comparison 
might turn into an interesting exercise, since it will make us win some perspective on 
the alternatives plus reveal some of the insights that remain unnoticed until the present 
moment. This section compares three different twentieth century measurement 
alternatives, based on the pre-existing measurement attempts. These three are TRUST, 
CIVIC, and SOCDEV, standing for level of trust in a society, civic engagement, and 
social development respectively.
Both TRUST and CIVIC have been originally extracted from the World Value Surveys, 
which periodically runs over a whole range of countries over the world. General trust in 
people (TRUST) is the percentage of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the following 
question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ I amplified TRUST to TRUSTAM by 
adding extra country data from both the most recent and past rounds of the World Value 
Surveys. Civic engagement (CIVIC) is the percentage of civic activities in which and
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average individual participates. The activities included are: social-welfare services for 
elderly and deprived; education, art, and cultural activities; local community affairs; 
conservation, environment, ecology; and voluntary associations for health (La Porta et 
al., 1997). Finally, social development (SOCDEV) was taken from Adelman and Morris 
(1967). The index is an extraction of factor scores from a principal components analysis 
including 41 socio-economic variables from 74 countries around the world, for the 
period 1957-62. Temple and Johnson (1998) used this index before in order to test the 
economic significance of social arrangements.
With respect to the timing of the measures, the first two correspond to the late twentieth 
century and have been taken from Knack and Keefer (1997), (hence KK appears in 
some instances attached to the variable name). Overall, the General Value Survey 
rounds for 1980, 1990-1 and 1995-6 are incorporated, using always the most recent 
observation available2. As an average, we can say the two variables are aimed at 
monitoring social capabilities at the end of the twentieth century. SOCDEV 
corresponds to the early 1960’s, -this is, twenty to thirty-five years earlier-, so we will 
need to keep this in mind.
Table 3.13 is a compendium of the data availability for three variables. We can observe 
that data availability is limited, so the comparisons amongst variables are forced to be 
restricted to a smaller sample of countries.
These are three different ways to measure social capabilities that have been proposed in 
the literature. They are conceptually different from each other and may or may not be 
related. The correlation matrix shows that their relationship, if any, is not always linear 
(table 3.2). Later we will find non-linear relationships between them.
In order to investigate deeper the relationships between the three variables, we make use 
of graphical representations. Only 9 complete cases are available for all three variables. 
This is due to the fact that the variables come from different sources and were not 
thought to match and be studied together. A scatter plot can help us to position these 
cases in the three-dimensional space. Figure 3.1 is a joint three-dimensional graphical 
representation of the three proposed indicators. SOCDEV stands for the Adelman and 
Morris social development index and is the variable positioned in one of the axis.
2 The last round of Surveys dating 2002 is not included because it is beyond the time framework.
3 Because o f the large amount o f calculations involved in this chapter, all tables are compiled at the end.
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CIVICKK stands for civic engagement as reported by Knack and Keefer (1997) and has 
been placed in the second axis. Finally, TRUSTAM stands for trust amplified as 
described above and is the variable positioned in the third axis. Every dot in the three 
dimensional space reveals the position of the indicated country with respect to the three 
indicators. For best visualisation on the three-dimensional space, we include two scatter 
plots representing two different perspectives on the same data; -one with spikes to the 
floor and a second one with centroid perspective (spikes to the centre of the data) - . The 
three-dimensional graphical representation offers an overall picture of the data, which 
reveals an elliptic shape.
Since we are especially interested in historical considerations, the focus of the paper is 
driven by past-present contrasts. Nonetheless, comparing both contemporary measures 
for social capital, TRUST and CIVIC, is not of least interest, since they stand for 
different concepts. This is done by overlapping throughout the paper two plots in one. 
In the figures 3.2 and 3.3 (within twentieth century comparisons), the light coloured 
dots and lines depict the pair CIVIC versus SOCDEV, while the dark dots and lines 
represent TRUST versus SOCDEV. In short, the scatter plots below should be read in 
the following way: Every graph is composed of two overlapping bi-dimensional scatter 
plots, with the historical index in the horizontal axis and the contemporary index in the 
vertical axis. SOCDEV is common for both overlapping plots and is always positioned 
in the horizontal axis. It represents the historical measure of social capital. CIVIC and 
TRUST are always placed in the vertical axis, representing the contemporary measure 
of social capital. In this way, we can read all the graphs as a historical evolution of 
social capital, by looking at where countries were positioned in the 1960’s (horizontal 
axis) and where they were positioned in the 1990’s (vertical axis).4
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 represent the historical evolution of social capital in the second half 
of the twentieth century. SOCDEV corresponds to the years around 1960, while TRUST 
and CIVIC capture roughly the last two decades of the twentieth century. The two 
figures are based on the same data, and differ only on visual aids. The first one draws 
spikes from every country to the mean of the contemporary variable. Both variables 
CIVIC and TRUST have been standardised and thus vary within the same range. It is 
particularly interesting to observe where the mean of these two falls. We can observe
4 STD at the end of the name o f the variable means that the variable has been standardised. The variables 
which do not contain STD at the end of their name were already constructed in a way which allows for 
comparison.
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that the mean of CIVIC is higher than the mean of TRUST. This fact can be due to the 
formulation of the questionnaire. But we should recall and keep in mind that they do not 
measure exactly the same concept: One is an index of voluntary participation and the 
other a percentage of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers regarding the general level of trust in a 
country. So there should be room for disparity. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to 
wonder whether there is a reason beyond formulation of the questionnaire and 
conceptual disparity behind the differing means. Later in this paper we argue that this is 
the case.
In figure 3.3 a line has been fitted to the points using a non-parametric technique called 
Towess’ (locally weighted linear regression). This method fits the maximum number of 
points with the minimum number of iterations. Fifty percent of the points have been 
fitted with only three iterations. This type of graph is very appealing because it reveals 
the outliers. For the sake of historical findings, the engagingness of this exercise lays 
more on unmasking the outliers than on the fitted points that stand on the average. The 
impossibility of the fit line to match all dots points at the exceptional evolutions (both 
for the good and for the bad).
Striking results are those of India and Japan. They reveal themselves as outstanding 
performers in social improvement, which is historically consistent with their growth 
experiences. We can also detect failure stories by looking at the extremely poor 
contemporary scores compared to the mid-century scores for some Latin American 
countries like Mexico or Venezuela. Indeed, from figures 3.1 to 3.3 we can observe how 
some countries strikingly detach from the average, defeating the path dependence 
argument postulated by North. Having said this, the path dependence hypothesis is not 
refuted but modified. This is saying that socially well-endowed countries do actually 
leap over the development gap.
Should we have time series information about social evolution, we would be able to 
determine the timing of the social change: before, during, or after economic growth. As 
discussed in previous sections, Putnam argues that social change happens up to 70 years 
ahead of subsequent economic growth. Therefore, we need to go back further into 
history of social development to be able to contrast this observation. This is done in the 
next section.
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3. III. CONSTRUCTING A SOCIAL CAPITAL INDEX 
FOR THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Constructing a social capital measure for the distant past presents several challenges. 
The first challenge is the limitations of data availability. Once we turn into the distant 
past (more than a few decades ago) no surveys can be conducted and one has to rely on 
data already collected for other purposes. The second challenge, which is going to be 
addressed now, is to find a quantitative methodology that is flexible enough given the 
data limitations, but still conveys informative results. For both challenges, one needs to 
be truly imaginative and make the most out of the resources. Finally, how are the 
resulting data going to be compared to more recent data? The third challenge is to 
construct a measure that, at the same time, can be compared -even if imperfectly- to 
some existing indicator.
3. III. 1. SOURCES: NEW ADELMAN AND MORRIS DATABASE
Contemporary indicators of social capital based on the World Value Surveys are 
informative. Yet we need a wider time span in order to bring historical perspective into 
the analysis of social capital. Having pre-First World War social capital estimations 
would provide useful historical insights in order to study its evolution and test its 
persistence.
It is possible to find historical data to fill in the blanks on existing work and give a time 
dimension to the social capital analysis. At this respect, Adelman and Morris (1988) 
provide an extensive socio-economic database for the period 1850 to 1914.
The comprehensive nineteenth century series provided by Adelman and Morris are the 
starting point for our database. The extensive data appendix accompanying their 1988 
book is a summary of the work on their data over more than 20 years. It contains cross- 
sectional data for 23 countries scattered over the globe and referring to 35 summary 
variables ranging from attitudes to change to political perceptions5. The latter depict the 
socio-economic structure of every country in the sample between 1850 and 1914, being 
this divided into 3 sub-periods: 1850-1870, 1870-1890, and 1890-1914. Cross-sectional
5 A list o f countries can be found in appendix 3. A; a detailed list o f variables can be found in appendix 
3.B.
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data are supplied for every sub-period. The variables in levels and proportions refer to 
the initial level of each period, while those capturing change or characteristics refer to 
the whole of the preceding 20 year period.
The Adelman and Morris database has unique characteristics of which an economist 
looking for social influences in historical perspective can certainly take advantage of. 
These are: The database describes the situation of the economy in the late nineteenth 
century in conjunction with a detailed picture of the institutional framework, and some 
interesting social attitudes and customs in different countries. This highly valuable 
database has been explored under its possibilities.
This research reconstructs a similar database to that which Adelman and Morris built for 
the period 1850 to 1914, and then uses it to construct a Social Development Index (SDI) 
for the nineteenth century. The variables are extracted from their 1988 book. They are 
re-codified for convenience but the integrity of the database is preserved. Some 
variables available from Adelman and Morris (1988), their previous publications, and 
other posterior sources have been omitted because the alternative variables covering the 
same concept are preferable in terms of country classification and overall consistency of 
the database. Re-codification consisted of transferring letter codification (alphabetic 
order of categories) into numeric codification (categories sorted by ordinal numbers). 
This turned alphabetically coded variables into numerically coded variables, suitable for 
the intended statistical analysis. In addition, almost half of the variables have been 
renovated or updated.6 Then we performed a principal components analysis.
3. III. 2. QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY
Why do I think that the principal components must convey information about the 
quality of the society? One could have gathered a bunch of variables which I think 
describe the quality of a society and calculate a simple average. However, not all 
variables contribute in the same measure to explain the dispersion in the data; some do 
capture more variance than others. The principal components analysis (PCA) is a 
sophisticated weighted average that gives more importance to those variables that 
deserve it in terms of variance explained. If there is something that makes the countries 
genuinely different, the principal components analysis will capture it.
6 Please, refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the Adelman and Morris (1988) database.
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In short, the principal components analysis is a data-reduction technique. It aims at 
giving a description of the relationships between a set of variables in terms of a smaller 
set of linear combinations of these variables. These linear combinations are called 
Principal Components. The extent to which the relationships between the variables can 
be adequately described by a small set of new variables called Principal Components 
depends on the correlations between the original variables. The higher the correlation 
between the original variables, the smaller the number of Principal Components and,
n
thus, the most effective the data reduction is.
The latter characteristic of the Principal Component Analysis will turn out to be very 
helpful to us. It is well-known that in the social sciences -  and especially in economics - 
many variables are highly correlated. Economic time-series tend to move together, and 
because of this it is often difficult to separate the effect that one variable has on another. 
However, here we are concerned with the parsimonious description of a high­
dimensional object (many variables) into a small-dimensional one (one index), and as a 
result the Principal Components Analysis actually takes advantage of these high 
correlations. It is for this reason that we consider this technique particularly adequate for 
our purposes.
But the principal components analysis is not merely a data reduction exercise. The 
principal components are the underlying factors behind the variables, those factors that 
make them move together (covariate), and cannot be captured in any other way than in 
the abstract. The variables are just the reflection or result of those underlying factors 
that make them move together. And social capital is precisely this glue. This is why I 
think that a set of variables describing a society can help us capture the social capital 
behind.
3. III. 3. PRE-PCA TESTS: OPTIMISING THE VARIABLES
Prior to the principal components analysis (PCA) of the data, there are some statistical 
preliminary tests that are convenient to run. The first one of these preliminary tests is 
the Bartlett’s test of sphericity. This test checks the validity of the whole exercise. 
Secondly, one might want to check for the validity of the inclusion of individual
7 An intuitive explanation of the principal components technique can be found in appendix D.
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variables. There are several ways to test the adequacy variable-by-variable. These are 
the square multiple correlation coefficient or R-squared of individual variables, a test of
o
simple partial correlations, and, finally, Kaiser's measure of sampling adequacy . This 
section goes through all these tests, prior to the principal components analysis.
The first preliminary test is the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1950). This is a 
basic test of the significance of the principal components analysis9. It checks that the 
correlations matrix of all variables to be included in the analysis is not an identity 
matrix. Should that be the case, it would make no sense to run a principal components 
analysis because this type of analysis is only adequate for variables that are interrelated. 
The Bartlett’s test of sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix (all zeros except ones in the main diagonal) against the alternative 
hypothesis that the variables show statistically significant correlations amongst each 
other. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the database has passed the first hurdle.
Given the socio-economic character of the variables in the database, one would be very 
surprised if the database would not pass this test. The principal components analysis has 
been chosen precisely because of the adequacy of this type of analysis to strongly 
interrelated variables.
The variables referring to the rate of adoption of new technologies in industry and 
agriculture respectively are perfectly correlated. The latter has been removed from the 
analysis in order to avoid multicolinearity problems. Therefore, there is one unique 
variable referring to the rate of adoption of new technologies, and this corresponds to 
both industry and agriculture.
As far as the adequacy of variables is concerned, all variables are in the database 
because there is a theoretical justification to include them. They are all related to or 
helping to reveal the quality of society in one way or another. However, statistical 
methods offer the possibility to put all variables through tougher tests of adequacy. 
First, the partial correlation between two variables is the correlation between the 
deviations from the mean. The simple partial correlations test consists of calculating 
partial correlations between all pairs of variables and checking whether these are strong
8 These series of preliminary tests have been suggested by Wuensch (2005).
9 Actually, the Bartlett’s test o f sphericity is designed to test the significance o f any factor analysis, 
regardless of the extraction method.
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enough for us to think they are contributing to the same underlying factors or 
components. Second, the squared multiple correlations (SMC) test calculates the R- 
squared of every variable with all the rest, and, therefore, is a more elaborated measure 
of adequacy variable-by-variable. For this reason, the first test of simple partial 
correlations is omitted. Still more sophisticated is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy (KMO). This measure is calculated as 1 minus the ratio between the 
sum of squares of all pair wise correlations (pair wise variances) and the sum of squares 
of all partial correlations of that variable with the rest10. This ratio is close to 1 when the 
pair wise correlations with all variables are high and the partial correlations are small, 
and close to 0 if the pair wise correlations with all other variables are small and the 
partial correlations high. It can be calculated both for individual variables and overall. 
For maximum representativeness in a principal components analysis one would want 
the KMO being close to 1, meaning that direct correlations with other variables are 
much more important than correlations of deviations from the mean. This is a way to 
measure the proportion of total variance explained by a particular variable with respect 
to the average. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) is used 
as the main criterion of inclusion/exclusion of variables, although the SMC or R- 
squared is also calculated for reassurance/illustration purposes.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy can theoretically take 
values from minus infinity to 1. In practice, very rarely takes negative values, so it is 
regarded as running from 0 to 1. Small values mean that overall the variables have too 
little in common to warrant a good factor analysis. Heuristically, the following labels 
are given to values of KMO:
Less than 0.49 unacceptable 
0.50 to 0.59 miserable
0.60 to 0.69 mediocre
0.70 to 0.79 middling
0.80 to 0.89 meritorious
0.90 to 1.00 marvelous,
as classified in the STATA User’s Manual, based on Kaiser. This measure of sampling 
adequacy improves as the number of variables increases, the number of effective
riZ 'f*
10 KMO = 1 -  **' , , where r is the correlation coefficient and pr is the partial correlation coefficient.
Z^Prik
k * \
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components decreases, the number of individuals increases, and the general level of 
correlation increases (Kaiser, 1970:405).
The KMO test is positive overall. The global rating for the adequacy of the sample of 
variables is 0.72 in a scale of 0 to 1. The KMO test also gives a mark for each one of the 
variables. A mark lower than 0.5 is suggesting the corresponding variable to be 
removed from the analysis. From the 32 variables in the first stage principal 
components analysis 4 are returning a mark lower than 0.5: Export growth group, 
population growth group, immigration group, and land concentration. Then, a second 
principal components analysis is performed.
In the second round (removing the 4 irrelevant variables) the overall KMO rate has 
improved from 0.72 to 0.77, and many more variables seem to fit better in this 
dimension. Also, 2 of them have become irrelevant: population per farm and population 
group. This is an invitation to perform a third principal components analysis round 
removing those two additional variables.
The third round with only 26 of the initial 32 variables is giving acceptable KMO marks 
for all variables. Therefore, it is the moment to stop. In addition, the overall KMO mark 
remains at 0.77 (same as last round). In total, we have removed 6 variables from the 
initial set plus 1 for being redundant. All the rest have been proven to have an empirical 
on top of theoretical justification to be there. It is interesting to note that the first 
principal component, characterised by the highest ranked variables, is becoming 
increasingly more important in terms of total variance captured as successive corrected 
rounds are performed. In the first round, the first principal component was capturing 
almost 45 percent of the variation in the data, in the second round it was capturing more 
than 50 percent, and in the third round it captures 54 percent.11 The relative importance 
of the first principal component with respect to the rest is explored in more detail in the 
next section of this chapter.
As a robustness test for the list of variables eventually included in the PCA let us alter 
the KMO selection criteria. Before, it has been set at a minimum of 0.5 variable-by- 
variable, following the classification above. Let us move this barrier up to the next 
level, 0.6 mark or above variable-by-variable. This is a more strict selection criterion,
11 Exact values are shown in the tables section at the end o f the chapter.
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and it is a standard one. Following this alternative criterion suggests dispensing with 
some extra variables after the first round: income growth, population per farmland, 
industrial wage change, agricultural wage change, population group, and form of land 
tenure, all of these scoring between 0.5 and 0.6, the latter not inclusive, [0.5, 0.6). 
Following this stricter criterion leaves a satisfying list of variables already in the second 
round. This has raised the KMO overall mark from 0.77 to 0.87, while leaving the 
significance level of the Barletf s sphericity test practically untouched. Thus, we shall 
stick to this criterion; all this keeping in mind that the overall KMO test is returning a 
global measure above 0.7 in all instances for the whole group of variables considered 
together. So, the successive rounds of variable-by-variable KMO test should be taken as 
a refinement of the selection exercise. As a result of the improved suitability, 22 
variables are left from the original 32. The total variance explained by the first principal 
component alone rises from the initial 45 to almost 60 percent thanks to the
i ^
optimisation of the choice of variables .
Now it is turn to turn into the new database, described in detail in chapter 2. The new 
database preserves the spirit of the original Adelman and Morris database but has been 
renovated and updated with the information available up to date. Therefore, it should be 
the preferred choice. The initial count of variables available for inclusion in the PCA 
goes up to 35, thanks to the updating work. A total of 14 variables are new, most of 
them substituting old ones. The same preliminary tests have now been run for the new 
database.
As before, the rate of adoption of new technologies in agriculture needs to be removed 
because of perfect correlation with the rate of adoption of new technologies in industry. 
Leaving just one of these two, no matter which one, will represent the rate of adoption 
of new technologies in general. This leaves the initial analysis of the new data with 34 
variables to start with.
The old variables for economic role of the government (govt) and representativeness of 
political institutions (represent) have a clearly superior performance than the new ones 
(govrel and polity2) in being aligned with the components. This fact is an invitation for 
the reincorporation of previous alternatives. Let us first do the second round with the 
suppression of these two as the KMO test suggests. Then, we will move to
12 See tables at the end o f the chapter.
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reincorporation of old adequate variables. In both cases, for the inclusion in the second 
round, the same restrictive criterion as above has been followed: All variables with a 
KMO mark below 0.6 have been suppressed.
The final result is the second round with the new database, having replaced govrel and 
polity2 by their old corresponding variables, govt and represent, due to the fact that they 
seem to perform better than the new ones. An initial survey has been made with the 34 
initial variables, just replacing back these two. Then, all those scoring below 0.6 in the 
KMO test have been removed. This gives rise to the final selection of variables.
Results are indeed the best in terms of adequacy of the variables that contribute to 
explain the principal components. This is reflected in the fact that the overall KMO is 
above 0.9, which corresponds to the highest target for the KMO test, and described as 
“marvellous”. Actually, once the less relevant variables have been suppressed, all 18 
eventually included variables have an individual KMO mark around 0.9, as seen in the 
tables shown at the end of the chapter. This reflects the adequacy of the variables in 
capturing the underlying principal components. Actually, this selection of variables 
happens to return also the highest percentage of variance explained by the first principal 
component alone (above 65 percent), which reinforces the intuitive idea that a summary 
variable unlocked by the principal components is more than feasible. The principal 
components selection is explored in more detail in the next section.
Both datasets, an adaptation of the original by Morris and Adelman (1988) and the 
renewed one presented in this thesis, have been put to test for best PCA performance 
potential. Preliminary tests for optimal selection of variables reveal that the new dataset 
has a higher PCA potential, once cleaned up. However, some of the old variables have 
been recovered in the final selection, because they seem to capture elements not present 
in the new data. In all cases there are no problems of insufficient correlation amongst 
the variables, as shown by the Barlett’s sphericity test.
3. III. 4. RESULTS: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
The principal components are newly generated variables, obtained from linear 
combinations of the original. The first component extracts the linear combination of the 
variables that contains most of the variance. Successive orthogonal components explain
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the variance that is left. Because every variable entering the analysis is startardised to 
have variance equal to 1, one should be interested in those outcoming principal 
components that have an eigenvalue greater than 1. This means they can explain more 
variance than any of the single variables can; the greater the eigenvalue, the larger the 
amount of variance explained. The sum of all eigenvalues has to be equal to the number 
of variables. This is why we are only potentially interested in those principal 
components with an eigenvalue greater than 1, although there are as many principal 
components (or dimensions) as variables.
The principal components are sorted by the associated eigenvalue: The first principal 
component is the one that has the highest eigenvalue and thus can explain the greatest 
amount of variance in the data, the second one is the one that has the second highest 
eigenvalue, and so on. Out of the 18 principal components extracted, there are only 3 
with an eigenvalue greater than one. These three alone capture 80 percent of the total 
variation in the data. Actually, only one of the has a 2-digit percentage of explained 
variance. Not only this but, in this case, the first principal component alone explains 
more than 65 percent of the total variation in the data, making data reduction very 
effective.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the total variance explained by the principal components in 
1870 and 1890 respectively, sorted by the amount of variance in the data they are able 
to capture. Remarkably, the analysis reveals that the first principal component alone 
explains between 63 and 65 percent of the variation in the data for both years 1870 and 
1890. The significance of this first principal component is also very clearly reflected in 
the scree plots (graphs 3.2 and 3.3 corresponding to 1870 and 1980 respectively). The 
figures for the eigenvalues abruptly decline after the first principal component. So we 
can take without fear the first principal component as the main underlying unobserved 
explanatory factor in the data.
How many components to retain? It can be observed both in the explained variance 
table and the scree plot that the first principal component is overwhelmingly the most 
representative one and effective in terms of data reduction. This is a quite clear case; 
nevertheless, it is always beneficial to double check with the theory. In a relatively 
recent methodological paper, Diana and Tommasi (2002) suggest to stop when the
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♦ nassociated eigenvalue is more than one and a half times the following one . In this case, 
the ratio of the first to the second eigenvalue is in the order of 7, so we are far on the 
safe side.
The dominant principal component of the analysis of the renovated Adelman and 
Morris database can be interpreted as the level of socio-economic development. I have 
extracted a score for each and year I have data for. I named this variable SDI [YEAR], 
standing for social development index in a given year. Series for years 1870 and 1890 
are presented here; though there is potential to expand the list of years to 1850 and 
1910, with the necessary amount of time and resources. Most of the necessary data for 
the latter are already available, but the way lagged variables operated in the 
computations made the final index non-obtainable for the first and last periods, 1850 
and 1914.
The first principal component score coefficients and scores for both years 1870 and 
1890 are shown in the tables 3.12 and 3.13. The component scores coefficients shown in 
table 3.12 are the weights by which variables are multiplied to obtain the country 
scores. Full name and description of variables can be found in the appendix. Table 3.13 
shows the first principal component scores obtained for every country and year in the 
sample. These are available for 23 countries (remarkably including China, country for 
which no data at this respect has ever been produced before, to the extent of my 
knowledge). In this way, we have a score for Argentina 1870, another for Argentina 
1890, and so on, completing the list of 23 countries.14 Two additional columns have 
been added to table 3.13 in order to monitor the evolution of the social development 
index over time. The third numerical column has been obtained by subtracting SDI 
1870 from SDI 1890. The result is the change of the index in these two decades. The 
last column in table 3.13 indicates the sign of the change, either positive (increase) or 
negative (decrease).
Interestingly enough, practically all countries in the sample show an increase in social 
development for the period under study, 1870 to 1890. New Zealand and Japan are the 
countries that improved the most in the SDI (more than 1 standard deviation in 20 
years), being the average improvement around half a standard deviation. The United
13 In other words, m ax{j-l, •••, k} Aj/Aj+i >1.5 (Diana and Tommasi, 2002:80).
14 List o f countries in Appendix A.
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Kingdom is the only country that appears to have lost some of its stock of social capital 
with respect to other countries. After the United Kingdom, but still exhibiting a positive 
sign of change, are China and France, in this order. There seems to the 2 groups of 
countries that have improved less than the rest of the sample, these being either Western 
European countries which departed from a privileged position and therefore do not have 
so much catching-up potential (UK, France, Belgium), or countries in a very poor stage 
of development which are not making much progress at that time yet (China, Egypt, 
India). These 2 groups are the countries that have lost or won less in terms of relative 
position in the ranking.
The two completely new series are depicted in figure 3.4. The Social Development 
Index for 1870 is positioned in the horizontal axis, while the 1890 counterpart lays on 
the vertical axis. In this way, we can see the change in the positioning of countries 
during the 20-year period in between. A diagonal 45-degree line has been drawn for 
ease of interpretation. All countries above the line improved their score in 1890 with 
respect to 1870. Countries below the line scored lower in 1890 than in 1870. Almost all 
countries managed to improve their score, as confirmed in table 3.13.
3. IV. LONG RUN INTER TEMPORAL COMPARISONS: 
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES
Tabellini (2007) provides a framework for long run inter-temporal comparison. In his 
investigation for the European regions, he concludes that economic outcomes have their 
root in historically fundamented attitudes towards trust, respect for others and self- 
determination and, therefore, gives a quite deterministic view to economic development, 
in the direction of what Douglass North pointed at regarding historical determinism 
(North, 1981).
The newly developed Social Development Index for the late nineteenth century creates 
some room for a long run inter-temporal comparison of the quality of the society for 
countries all over the world, including both colonised and colonisers. The new SDI 
series for 1870 and 1890 can be contrasted to the contemporary measures of social 
capital. In particular SOCDEV for the early 1960’s was constructed with a similar 
technique. Unfortunately, samples of countries for the nineteenth and the twentieth
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century overlap thinly. This results in a small number of countries being in the two 
samples for this specific index.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 depict the historical evolution of social developments over long 
periods of time. Figure 3.5 represents the change in scores over almost a century, from 
1870 to 1960. Figure 2.6 depicts the change over a 70 year period, from 1890 to 1960. 
All countries in the sample have improved notably over these long periods of time.
We have just seen that tracing the change of the Social Development Index over the 
twentieth century is currently feasible for a small sample of countries. Now, what can 
we learn from the relationship of the nineteenth century SDI with other twentieth 
century indicators of social capital? At this point, it turns useful to bring into the 
analysis the two most popular contemporary alternatives, namely trust and civic 
engagement. In particular, are there any patterns in which these two contemporary 
variables proceeding from surveys relate to the nineteenth century newly constructed 
estimates?
Starting with the most recent first, the relationship between TRUST and CIVIC is 
illustrated by means of the overlay scatter plot (i. e. overlapping to scatter plots). The 
scatter plots should be read in the same way described for the twentieth century analysis 
in section 3.II. In figures 3.7 to 3.12 the light coloured dots and lines represent the 
relation between SDI and TRUST, while the dark dots and lines represent the relation 
between SDI and CIVIC.
Figure 3.7 shows quite different from its twentieth century counterpart studied in 
section 3.II (figure 3.2). In the first place, countries are more widely spread over the 
social development index range and less over the vertical axis. This indicates 
convergence from a wide range of social development positions in the nineteenth 
century to a more equalised level at the end of the twentieth century. Late nineteenth 
century results are similar (see figure 3.8 for 1890). Secondly, means for contemporary 
variables are reversed. Now the mean of TRUST is higher than the mean of CIVIC, 
both when contrasted to past SDI. This is true both for 1870 and 1890. Also, civic 
engagement appears to be more stable or equalised across countries than trust. This 
means that all countries in the display a relatively similar level of contemporary civic 
engagement, no matter where they were standing in terms of social development in the
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past. However, this is not true for trust. There seems to be a pattern in the distribution of 
trust across countries, depending what was their departure point in terms of social 
development in the past. Let us have a closer look at this phenomenon.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the same set of data with fitted lines for 1870-nowadays and 
1890 nowadays historical evolutions. In both cases the fitting method was the lowess 
method, with fifty percent of the points fitted in three iterations (same as in section 3.II 
graphs). Here we can observe that trust is more volatile across countries than civic 
engagement is, and has a tendency to be less equalised. This fact stands clear from both 
1870-nowadays and 1890-nowadays fit lines. Again, India stands as the most 
paradigmatic outlier in the sample, showing a spectacular social evolution in the course 
of the twentieth century. New outliers revealed by the nineteenth century analysis are 
Norway in the good side, and Brazil, Australia, and France in the down side. We would 
not have expected this deceiving result from France or Australia, even with the more 
than one century’s perspective. But be aware that we have only very recently realised 
that India had a big potential for economic growth, which has recently being 
spectacularly coming out. This was not obvious just twenty years ago. So, we are afraid 
one could be a catastrophist when auguring growth prospects for France and Australia if 
one is to judge by the social evolution indications15.
The tendency of civic engagement levels to be equalised across countries regardless of 
their past is confirmed in figures 3.11 and 3.12. These present fit lines with ninety-five 
percent confidence intervals. Quadratic and cubic regression prediction lines were used 
respectively, according to which method fitted the data best. Again 1870-nowadays and 
1890-nowadays analyses show similar results, the main ones being: 1) civic engagement 
tends to be similar for all countries in the sample, regardless of where they were 
standing in terms of social development in the past and, 2) parabolic layout of trust 
observations.
The contemporary civic engagement levels appear to be very similar for almost every 
country in the sample, regardless of what was the level of social development in the late 
nineteenth century. Second, open ends mean that social extremes seem to be more 
unpredictable. This happens by construction of the confidence intervals. Extremes tend 
to be more unpredictable, since we only have data either from the right or from the left,
15 Implications for per capita income are tested in the next chapter (Chapter 4).
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but not from both sides. Still, this phenomenon is especially acute for the bottom tale of 
the sample. Countries with very low levels of social development in the late nineteenth 
century have proved to unfold in all directions: They might evolve into a miracle (India) 
or turn down to a catastrophe (Brazil).
The ‘parabolic layout of trust points’ means that the cross-country study of the 
evolution of trust contrasted with social development in the nineteenth century reveals a 
parabolic layout. Even allowing for a higher level polynomial would the prediction line 
turn out to be quasi-parabolic (see figure 3.12). The relevance of the quadratic term can 
be tested econometrically. It can be shown that the square of social development in a 
trust regression is significant at the standard 5 percent level. In other words, countries in 
the middle of the spectrum have improved the most with respect to their nineteenth 
century position in the SDI ranking. I interpret this parabola as the combination of two 
phenomena: the unpredictable direction that the worst scored countries will follow (see 
previous paragraph), combined with the Abramovitz hypothesis of ‘falling behind’ for 
the best historically positioned countries (Abramovitz, 1986). In this way, countries in 
the middle of the spectrum have the highest predictable prospects for catching up.
A considerable historical perspective is added to the analysis. We can observe a 
tendency to persistence of the social indicators. So, there is an element of North’s 
hypothesis on path dependency, as suggested by Tabellini (2007). However, outliers 
depart from the trend, doing nothing but confirm that the results are historically 
consistent with future economic growth trajectories. This is the case of India, which 
shows exceptionally high values in the social development index or Brazil, whose 
scores are deceivingly poor. A striking characteristic is the finding that some socially 
well located countries in the nineteenth century show to be loosing their relative 
position at the end of the twentieth century. This preoccupating phenomenon, which 
surprises as counterintuitive, needs a more detailed consideration. One needs to keep in 
mind that the comparison is done with different scales. But, as a first approximation, 
this dramatic finding is nothing but the proof of what Putnam was pointing at in his 
2000 book Bowling Alone, detailing the weakening of social values in the North 
American society. There seems to be a tendency for Western European countries to fall 
into this group.
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3. V. CONCLUSION
We presented the first international historical estimates for social capital. Two new 
series of a Social Development Index (SDI) become available: one for 1870 and one for 
1890. We showed a new way of looking at social evolution. Together with some other 
contemporary measurement attempts, the new series allow monitoring the evolution of a 
social development index over time.
As a conclusion, one can say that it is true that social attitudes are correlated to 
economic performance (Tabellini, 2007), but it is not true that the former do not change. 
The inter-temporal comparison of the various social capital proxies shows that cultural 
revolutions are possible and are indeed observed in the data if one allows for a sufficient 
time span. The present study looks at the change in the world country ranking of social 
capital proxies for a period of 70 to 90 years, and the result is that cultural miracles (as 
growth miracles) exist. When all regions in the world are included instead of only 
Europe, differentiated patterns of social development trajectories can be pinned down.
Thus, North’s hypothesis of path dependency is modified. Practically all countries in the 
sample show an increase in social development during the intermediate period (1870 to 
1890), and all of them reveal a very significant improvement over the twentieth century. 
We find some outstanding performers in social improvement, defeating path 
dependence, and also detect some failure stories. In both cases, the social development 
trajectories seem to be historically consistent with their subsequent economic growth 
experiences.
Europe’s relative position with respect to the rest of the World varies. Scandinavian 
countries are absolute leaders on trust, while they were in the centre of the social 
development spectrum more that 100 years ago. Meanwhile, some core Western 
European countries like France or the United Kingdom, who were World leaders once, 
seem to have lost their privileged positions during the course of the twentieth century.
Finally, different social capital measurement alternatives exhibit different patterns, 
suggesting that they are simply capturing different aspects. We find statistically 
significant non-linear relationships between them. In particular, trust describes a
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parabolic layout with respect to our Social Development Index, and civic engagement 
stands as surprisingly even across countries.
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TABLES AND FIGURES FOR SECTION 3.II - CONTEMPORARY 
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
Table 3.1 -  Three alternative measures to monitor social capital
COUNTRY soc TRUST CIVIC COUNTRY SOC TRUST CIVIC
DEV AM KK DEV AM KK
Afganistan -1,02 Lesotho
Algeria 0,18 Liberia -1,01
Angola Libya -0,68
Argentina 1,91 27.0 39.50 Lithuania 22
Armenia 25 Luxembourg
Australia 47.8 38.27 Madagascar -1,31
Austria 31.8 41.45 Malawi -1,57
Azerbaijan 21 Malaysia
Bahamas, Mali
The
Bahrain Malta
Bangladesh 21 Mauritania
Barbados Mauritius
Belarus 24 Mexico 0,75 17.7 34.55
Belgium 30.2 38.08 Moldova 22
Benin -1,54 Morocco -0,57
Bolivia -0,35 Mozambique
Botswana Myanmar (Burma) -0,41
Brazil 0,79 6.7 37.58 Nepal -1,36
Bulgaria 30.4 Netherlands 46.2 38.36
Burkina Faso New Zealand
Burundi Nicaragua 0,88
Cambodia -0,55 Niger -1,86
Cameroon -1,34 Nigeria -0,91 22.9 39.19
Canada 49.6 39.74 Nonway 61.2 40.75
Cape Verde Oman
Central 
African Rep.
Pakistan -0,08
Chad -1,70 Panama 0,84
Chile 1,39 22.7 36.80 Papua New Guinea
China Paraguay 0,97
Colombia 0,66 10 Peru 0,68 5
SOC
DEV
TRUST
AM
CIVIC
KK
COUNTRY SOC
DEV
TRUST
AM
CIVIC
KK
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Comoros Philippines 0,56 6
Congo Poland 34.5
Costa Rica 0,78 Portugal 21.4 36.89
Cote d'Ivoire -0,98 Romania 16.1
Croatia 25 Russia 24
Cyprus 1,08 Rwanda
Czech 30 Saudi Arabia
Republic
Denmark 56.0 40.34 Senegal -0,52
Dominica Seychelles
Dominican 0,81 26 Sierra Leone -1,39
Rep.
Ecuador 0,54 Singapore
Egypt 0,73 Slovakia 23
El Salvador 0,71 Slovenia 16
Estonia 22 Solomon Islands
Ethiopia -0,99 Somalia -1,35
Fiji South Africa 0,62 30.5 36.99
Finland 57.2 40.64 Spain 34.5 38.75
France 24.8 36.26 Sri Lanka 0,35
Gabon -0,83 St.Lucia
Gambia St.Vincent&Grens.
Georgia 23 Sudan -0,64
Germany 29.8 39.83 Suriname 0,54
Ghana -0,01 23 Swaziland
Greece 1,47 Sweden 57.1 41.57
Grenada Switzerland 43.2 40.89
Guatemala 0,35 Syria 0,57
Guinea -1,47 Taiwan 1,05 42
Guinea- Tanzania -1,22
Bissau
Guyana Thailand 0,50
Haiti Togo
Honduras 0,26 Tonga
Hong Kong Trinidad & Tobago 1,15
Hungary 24.6 Tunisia -0,18
Iceland 41.6 41.07 Turkey 0,88 10.0 42.43
SOC TRUST CIVIC COUNTRY SOC TRUST CIVIC
DEV AM KK DEV AM KK
India -0,28 34.3 42.65 Uganda -1,22
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Indonesia -0,40 Ukraine 31
Iran, I.R. of 0,09 United Arab 
Emirates
Iraq -0,03 United Kingdom 44.4 40.07
Ireland 40.2 37.51 United Status 45.4 40.55
Israel 1,77 Uruguay 1,59 22
Italy 26.3 41.23 Vanuatu
Jamaica 1,06 Venezuela 1,37 14
Japan 1,63 40.8 41.79 Vietnam, South -0,49
Jordan 0,16 Western Samoa
Kenya -0,53 Yemen, N.Arab -1,35
Korea 0,85 38 Yugoslavia 31
Kuwait 38.0 39.64 Zaire
Laos -1,06 Zambia -0,89
Latvia 25 Zimbabwe 0,14
Lebanon 1,44
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Table 3.2 -  Pearson Correlation Matrix of Social Capital
Alternatives
socdev
1960
trustam
1990
civickk
1990
socdev
1960
Pearson
Correlation
1 ,090 -,089
Tail probability ,723 ,820
Number of 
cases
75 18 9
trustam
1990
Pearson
Correlation
,090 1 ,387(*)
Tail probability ,723 ,038
Number of 
cases
18 58 29
civickk
1990
Pearson
Correlation
-,089 ,387(*) 1
Tail probability ,820 ,038
Number of 
cases
9 29 29
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The correlation matrix shows that there is no strong linear relationship 
between these three variables.
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Figure 3.1 - 3D Scatter Plots of Social Capital Alternatives. 
Spikes to the Floor and Centroid respectively
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Figure 3.2 - Historical Evolution, from 1960 (Soc Dev) to Surveys:
Overlay Scatter Plot
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Figure 3.3 - Overlay Scatter Plot w ith  Fit Line
3
2
India
T u rk ey
J a p a n
T ai^ an  J a p a n  
K orea  ■
1
India
S o u th  A frica A rgeni n a  
A rgtyii n aN iger ia
Nigeria"
0 D o m in ica n  R ep>
-© b an a
■1 iuth A p ica  V e r ^ y ^ l
Philii
C IV IC S T D
S O C D E V-2
M ex ico
■  T R U S T S T D
■3 S O C D E V
•2 1 0 1 2
SOCDEV in the horizontal axis, CIVICSTD (light) and 
TRUSTSTD (dark) in the vertical axis. Fit Method: L ow ess. 
50% o f  points fitted with 3 iterations.
146
TABLES FOR 3.III.3 -  PRE-PCA TESTS: OPTIMISING THE VARIABLES
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy. ,716
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 1684,231
Sphericity df 496
Sig. ,000
Table 3.3 -  First round variables, after excluding rate of 
adoption of new technologies in agriculture
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy. ,769
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 1419,284
Sphericity df 325
Sig. ,000
Table 3.4 -  Third (and last) round variables, after excluding 
rate of adoption of new technologies in agriculture, 
population per farmland, export growth group, the 
demographic variables (population group, population growth 
group and immigration group) and land concentration.
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy. ,869
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 1258,497
Sphericity df 231
Sig. ,000
Table 3.5 -  Second (and last) round variables following a stricter 
criterion of variable-by-variable KMO selection (mark greater or 
equal than 0.6) for every variable. This has raised the overall 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy from 0.77 to 0.87, while 
keeping the significance of the sphericity test practically 
untouched.
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling
Adequacy. ,909
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 1093,367
Sphericity df 153
Sig. ,000
Table 3.6 -  Final selection of variables
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Table 3.7 - Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) of variables with all other variables
Variables Original Data New Data
SMC SMC final SMC SMC final
initial variables, initial variables,
variables after KMO test variables after KMO test
income .9841 .9399 .9790 .9270
income growth .9330 - .8930 -
technique in industry .9702 .9290 .9634 .9258
adoption of new techniques .9349 .8956 .9776 .8501
technique in agriculture .9714 .9152 .9799 .9029
agricultural labour .9700 .9043 .9820 .8839
population per farmland .8578 - .9160 -
inland transportation .9581 .9046 .9346 .8739
transportation, growth .8049 .6294 .9151 .5736
export growth group .7242 - - -
trade - - .9618 -
shift in export structure .8594 .7928 .8747 .6935
industrial wage change .8491 - .8840 -
agricultural wage change .7164 - .8710 -
wages - - .8971 -
population .8951 - .9654 -
population growth .8988 - .9506 -
immigration .8980 - .8947 -
migration to pop. growth - - .9050 -
literacy .9748 .9309 .9879 .8827
primary education growth .8011 .7330 .9401 -
form of land tenure .9287 - .9348 -
land concentration .7499 - .8628 -
land adoption .9302 .7819 .9329 .7689
urbanisation .9321 .8354 .9361 .7707
entrepreneurship .9584 .9188 .9841 .8941
role of government .7112 .6152 .6427 -
socio-politics .9145 .8743 .9741 .8555
representativeness .9488 .9042 - .8479
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polity 2 - - .9659 -
political stability .9595 .8665 .9579 -
foreign dependency .9161 .7965 .9400 -
colonial status .9414 .8742 .9639 .7587
market development .9810 .9511 .9922 .9318
market development growth .9989 .9975 .9988 .9972
mkt develpt growth, lagged .9989 .9972 .9987 .9969
Number of variables 32 22 34 18
KMO sampling adequacy .7161 .8692 .6026 .9086
The SMC shows that all variables are strongly correlated to one another. However the 
sampling adequacy test reveals that not all of them are so relevant for the components 
analysis.
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Table 3.8 -  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sample adequacy scores variable-by-variable
Variables Original Data New Data
KMO initial 
variables
KMO final 
variables
KMO initial 
variables
KMO final 
variables
income .6985 .8589 .8194 .8938
income growth .5393 - .5443 -
technique in industry .7590 .8866 .8517 .8856
adoption of new techniques .8853 .8781 .6678 .9126
technique in agriculture .7950 .9330 .6745 .9389
agricultural labour .6579 .8512 .6578 .8889
population per farmland .5702 - .3341 -
inland transportation .8314 .8674 .8629 .9161
transportation, growth .7421 .8454 .4820 .8683
export growth group .4345 - - -
trade - - .1977 -
shift in export structure .7839 .8170 .6892 .9214
industrial wage change .5994 - .5535 -
agricultural wage change .5819 - .2956 -
wages - - .2857 -
population .5216 - .4677 -
population growth .4177 - .4521 -
immigration .4658 - .2399 -
migration to pop. growth - - .4671 -
literacy .8090 .8931 .7048 .9332
primary education growth .6685 .7167 .3733 -
form of land tenure .5909 - .5719 -
land concentration .2078 - .1454 -
land adoption .7264 .9337 .6294 .9288
urbanisation .6957 .8547 .6394 .9138
entrepreneurship .9029 .9515 .6509 .9444
role of government .6380 .6545 .3797 -
socio-politics .8491 .9230 .6929 .9372
representativeness .8283 .8854 - .9287
polity 2 - - .4022 -
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political stability .6373 .8033 .6323 -
foreign dependency .7443 .8602 .6904 -
colonial status .6276 .7379 .5800 .8168
market development .7861 .9014 .6380 .9322
market development growth .7401 .8683 .7381 .8713
mkt develpt growth, lagged .7096 .8651 .7573 .8675
Number of variables 32 22 34 18
Overall sampling adequacy .7161 .8692 .6026 .9086
The score differences between the initial and the final selection of variables reflect the 
improvement in sampling adequacy, in a scale from 0 to 1.
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TABLES A ND FIGURES FOR 3.III.4 - RESULTS: PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
Table 3.9 - Total Variance Explained
Principal components/correlation Number of obs = 46
Number of comp. = 18
Trace = 18
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho = 1.0000
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 11,723 65,126 65,126 11,723 65,126 65,126
2 1,648 9,158 74,284 1,648 9,158 74,284
3 1,068 5,932 80,216 1,068 5,932 80,216
4 ,889 4,936 85,152
5 ,664 3,691 88,843
6 ,453 2,516 91,359
7 ,303 1,683 93,042
8 ,287 1,593 94,635
9 ,209 1,161 95,796
10 ,183 1,017 96,813
11 ,142 ,788 97,601
12 ,104 ,580 98,181
13 ,087 ,482 98,663
14 ,084 ,467 99,130
15 ,069 ,382 99,512
16 ,051 ,284 99,796
17 ,035 ,196 99,992
18 ,001 ,008 100,000
Codes of the variables included: income indutech indtecgr agritech agrilgrp intransp transpgr shiftx 
lit landadop urbani entrep sociopol represen colstat mktdev mktdevgr mktdvgrl Extraction 
Method: Principal Component Analysis.
This is the second round of the new database, but having replaced govrel and polity2 
with the old ones govt and represen to start with, given that they give better results than 
the new ones. As a result, govt should be removed in any case, but represen stays in the 
second round. Re-introducing represen makes polstabi and foreignd go; in addition, 
transpgr cannot be removed.
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Table 3.10 - Total Variance Explained for 1870
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 11,873 65,961 65,961 11,873 65,961 65,961
2 1,683 9,348 75,308 1,683 9,348 75,308
3 1,259 6,992 82,300 1,259 6,992 82,300
4 ,703 3,904 86,204
5 ,693 3,851 90,055
6 ,549 3,053 93,108
7 ,306 1,698 94,806
8 ,207 1,150 95,956
9 ,192 1,064 97,021
10 ,136 ,756 97,777
11 ,131 ,725 98,502
12 ,084 ,468 98,970
13 ,061 ,340 99,310
14 ,053 ,295 99,605
15 ,033 ,185 99,790
16 ,024 ,133 99,923
17 ,014 ,076 100,000
18 8.04E-005 ,000 100,000 L
Codes of the variables included: income indutech indtecgr agritech agrilgrp intransp transpgr shiftx 
lit landadop urbani entrep sociopol represen colstat mktdev mktdevgr mktdvgrl 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Only cases for which year = 1870 are used in the analysis phase.
G raph 3.2 - Scree Plot for 1870
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Table 3.11 - Total Variance Explained for 1890
Component
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 11,446 63,587 63,587 11,446 63,587 63,587
2 2,038 11,320 74,907 2,038 11,320 74,907
3 1,279 7,105 82,012 1,279 7,105 82,012
4 ,915 5,086 87,098
5 ,587 3,258 90,356
6 ,450 2,500 92,856
7 ,326 1,812 94,668
8 ,246 1,366 96,034
9 ,187 1,041 97,075
10 ,138 ,765 97,840
11 ,115 ,639 98,478
12 ,082 ,453 98,932
13 ,075 ,417 99,348
14 ,057 ,315 99,664
15 ,047 ,259 99,923
16 ,011 ,061 99,984
17 ,003 ,015 99,999
18 ,000 ,001 100,000
Codes of the variables included: income indutech indtecgr agritech agrilgrp intransp transpgr shiftx 
lit landadop urbani entrep sociopol represen colstat mktdev mktdevgr mktdvgrl 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Only cases for which year = 1890 are used in the analysis phase.
G raph 3.3 - Scree Plot for 1890
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Table 3.12 - First Principal Component Score Coefficients (Loadings)
Variable (1)Joint score
(2)
Score 1870
(3)
Score 1890
Income .2463 .2363 .2539
Technique in industry .2603 .2605 .2583
Adoption of new techniques .2368 .2492 .2230
Technique in agriculture .2650 .2630 .2666
Agricultural labour -.2229 -.2181 -.2282
Inland transportation .2445 .2319 .2577
Transportation, growth .1744 .1833 .1496
Shift in export structure .1897 .1907 .1864
Literacy .2467 .2290 .2667
Land adoption .2217 .2208 .2362
Urbanisation .2036 .2041 .1953
Entrepreneurship .2537 .2574 .2531
Socio-politics .2509 .2500 .2515
Representativeness .2529 .2468 .2565
Colonial status .1731 .1818 .1770
Market development .2750 .2721 .2787
Market development growth .2486 .2601 .2338
Mkt develpt growth, lagged .2435 .2578 .2247
Notes: The weight given to each variable is determined by the eigenvectors o f the 
correlation matrix of all variables. Columns in the table are the eigenvectors associated to 
the first principal component. (1) Joint score coefficients; common weights across periods. 
This is the preferred option. (2) Weights corresponding to 1870 only; (3) weights 
corresponding to 1890 only.
Normalisation: Sum o f Squares column =1
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Table 3.13 -  First Principal Component Scores
Country SD I1870 SD I1890 Change SDI 1890 -SDI 1870
Sign of 
Change
Argentina -1.099 -0.215 0.885 +
Australia 0.060 0.730 0.669 +
Belgium 1.125 1.292 0.168 +
Brazil -1.339 -0.926 0.413 +
Burma -1.581 -1.144 0.437 +
Canada 0.081 0.669 0.588 +
China -1.673 -1.538 0.135 +
Denmark 0.079 0.851 0.772 +
Egypt -1.192 -0.980 0.212 +
France 0.846 0.990 0.145 +
Germany 0.695 1.261 0.566 +
India -1.433 -1.192 0.242 +
Italy -0.429 -0.000 0.429 +
Japan -1.075 -0.015 1.060 +
Netherlands 0.660 1.007 0.348 +
New Zealand -0.492 0.615 1.107 +
Norway -0.402 0.076 0.478 +
Russia -1.128 -0.786 0.341 +
Spain -0.809 -0.367 0.442 +
Sweden 0.158 0.747 0.589 +
Switzerland 0.796 1.314 0.518 +
United Kingdom 1.496 1.455 -0.042 -
United States 0.999 1.814 0.815 +
Note: The scores presented here have been standardised to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
This results in a maximum observed score of 1.814 and a minimum o f -1.673. To recover the 
unstandardised scores, multiply by 3.424. Italy score -0.000 is marked with the negative sign 
because for more than 4 significative ciphers, the number is negative.
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Figure 3.4 - Scatter Plot for the New Social D evelopm ent Index:
1870 against 1890
U S A
S w itz e r la n  
G e r m a n y *  *  *
N e th e r la n d  F r a n c e '
slg ium
1 - D e n m a r k
A u str a lia
•  S w e d e n  
C a n a d a  ,N e w  Z e a la n
oo>
00
N o r w a y
J a p a n
A r g e n t in a
0-
ItalyTJ(/)
S p a in
R u s s ia
B ra z il
- 1 - B u r m a
C hin;
0 2■2 1 1
sdi1870
SDI 1870 in the horizontal axis. SDI 1890 in the vertical axis. A lm ost all countries lie 
above the 45-degree line. This means all countries except UK improved over this 
period.
U S A
U K
S w itz sr fa n
B e lg iu m
F r a n c e
1 - D e n m a r k
A u str a lia
>w ed en
C a n a d aN e w  Z e a la n
oo>
CO
ray
J a p a n
A r g e n tin a
0-
Italy-O
</>
iu s s ia
B razil
- 1 -
E g y p t
India
R  S q  L in e a r  =  0 .9 1 1
C h in a
2-2 1 0 1
sdi1870
Scores with fit line at average standard deviation. Scores have improved an average o f  around half
standard deviation in 2 decades.
158
Gr
ap
h 
3.4
 
- 
SD
I 
Ch
an
ge
 
fro
m 
18
70
 
to 
18
90
□
aBueip
-U K
-C hina
-France
-Belgium
-Egypt
-India
-R u ssia
r-Netherland
-Brazil
-Italy
-Burma
-Spain
-N orw ay
rSwitzerlan
-G erm any
-C anada
-S w ed en
-Australia
-Denmark
-U S A
-Argentina
-Japan
-N ew  Zealan
Re
fe
re
nc
e 
lin
e 
set
 e
qu
al
 t
o 
the
 
me
an
 
=.
49
2
ON
Figure 3.5 - Scatter plot for Social D evelopm ent Index.
Historical Evolution from 1870 to 1960
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SDI 1870 in the horizontal axis. SOCDEV in the vertical axis.
A ll countries in the sam ple improved notably during the period 1870-1960.
Figure 3.6 - Scatter plot for Social D evelopm ent Index. 
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G raph 3.5 -  SDI Change from  1870 to 1960
A rgen tina  J a p a n  Brazil E g y p t B urm a
Reference line set at mean value =  2.02  
Countries have improved an average o f  2 standard deviations between 1870 and 1960 (90 years).
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G raph 3.6 -  SDI Change from  1890 to 1960
A r g en tin a B u rm aB razil E g y p t J a p a n
Reference line set at mean value = 1.47 
Countries have improved an average o f  around one and a h a lf standard deviations between 1890 and 1960
(70 years).
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FIGURES FOR SECTION 3.IV - INTERTEMPORAL COMPARISONS: 
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES
Figure 3.7 - Historical Evolution 1870-Nowadays: 
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith  Spikes
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SDI 1870 in the horizontal axis, TR U STSTD  (light) and CIVICSTD  
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Figure 3.8- Historical Evolution 1890-Nowadays: 
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith  Spikes
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Figure 3.9 - Historical Evolution 1870-Nowadays:
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith  Fitted Line
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Figure 3.10 - Historical Evolution 1890-Nowadays: 
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith  Fitted Line
3
N orw ay
2
India
S w e d e n
S w itze
U nitedN orw ay D enm arkS painIndia
C a n a d a
0 Italy
F ran ceR u ssii
A ustrali B elg ium
Brazil
1
F ran ce
Brazil
T R U S T S T D
S D 1 8 9 0-2
■  CIVICSTD  
S D 1 8 9 0-3
1 ,51,5 ■1.0 ,5 0,0 ,5 1.0
SOCDEV in the horizontal axis, TRUSTSTD (light) and CIVICSTD 
(dark) in the vertical axis.Fit method: Lowess. 50% of points fitted 
with 3 iterations.
163
Figure 3.11 - Historical Evolution 1870-Nowadays.
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith Q uadratic Regression Lines
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Figure 3.12 - Historical Evolution 1890-Nowadays. 
Overlay Scatter Plot w ith Cubic Regression Lines
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APPENDIX 3.A
LIST OF COUNTRIES
Recoding of variable 'country' into 'countryn' in order to assign a 
value to every country:
COUNTRY COUNTRYN
Old Value New Value Value Label
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Burma
Canada
China
Denmark
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Russia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
UK
US
1 Argentina
2 Australia
3 Belgium
4 Brazil
5 Burma
6 Canada
7 China
8 Denmark
9 Egypt
10 France
11 Germany
12 India
1 3 Italy
14 Japan
1 5 Netherlands
1 6 New Zealand
17 Norway
1 8 Russia
1 9 Spain
2 0 Sweden
2 1 Switzerland
2 2 UK
2 3 US
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APPENDIX 3.B 
KEY TO THE VARIABLES IN THIS CHAPTER
(O) means variable in the adaptation of the original Morris and Adelman (1988) 
databse. (N) means variable in the new database. (F) means definitive final list of 
variables that go into SDI. A complete list of variables, including working variables, 
with sources and construction notes is provided in chapter 2.
o N F Variable
Code
Description
X incgroup Classification for level of per capita income
X X income GDP per capita
X incomgram Classification for rate of change in per capita income in the 
past 20 years
X incomegr GDP per capita growth
X X X indutech Level of development of techniques in industry
X X X indtecgr Classification for rate of improvement of techniques in 
industry (lagged, referred to the last 20 years)
X X X agritech Classification for level of development of techniques in 
agriculture
X X agrtecgr Classification for rate of improvement of techniques in 
agriculture
X X X agrilgrp Classification for percentage of labour force in agriculture
X X popxfarm Population per square kilometres of farmland
X X X intransp Level of development of inland transportation
X X X transpgr Classification scheme for rate of improvement of inland 
transportation (lagged)
X xgrgroup Classification scheme for rate of growth of total real exports
X trade Volume of exports relative to GDP
X X X shiftx Classification for degree of shift in structure of export sector
X X indwchan Classification for direction of change in average real wages 
in industry
X X agrwchan Classification for direction of change in average real wages 
or income of the employed agricultural poor
X wages Real wages
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X popgroup Classification for total population
X pop Total population in thousands
X popgrgrp Classification for rate of population growth in the last 20 
years
X popgr Cumulative population growth in the last 20 years (%)
X immigrp Classification for net immigration
X immi Net migration, in thousands (immigration with positive sign 
and emigration with negative sign)
X mitopopgr Rate of net migration over total population growth (%)
X X X lit Classification of extent of adult literacy
X X primedgr Classification for rate of spread of primary education in the 
past 20 years
X X landtenu Classification for predominant form of land tenure and 
holding
X X landconc Classification for concentration of landholdings
X X X landadop Classification for favourableness of land system to adoption 
of improvements
X X X urbani Classification for extent of urbanisation
X X X entrep Classification for favourableness of attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship
X govt Classification for extent of domestic economic role of 
government in the past 20 years
X govrel Public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
X X X sociopol Classification for socioeconomic character of national 
political leadership in the past 20 years
X X represen Classification for strength of national political institutions in 
the past 20 years
X polity2 Revised Polity variable score, ranging from -10 to 10 (from 
Polity IV, variable under the same name)
X X polstabi Classification for extent of political stability in the past 20 
years
X X foreignd Classification for degree of foreign economic dependence in 
the past 20 years
X X X colstat Classification for colonial status
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X X X mktdev Component scores for composite indicator of level of 
development of market institutions up to the given date
X X X mktdevgr Component scores for composite indicator of rate of spread 
of market institutions in the last 20 years
X X X mktdvgrl Component scores for composite indicator of rate of spread 
of market institutions in the last 20 years (lagged)
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APPENDIX 3.C 
THE BASICS OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
The Calculation of the Principal Components
Suppose we have a dataset with n observations on k variables. We denote these 
variables by X2, ... ,Xk. These data can be arranged in a matrix X with n rows and k 
columns: X=(xi X 2 . . .  X k ).16 Each column in this matrix contains the data on a particular 
variable. For instance, the n observations on the first variable, xj, are in the first column 
of X. As we have k variables, we can compute all the sample variances (Var(xi), 
Var(x2), ... , Var(xk)) of the variables and all the sample covariances between these 
variables (Cov(xi X2), Cov(xiX3), etcetera) and arrange them in a variance-covariance- 
matrix S. This matrix has k rows and k columns. The diagonal of this matrix contains 
the variances and the other elements of the matrix contain the covariances. For example, 
the element in the second row and the third column of S contains Cov(x2,X3).
The calculation of the Principal components proceeds via the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors of the sample covariance matrix S.17 This matrix can be described by k 
positive eigenvalues (Xi, ^2,...Ak) and k corresponding eigenvectors (ei, e2,..., ek) that 
have unit length and are orthogonal to each other. Therefore, after calculating the 
variance-covariance matrix S we can compute (A,j, ei), (X2 , e2),..., (A*, ek), where we 
have arranged this sequence in such a way that X] is that largest eigenvalue, X2 the one 
but largest eigenvalue, etcetera. There is a simple relationship between these 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of S and the Principal Components.
The relationship is as follows: in the introduction we described the Principal 
Components as linear combinations of the original variables. A linear combination of 
the variables xi, X2, ..., Xk is a weighted sum like
P = ajX] + a2X2 + ... + akXk.
16 In what follows, we assume that the reader is familiar with matrices, and basic matrix multiplication. 
For more information see Johnson and Wichem (2002), chapter 2.
17 Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a matrix are explained briefly in the appendix to this chapter. A more 
technical discussion can be found in Johnson and Wichem (2002), chapter 2:98-100.
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1 8Here, the weights are given by the vector a=(aj, a2, . . a j .  Now, it can be shown that 
the Principal Component that is responsible for the highest variance in the data is the 
linear combination Pi with weights equal to the values in the eigenvector of S that 
corresponds to the largest eigenvalue, i.e. the values in Q\. In short, we obtain the first 
Principal component by taking the vector a in the formula above equal to the vector ej. 
The second Principal Component is the linear combination P2 with weights equal to the 
values in the eigenvector of S that corresponds to the one-but-largest eigenvalue, i.e. the 
values in e2, and so on and so on. As a result, we will be able to describe the n 
observations we have on the k variables of the original data in X as n factor-scores on k 
Principal Components. Hence, we effectively transformed an n by k matrix X of data 
into an n by k matrix P=(Pi, P2, . . Pk) of factor scores.
At first sight it seems that we have not reduced the data at all. We started with an n by k 
matrix X and arrive at an n by k matrix P. The difference between X and P, however, is 
that the columns of P are now independent (orthogonal to each other), each of the 
columns pointing at a separate independent dimension of variation in the data. 
Moreover, P is constructed in such a way that its first column (Pi) is the linear 
combination of the original variables in the data that has the largest variance of all 
possible linear combinations of the original variables. The second column is the linear 
combination of the variables in the orginal data that has the second-largest variance, and 
so on. This fact has important consequences for data-reduction. Indeed, if we remove 
the last column of P, we know that we remove the direction in the data that has the 
lowest variance. The resulting columns may well still contain most of the variance that 
was available in the original data matrix X. Hence, by dropping the last column of P we 
made sure that at least as possible variation was lost. The same holds for dropping the 
second-last column and so on. In some cases we can still capture most of the variation 
in the data by concentrating on only the first or the first two Principal Components.
Geometrical Explanation of Principal Components
Principal Component Analysis is most easily understood graphically in the case where 
there are only two variables, XI and X2. Suppose we have a dataset X=(X1 X2) with 
some observations on these two variables. We can display the variation in these two
18 See Johnson and Wichem (2002), chapter 8.
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variables over different observations in a scatterplot, as in Figure 3.13 below. From this 
graph we can see that XI and X2 are positively correlated, and that XI has a larger 
variance than X2. If we were interested in reducing the number o f variables (data- 
reduction) while preserving most of the variation in the original data, we would choose 
to keep XI and to drop X2. However, we can do better than that.
3
2 -
1
Q
-2
- 3 -
- 3 - 2 - 1 0 1 2 3
X1
Figure 3.13 - Scatter plot of X 1 and X2.
There is positive covariance between XI and X2, and the variance o f  XI is larger than the variance o f  X2.
In Figure 3.14, two dashed lines are added to the figure. The most horizontal line o f the 
two is the axis along which most o f the variation in the data is concentrated. The vector 
in the graph that follows the direction o f this axis turns out to be proportional to the 
eigenvector ei (the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue X\ o f S, the 
variance-covariance matrix o f X). The length of the vector drawn in the graph is exactly 
^ i.19 The second axis that is drawn in the graph runs in the direction of Q2- The length of 
this vector in the graph is X.2.
The first axis mentioned above is called the first Principal Component. Note that the 
points that lie on this axis are simply linear combinations o f points on the original axes.
19 A technical note: the associated contour is the contour that describes the set o f  points that have 
statistical distance from the center-point equal to 1.
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The second new axis is called the second Principal Component. Note that the two new 
axes are just a rotated version of the original axes. With respect to these two new axes, 
all o f the points in the graph have new coordinates. Each point now has a
3- 
2 -  
1
CN n
X  U 
-1 
-2
-3 
-3
Figure 3.14 - Scatter Plot with Principal Components.
Let S denote the sample variance Covariance matrix o f  the variables XI and X2. The eigenvector corresponding to the largest 
eigenvalue o f  S is the more horizontal vector in the graph. Its length is the corresponding eigenvalue. Likewise, the more vertical 
vector is the other eigenvector o f  S and its length is the smallest eigenvalue o f  S. Here, the ‘most horizontal ’ axis is the axis with 
respect to which the data have the widest range o f  coordinates (factor scores). Therefore, this axis is the first Principal Component.
The more vertical axis is the second Principal Component.
coordinate with respect to the first Principal Component and a coordinate with respect 
to the second Principal Component. These new coordinates are called factor-scores. The 
idea now is, that if the correlation between XI and X2 would have been very high, most 
of the variation in the data would be due to variation in the factor scores on the first 
Principal Component. Hence, data-reduction would ideally proceed by keeping the first 
Principal Component and dropping the second Principal Component. This procedure 
preserves much more variation than the data-reduction strategy mentioned above, where 
simply XI was kept and X2 was dropped.
Conceptual Definition of Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors
There are different types of multiplication possible, depending on what is multiplied by 
what. The simplest case is premultiplication o f a variable x by a scalar X. It is easy to
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understand what happens in this case: we obtain Xx , X  times the original variable x. The 
second type of multiplication we can consider is pre-multiplication of a vector x by a 
scalar X. Again, it is easy to understand what will happen to the vector x: we obtain a 
vector X x that has the same direction as x, but a length that is X times the length of the 
original vector x. The problem occurs in the third type of multiplication that we will 
consider. It is much harder to understand what happens if we pre-multiply a vector
9 0variable x by a matrix A. We obtain the vector Ax, which we will call y. It is typically 
not clear how the original vector x relates to the resulting vector y. In the abstract, we 
understand scalar multiplication much better than matrix multiplication.
In order to make the relationship between x and Ax clear, we would really have to 
calculate the result of multiplying A with x. A priori, we do not have any intuition as to 
what the result will be. In order to obtain a better intuition of what pre-multiplying with 
A does to x, it is natural to ask if A maybe acts as scalar multiplication for some vectors 
x. Then, at least for those vectors, we would understand what A does. In other words, 
we ask ourselves if for a particular matrix A there exists a scalar X and a corresponding 
vector x such that Ax= Xx. If there exists such a scalar and such a vector, we call the 
scalar X an eigenvalue of A, and the corresponding vector x the eigenvector of A 
corresponding to the eigenvalue X. In particular, to emphasize that this vector x is rather 
special, we will denote it by e, instead of x. It turns out that for any k by k symmetric 
matrix A ,21 there actually exist k eigenvalues, (X], X2 , ... , A*) and k corresponding 
eigenvectors (ej, e2, ... , ek). These eigenvectors are orthogonal to each other, and can 
be chosen to have unit length. Details about the calculation of these eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors can be found in Johnson and Wichem (2002). Most statistical software 
packages have pre-programmed routines that calculate eigenvalues and eigenvectors for 
any k by k matrix. The important thing to know about them is that eigenvectors identify 
the areas (sets of vectors) for which the matrix A works as scalar multiplication. The 
eigenvalues are the corresponding scalars.
20 If A is a k by k matrix and x a k by 1 vector, the result y is a k by 1 vector.
21 Remember that for Principal Component Analysis we are interested in the eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
of the sample covariance matrix S. This matrix is symmetric.
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APPENDIX 3.D 
PRE-PCA PRELIMINARY TESTS: 
TABLES FOR SECOND BEST ALTERNATIVES
Table 3.14 -  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sample adequacy scores variable-by-variable, 
Second Best alternatives
Variables Original Data 
Criterion: KMO>.5
All New Data* 
Criterion: KMO>.6
2nd Round 3rd (and final) round 2nd (and final) round
Income .7140 .6883 .8544
income growth .6397 .6341 -
Technique in industry .7663 .7928 .9074
adoption of new techniques .8745 .8907 .8931
Technique in agriculture .8128 .7966 .9359
agricultural labour .7574 .7511 .8292
population per farmland .4896 - -
inland transportation .8317 .8909 .9378
transportation, growth .7403 .8078 -
export growth group - - -
Trade - - -
shift in export structure .7833 .8362 .9079
industrial wage change .6503 .7454 -
agricultural wage change .6588 .6674 -
Wages - - -
population .4850 - -
population growth - - -
immigration - - -
Migration to pop. growth - - -
Literacy .8056 .7354 .8690
primary education growth .6565 .6059 -
form of land tenure .6260 .5573 -
land concentration - - -
land adoption .7227 .7141 .9240
urbanisation .8963 .8715 .9240
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entrepreneurship .8856 .8808 .9471
role of government .5757 .6140 -
socio-politics .8768 .8778 .9370
representativeness .8176 .7891 -
polity 2 - - -
political stability .6482 .6354 .7800
foreign dependency .8160 .8164 .8479
colonial status .6930 .6820 .7741
market development .8347 .8448 .9060
market development growth .8037 .7882 .8588
mkt develpt growth, lagged .7728 .7570 .8551
Number of variables 28 26 18
Overall sampling adequacy .7661 .7694 .8859
KMO measures sampling adequacy, in a scale from 0 to 1.
* All new data refers to the new database keeping goverel and Polity2, which have been 
replaced by the old variables due to better performance in the first best option.
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Table 3.15 - Squared Multiple Correlations (SMC) of variables with all other variables 
Second Best alternatives
Variables Original Data 
Criterion: KMO>.5
All New Data* 
Criterion: KMO>.6
2nd Round 3rd (and final) round 2nd (and final) round
Income .9796 .9793 .9341
income growth .8749 .8503 -
Technique in industry .9650 .9478 .9180
adoption of new techniques .9189 .9055 .8592
Technique in agriculture .9586 .9548 .9048
agricultural labour .9432 .9411 .9038
population per farmland .8279 - -
inland transportation .9395 .9072 .8610
transportation, growth .7539 .7135 -
export growth group - - -
Trade - - -
shift in export structure .8415 .8038 .6853
industrial wage change .7833 .7163 -
agricultural wage change .6009 .5864 -
Wages - - -
population .8841 - -
population growth - - -
immigration - - -
Migration to pop. growth - - -
Literacy .9736 .9684 .9165
primary education growth .7783 .7756 -
form of land tenure .9000 .8735 -
land concentration - - -
land adoption .9235 .9122 .7664
urbanisation .8596 .8583 .7749
entrepreneurship .9546 .9469 .8979
role of government .6916 .6552 -
socio-politics .9021 .8912 .8536
representativeness .9390 .9368 -
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polity 2 - - -
political stability .9407 .9264 .8285
foreign dependency .8850 .8590 .7502
colonial status .9274 .9208 .8265
market development .9692 .9657 .9394
market development growth .9982 .9981 .9973
mkt develpt growth, lagged .9982 .9981 .9970
Number of variables 28 26 18
Overall sampling adequacy .7661 .7694 .8859
* All new data refers to the new database keeping goverel and Polity2, which have been 
replaced by the old variables due to better performance in the first best option.
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Chapter 4
THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX AND 
PER CAPITA INCOME: TESTING FOR A STRUCTURAL 
RELA TIONSHIP IN  THE LONG RUN
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4 .1. INTRODUCTION
Social capital is a form of capital. As such, it has been shown in previous studies that it 
is bonded to economic performance. To mention some of the most influential papers, La 
Porta et a l (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), and Temple and Johnson (1998) all tested 
the statistical significance of social capital indicators in explaining economic 
performance. For the relatively recent periods they analysed, they all found a positive 
association between the two.
First, La Porta et al. find supporting evidence for the fact that trust and cooperation have 
a positive effect on the well-functioning of organisations such as government, 
professional societies, and large firms. More generally, they show that social capital 
makes institutions work better; at least for the period 1970-1993.
Second, Knack and Keefer (1997) test the significance of social capital in explaining 
economic growth for the period 1980-1992. For this, they use two alternative measures, 
trust and the civic engagement index, both extracted from the World Value Surveys. 
Growth regressions incorporating these variables show a strong effect of both of them 
on economic growth. A 10 percent increase in the level of trust is associated with a 0.8 
percent increase in 1980-1992 growth. A similar increase in the civic engagement index 
corresponds to a 2.7 percent increase in economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 
1997:1260-1).
Finally, Temple and Johnson (1998) use the dataset and sample of Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992) for measures of economic prosperity. In particular, they contrast the 1960’s 
social development index constructed by Adelman and Morris (1967) for another 
purpose with the log difference of per capita income 1960-1985 (long run growth of 
GDP). They found a correlation coefficient of 0.60 (Temple and Johnson, 1998:970). 
When they run ordinary least squares (OLS) growth regressions, the social development 
index coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of initial income, investment, schooling, and population growth 
in the growth regressions. This finding supports the initial hypothesis of the predictive 
power of social development in explaining subsequent economic growth.
183
The Adelman and Morris (1967) work could shed some light on the questions in the 
agenda. Now that we can look at their analysis in historical perspective, it appears to 
have not only the historical insights the authors were presenting but also more 
predictive power than they suspected. When they created them, their indicators turned 
out to be apparently too pessimistic for Latin America and too optimistic for some Far 
Eastern countries. At that time, they did not know the importance of their findings. 
Their social indicator could have helped forecasting subsequent growth better than any 
other contemporary attempt. Temple and Johnson (1998) tell us that the socio-economic 
index constructed by Adelman and Morris ‘could have helped researchers make much 
better forecasts of long-run growth rates’.
Notice that all of these studies have a fairly recent chronology. The earliest one is the 
study by Temple and Johnson (1998), which starts in 1960. This is the only one using 
the Adelman and Morris socio-development indicator; therefore, it provides us with a 
framework for comparison.
The nineteenth century social capital index proposed in Chapter 3 is based on own 
calculations along the lines of Adelman and Morris. The variables are not exactly the 
same due to historical data limitations, but they have been constructed keeping their 
spirit in mind. We make use of another well-established international database for 
socio-economic measures from 1850 to 1913, broken into three periods: 1850-1870, 
1870-1890, and 1890-1913. It comprises a wide range of socio-economic variables, 35 
in total, ranging from education or political attitudes to favourableness towards adoption 
of new technology. Morris and Adelman (1988) worked for more than twenty years 
(since 1965) on this database together with a team of country experts so that the data 
were homogeneous and reliable. The data needed to be recovered, digitalised, and 
updated. Although the original data were not gathered for this purpose, we propose 
using this international dataset for the nineteenth century to construct a completely new 
Social Development Index (SDI), based on a principal components analysis, and 
described in detail in Chapter 3.
The Social Development Index (SDI) can be interpreted as measuring social 
development or social capital, just as the Human Development Index (HDI) measures 
human development. The new SDI series are the first available nineteenth-century 
international social capital estimates. They are available for a large set of countries, 22
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in total, from all continents. We make use of the SDI in this paper in order to investigate 
its economic implications.
The new Social Development Index (SDI) gives us the possibility to do the tests that 
Temple and Johnson performed on 1960 data, but now on data from the nineteenth 
century; in particular, we do it for 1870 and 1890. By doing so, we could determine 
whether the relationship between social development and economic performance could 
have further theoretical implications beyond the post-Second World War era. The 
question to answer in this chapter is the following: Is the relationship between social 
capital and economic performance consistently present over time? In other words, is 
there some evidence for a long run structural relationship between social capital and 
macroeconomic performance.
4. II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND INCOME
In order to answer the question of whether the relationship between social capital and 
economic performance is consistent over time, let us start with a snapshot of the work 
by Temple and Johnson mentioned in the previous section. This work refers to the 
period 1960-1985.
Figure I and II have been extracted from Temple and Johnson (1998:971-2). In both 
figures, the social development index derived in Adelman and Morris (1967) for the 
period 1957-62 is displayed on the horizontal axis. In short, their indicator is a 
compound index extracted from a selection and combination of variables belonging to a 
broad database with 41 variables and 72 countries (see Adelman and Morris, 1967 for 
details). In Figure I, this index is plotted against the natural logarithm of GDP in 1960, 
the initial GDP for the period under study. The figure shows a clearly positive relation 
between initial GDP and social development. The second figure plots social 
development against long run per capita GDP growth rate and again we see a positive 
association between the two. Therefore, according to the work of Temple and
185
Source: Tem
ple 
and 
Johnson 
(1998:971)
(Ji
•Venezuela
•Trinidad
ooOs
o
CDa>
CL
a
o
o>o
oo -
• South Africa 
•Mexico
.C h teU ru g ^ ^gc antina
’PeSeSfeBUgba
Colombia ‘ Jamaica
• Japan
• Chad
•AlgelGfejale,
•Jordan
•Bolhriunisla *Sn ^Philippines 
♦Cb?0$JfciaireSenegal -Honduras .e__ ,
n -Madagascar ‘ Sudan -Zimbabwe * ° rea
-Nigeria -M oroc^n<ija
•Greece
ria •fhdonesia • Egypt
CD -
•Uganda 
■Niger .Sierra Udl&h,0Pia 
-Malawi
■ Tanzania
•Myanmar
-2 -1 0
Social developm ent index
F ig u r e  I
The Adel man-M orris Index and per C apita Income
Source: Tem
ple 
and 
Johnson 
(1998:972)
Japan
►Korea
oo
UO
00
t—Io
CD
03
& OJ -
JC
%o
o>
ra 
•*—;
G lCOo
k.
CL
o  -
OJI
-Brazil
•Cameroon *S^r'a ♦Indonesia •Thailand
•T uni^procco
►Greece
•Jordan
•f^iger ^  • Sierra iSS'Se1^ '1
Israel
e y *Paraj|flparnmar
hican ftep
•Benin
. r ‘ w n "
.-Ifcmaaillwire 'Bolivia . Guatefna^ ic a r a ^ j a  'H onduras
•Nl^ | | r l f- ^ n^ h i ,e *.Et t JamaiC^ 9*n(lna
♦Zambia c .►Madagascar •Sudan
♦Somalia
♦Venezuela
• El Salvador
■Ghana
■ Chad
- 1 0 -0.5 0.0
T "
0.5 1.0
Component of SOCDEV orthogonal to initial income
*Eg> pt
FlGUKE 11 
Social Development and Grcwth.
Johnson, higher values of social development are associated with higher values of both 
initial GDP and subsequent GDP per capita growth for the period 1960-85.
As described in the previous section, we now have nineteenth century data available, in 
particular for the years 1870 and 1890. Chapter 3 presented a social development index 
for 1870 and 1890. The natural question that appears, then, is whether the associations 
between social development and GDP can be found as well for the nineteenth century. 
More generally speaking, one would like to compare the results obtained for the 
nineteenth century to those available for the twentieth century in order to identify any 
relevant changes in the relationship.
4. II. 1. THE TEMPLE AND JOHNSON TESTS
In this section, we first replicate Figure I of Temple and Johnson for 1960 and, second, 
we test for a similar relationship between social development and GDP per capita in the 
nineteenth century.
In order to allow for comparison, we need to contrast data for 1870, 1890 and 1960 (the 
3 years for which we have SDI) using a comparable GDP data source. This is to avoid 
that changes in the results between the two centuries can be attributed to inconsistencies 
in sourcing. Temple and Johnson (1998) use the Summers and Heston database for GDP 
and other economic measures, which starts in 1950. More precisely, instead of the 
original they use a secondary source, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), which starts at 
1960, presumably to obtain full data for a larger number of countries. Therefore, if we 
are to replicate the Temple and Johnson tests for the twentieth century and present new 
ones for the twentieth century with a consistent data source for GDP, we cannot use the 
Summers and Heston data. For this reason, the latest 2007 updated version of Maddison 
(2003) historical statistics on per capita GDP has been used instead. The unit of measure 
is per capita GDP, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. There is an ongoing 
discussion about the conveniences and inconveniences of using this way of adjusting 
GDP, but this source has the advantage that it contains all periods and countries in the 
sample.1
1 For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using Maddison’s data for GDP, see Chapter 2.
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Graph 4.1 plots social development for 1960 against the raw level of GDP per capita in 
1960. This graph seems to suggest an exponential relationship between SDI and 
income, which is expected: An exponential relationship between social development 
and income implies a linear relationship between social development and the natural 
logarithm of income, as seen in Figure I of Temple and Johnson (1998). An exponential 
estimation line has been added to the graph and, indeed, fits the data well (R-squared 
equals 0.611). As a consequence, we should find that the relationship between the index 
and the log of GDP per capita is linear. We now investigate this relationship more 
rigorously.
Graph 4.2 is a replica of Temple and Johnson’s Figure I using 2007 update of Maddison 
(2003) data for GDP.2 There are 74 country observations in this scatter plot, those 
corresponding to the 74 countries in the Adelman and Morris (1967) sample. Although 
the exact figures for Temple and Johnson were not reported, it is worth noting that the 
scatter plot is nearly identical to the scatter plot of Temple and Johnson. So we can 
conclude that the change of data source and reference year has no important effect on 
the results. A linear trend fitted through the cloud of points returns a highly statistically 
significant slope of 0.549 (see Table 4.1, equation 6). This means that an increase of one 
whole unit in the 1960 social development index (ranging approximately between -2 
and 2) is associated with a log GDP level 0.549 units higher. Another way of seeing 
moves along the line is measuring moves in terms of standard deviations: The 
standardised beta coefficient (not shown in the Table but equal to 0.781) implies that 
one standard deviation increase in SDI corresponds to a 78.1 percent of a standard 
deviation increase in log GDP.
2 Maddison (2005) has been the source for GDP figures of Cyprus and Suriname, which do not appear in 
his later work. GDP for Cyprus 1960 and 1985 has been interpolated from the existing 1950 and 1990 
estimations at a constant rate o f growth; likewise for Suriname 1960.
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This graph illustrates the exponential relation between SDI and per capita 
income. An exponential line with a constant has been fitted to the scatter plot, 
obtaining an R-squared of 0.611.
The adjusted R-squared is 0.605; i.e. for this sample of countries, 60.5 percent o f the 
total international dispersion o f incomes in 1960 can be captured with only one 
explanatory variable (social development) and a constant. Caution: this does n o t 
necessarily imply that social development ca u ses  60.5 percent of the variation of 
income. This figure is just statistical correlation; we should introduce some control 
variables in a multivariate regression to find out the clean effect o f one single variable 
on another; (this is done later on in the chapter).
We now move to the nineteenth century analysis, making use o f the new SDI series for 
1870 and 1890. We have found that in the post-Second World War era higher
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levels of social development are associated with higher levels o f income and vice versa. 
Given that we have a social development index for 1870 and 1890 constructed earlier in 
the thesis, we can now investigate whether this relationship did already exist in the late- 
nineteenth century. Graph 4.3 shows that a very similar relationship is found for the late 
nineteenth century, for which we have data. Graphs 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate this 
relationship separately for years 1870 and 1890 respectively. Table 4.1 corroborates the 
results statistically, and shows that the figures obtained for 1870 and 1890 not only go 
in the same direction but are also very similar to those obtained for 1960.
Regression (1) in Table 4.1 is a pooled sample o f the 1870 and 1890 observations 
considered together in order to increase the sample size. This alternative is not 
unreasonable, since the 2 time cuts for the nineteenth century are not too far apart; so 
within the framework o f a long run perspective they could - i f  necessary- be considered 
as belonging to the same ep o q u e . The result is a sample o f 46 observations giving an 
average SDI coefficient o f 0.575 (highly significant) and almost 80 of the total variance 
explained with the social development index only. There is no need to include time 
fixed effects in this panel regression, since the differential effects o f the 2 time cuts have 
already been estimated separately in regressions (2) to (5) and the only purpose o f this
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regression was to test for robustness o f the results in a larger sample. Graph 4.3 is the 
scatter plot corresponding to the pooled nineteenth century sample.
Nineteenth century calculations for individual years count only with 23 countries due to 
narrower data availability. Still, statistical results for bivariate analysis are surprisingly 
clear cut and they all point at the same direction. The line fitted to Graph 4.4 for 1870 
exhibits a 54 percent slope; the line fitted to Graph 4.5 for a 1890 parallel analysis 
exhibits a slope o f 62 percent. Recall that the slope for 1960 data was just below 55 
percent. All three analyses have highly statistically significant and very similar 
correlation coefficients. Moreover, all display fairly high adjusted R-squares varying 
between 0.61 and 0.84; i.e., the linear regressions fitted on the scatter plots can explain 
between 61 and 84 percent of dispersion.
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Adjusted R-squares raise up to more than 88 percent o f dispersion captured when we 
remove 1-2 influential observations from each o f the regressions (see equations 3, 5, 
and 7 in Table 4.1). Still, slopes remain practically unchanged in all three chronologies.
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Table 4.1
Level of association between Social Development and Income 
Dependent Variable: Log GDP Method: OLS___________
Regression
Year
(1)
Pooled
1870&
1890
(2)
1870
(3)
1870
(4)
1890
(5)
1890
(6)
1960
(7)
1960
Observations 46 23 21 23 22 74 72
SDI slope .575*** .543***
544*** .620*** .605*** 549*** 544***
(.044) (.070) (.044) (.059) (.053) (.052) (.046)
R2 .796 .740 .888 .839 .867 .611 .666
Adjusted R2 .791 .728 .882 .832 .861 .605 .661
Notes: Constant included in the regressions but not shown on table. Standard deviation of coefficients 
between parentheses. Influential observations outside 2 standard deviations (Australia and New Zealand 
for 1870, Australia for 1890, Gabon and Venezuela for 1960).
To sum up, Temple and Johnson's results are confirmed. Moreover, regression results 
show that the observed associations between social development and income are 
significantly different from zero in all years discussed, and the coefficients are very 
similar between them. Thus, we can conclude that social development is positively 
related to economic wellbeing, and this relationship already existed in the nineteenth 
century.
4. II. 2. ENDOGENEITY AND CAUSALITY:
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The main concern regarding the results in the previous section is whether the significant 
relationships we found can be attributed to a causal link between the two variables. In 
other words: can we conclude that social development significantly contributes to 
income being of a certain level, at least in part? This would be the case if we can 
assume that differences in the social development index between countries can be 
interpreted as exogenous changes. In our case, it is very unlikely that this is the case. On 
the contrary, it is very likely that there is some degree of endogeneity in the SDI, 
because the richer a country is the more likely to have an advantageous social quality 
thanks to being able to afford better education, higher likeliness to have advantageous 
political framework, etc. Therefore, before concluding that SDI has some partial causal 
effect on income one should control for all those factors that are known to affect income 
and could potentially be correlated with the social development index at the same time. 
The disturbance or error term in the regressions signify all the factors that play a role in
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the determination of GDP that we have not taken into account. As a result, the 
regression estimate of the slope of SDI is likely to be biased, and can as a rule therefore 
not be interpreted as causal effects straight away (Wooldridge, 2001, chapter 1; Greene, 
2003, chapter 8). If SDI is endogenous, then the estimate of its slope in the above 
equations cannot be interpreted as an estimate of the causal effect of SDI on GDP; it 
just verifies a statistical association between the two.
Graphs in the last section show a positively linear relationship between the two 
variables, but they do not represent a causal link per se. In order to find a causal effect 
between social development and income, we have to address the endogeneity of social 
development. The obvious solution to this problem is to include these omitted variables 
in the regressions. At this respect, there is a large literature on growth regressions from 
which we can borrow. The encompassing summary model by Bleaney and Nishiyama 
(2002) indicates that according to the most influential multivariate regressions literature, 
a comprehensive model should include openness to trade, life expectancy, schooling, 
quality of institutions, democracy, government savings, exports of primary products, 
climate and active population growth.
There are some data limitations to running multivariate regressions on nineteenth 
century information. For the last third of the nineteenth century, data are, in general, 
reliable (Mitchell, 1998). However, the specific control variables proposed in the 
growth regressions literature -representative examples are Barro (1997), Easterly and 
Levine (1997), and Sachs and Warner (1997)- and summarised by Bleaney and 
Nishiyama (2002) were not originally though for inclusion in pre-Second World War 
regressions. In many cases we are forced to find proxies available for the nineteenth 
century. Fortunately, Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) summary of relevant variables is 
conceptually broad enough to facilitate this task. As we have an extensive list of 
variables in the database, we are able to find a proxy for all of these variables.
We use the following variables as proxy; (we present two alternative variables for some 
of them):
'y
foreign economic dependency (“foreignd”) for openness to trade;
3 Growth o f exports (“xgrgroup”) from Morris and Adelman (1988) has also been alternatively tested for, 
giving similar results.
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- proportion of population living in towns of more than 10,000 people (“urbani”) 
for the inverse of life expectancy;4
literacy rate (“lit”) for schooling;
- predominant form of land tenure (“landtenu”) for institutions;
- the index “polity2” from the Polity IV database or, alternatively, political 
influence of workers (“sociopol”) for democracy; 5
relevance of the economic role of the government (“govt”) for government 
savings;6
shift in the export structure towards manufactured products (“shiftx”) for exports 
of primary products; and
Cumulative population growth in the last 20 years, percent, (“popgr”) for active 
population growth.
All these variables are extracted from Morris and Adelman (1988), the Polity IV 
database (CIDCM) or derived from own calculations, all detailed in Chapter 2, and have 
the advantage that we have them for all countries in the sample.
Finally, the proportion of land area in the geographical tropics (“tropicar”) 
accounts for climate in the regressions. It has been shown that what really 
matters about climate for economic development is whether or not a country is 
located in the tropics (Sachs, 2001). We use the proportion of land area within 
the geographical tropics as in Gallup and Sachs (1999), and we take it as 
constant over the period of study. These geographical can be obtained from the 
Geodata database (Boston College, 2000).
So, all control variables suggested by Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) are present in the 
analysis. This explains the very high R-squares obtained in the regressions. Table 4.2 
displays the multivariate estimation results for 1870 and 1890.
4
Life expectancy around 1900 could be taken from Maddison (1991 and 1995). This possibility has been 
explored; however it reduces the full sample size from 46 to 34, and any cross country cut from 23 to 17 
countries only. Due to this limitation of the sample size, urbanisation has been preferred as a proxy. 
Results go along the same lines.
5 Results are also shown for the alternative variable political power of workers (“sociopol”) from Morris 
and Adelman (1988). It seems worth to bring this alternative in the table since it achieves larger 
significance results for 1890.
6 Public expenditure as a percentage to GDP (“govrel”) coming from own calculations detailed in Chapter 
2 has also been tested. Results go in the same direction.
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Table 4.2
Social Development and Income in the Late Nineteenth Century Including Control 
Variables.
Dependent variable: Log GDP Method:OLS_____________________________
Year
(1)
1870
(2)
1870
(3)
1890
(4)
1890
(5)
Pooled
(6)
Pooled
Observations 23 23 23 23 46 46
SDI 421* * * 390*** .450*** 429*** 427* ** 4Qj***
Foreign
(.063)
-.0004
(.069)
-.0005
(.119)
-.002
(.085)
-.004*
(.048)
-.001
(.048)
-.0015
dependency
Urbanisation
(.0015)
-.0007
(.0014)
-.0009
(.002)
.002
(.002)
.003
(.001)
.0003
(.0009)
.0005
Literacy rate
(.0017)
0060***
(.0017)
.006***
(.002)
.008***
(.001)
.007***
(.0012)
008***
(.0011)
.007***
Form of land
(.0016)
-.006***
(.001)
-.006***
(.001)
(.002) (.002)
-.006***
(.001)
(.001)
-.007***
(.001)
tenure
Polity2
(.001)
-.0008
.006***
(.002)
.003
(.001)
.004
.007***
(.0009)
Political power of
(.0059)
.002
(.006)
.0044***
(.004)
.003*
workers
Econ Role of Govt. .002
(.002)
.002 .002
(.0019)
.001 .002*
(.001)
.002*
Shift of exports to 
manuf
Population growth 
% land in tropics
(.002)
-.0034*
(.0019)
.0037***
(.0007)
-.508***
(.109)
(.002)
-.0034*
(.0018)
.0035***
(.0006)
521*** 
(.094)
(.002)
.005***
(.002)
.002
(.001)
401***
(.125)
(.001)
_ 005*** 
(.001)
.001
(.001)
- 341*** 
(.097)
(.001)
-.005***
(.001)
.0030***
(.0005)
_ 494***
(.072)
(.0009)
QQ4***
(.001)
.003***
(.0004)
.465***
(.064)
R2 .984 .985 .983 .988 .979 .981
Adjusted R2 .971 .972 .968 .977 .973 .975
Notes: Constant not shown. Standard errors between parentheses. Test for heteroskedasticity of  
standard errors passed.*Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.1 level. ** Coefficient 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. ***Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The dependent variable is again the log GDP per capita and the explanatory variables 
this time include the new Social Development Index (SDI) for the corresponding year 
plus the whole set of control variables discussed above. Table 4.2 presents 6 equations, 
2 alternative ones for 1870, 2 for 1890, and 2 with a pooled sample. The regressions for 
individual years (regressions 1 to 4) are limited to a sample of 23 countries, those for 
which the Social Development Index is available for the nineteenth century. The pooled 
sample (regressions 5 and 6), has 46 observations. Still, adjusted R-squares are very 
high in all cases, around or above 0.98. This means that about 98 percent of the total 
international variation of income per capita is explained by the data.
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The two equations for each year or pooled sample represent 2 alternative models 
depending on which variables we use as proxies. It is useful to show different proxy 
alternatives because in this way we see how much the regression results are affected by 
changing the variables of control. Table 4.2 reveals that all 6 equations have highly 
significant and very similar coefficients for SDI, all around 0.40 and 0.45. This means 
that 1 unit increase in the SDI, ranging approximately between -2 and 2, is associated 
with a 0.40-.45 unit increases in the log of income per capita. Data do not reveal any 
strong break between 1870 and 1890, which suggests that the relationship between 
social development and income enjoyed some generalised stability in the late-nineteenth 
century.
As a conclusion for this section we should say that the results show that, after 
controlling for a range of variables, the social development index SDI still has a 
significantly positive effect on income, and this relationship seems fairly stable for the 
period under analysis. The results for the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are not 
directly comparable because we are not working with strictly the same set of countries 
and variables. However, putting together the findings for the twentieth century 
described in the introduction and ratified later on in the chapter, there are clear 
indications of a long run structural positive relationship between the SDI, understood as 
a proxy for social capital, and economic wellbeing.
4. II. 3. SDI AND FUTURE INCOME
As an extra piece of analysis, this section takes up on Putnam’s (2000) hypothesis that 
social capital in a society does not have all its impact on wealth immediately but is 
something that transforms the society deeply and slowly enough to have effect several 
decades ahead of our time. This section presents some basic statistical results showing 
the increasing correlation between SDI and future income as we widen the time gap, 
which would ratify Putnam’s hypothesis.
Thus, the next question is the following: What is the correlation between SDI and future 
income? Table 4.3 presents the simple univariate regression coefficients for SDI in 1960 
and income per capita in different horizons: contemporary income per capita, income 
per capita 25 years ahead (emulating the Temple and Johnson 1998 chronology) and
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income per capita 40 years ahead. The results show that the positive correlation between 
SDI and income becomes stronger the wider is the time gap. This means that the Social 
Development Index alone could predict the international distribution of income 40 years 
ahead better than the international distribution of income 25 years ahead, and much 
better than the international distribution of income for a contemporary time cut. This 
result is robust after controlling for the initial level of income. Once we account for the 
initial level of income this result does not change: A first regression of SDI on income 
is run, and then the residual SDI left unexplained by the initial level of income is taken 
to a second stage regression. Table 4.4 displays the results for the second stage, 
regressing future income on the residual SDI, which has been cleared of all the effects 
that the initial level of income in 1960 might have. Even after controlling for the effect 
of initial GDP, the SDI residual in 1960 alone is able to explain up to half of the 
variation in income per capita. Graphs 4.6 to 4.9 illustrate this relationship with all 
countries in the sample.
Let us now move to testing whether a positive relationship between SDI and future 
income existed in the past. The SDI residual for the nineteenth century has been 
constructed as a unique pooled variable for data corresponding to both time cuts, 1870 
and 1890, in order to increase the sample size. However, these data do not correspond to 
a pooled regression making no difference between the two years. On the contrary, SDI 
residuals for the two time cuts correspond to different regressions run separately for the 
two years, which implies that the SDI 1870 residual has been extracted from contrasting 
it against 1870 per capita GDP only and, likewise, SDI 1890 residual arises from 
regressing SDI 1890 on per capita GDP for 1890 only. Therefore, every SDI residual 
corresponds to the regression against its relevant year. Just for reassurance, the whole 
exercise has been repeated with a pooled sample SDI residual, obtaining similar results.
Table 4.3 -  SDI in 1960 and Future Income
Regression 
Dep. Var 
N obs.
(i)
Lgdpl960
74
(2) 
Lgdp 1985 
74
(3)
Lgdp2000
72
Sdl960 0.733*** .855***
(.052) (.058) (.060)
R-squared .611 .689 .741
Adj R-sq .605 .684 .737
Standard error in parenthesis. Constant not shown. Regression 3 includes 72 
countries instead o f 74 because comparable income per capita is not 
available for Cyprus and Suriname. ***Coefficient statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4.4 -  Residual SDI in 1960 and Future Income
Regression 
Dep. Var. 
N obs.
(1)
Lgdpl985
74
(2)
Lgdpl985
71
(3)
Lgdp2000
72
(4)
Lgdp2000
71
Sd 1960 residual, 
orthogonal to 
Initial GDP
.521***
(.127)
.824***
(.116) (.134)
1.058***
(.120)
Standardised beta 
coefficient .436 .650 .547 .733
R-squared .190 .422 .299 .537
Adj R-sq .179 .414 .289 .530
Standard error in parenthesis. Constant not shown. R egressions 2 and 4 exclude outliers above 2 standard 
deviations away from the mean (Gabon, Trinidad and V enezuela). **C o e ff ic ie n t  statistically significant 
at the 0.01 level.
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Graph 4.9 -  Social Development Residual and Income 40 years ahead
W ithout Gabon, Trinindad and Venezuela (above 2 std dev away from the mean)
For the nineteenth century, no consistent relationship has been found between SDI and 
future income for 20 and 40 years ahead. This might be due to the fact that the economy 
simply moved slower 100 years ago, so one should expect to find a significant 
relationship between SDI and future income with wider time gaps than for the twentieth 
century analysis. This idea is backed up by the separate analysis o f the two time cuts, 
1870 and 1890. Despite the limitations in the sample size (23 countries only) the 
analysis for 1890 reveals some mild but positive correlation between SDI 1890 residual 
orthogonal to income and the distribution o f per capita income 40 years ahead (equal to 
0.108) above all other nineteenth century related correlations, which are close to 0. 
Further support o f this idea is provided by Putnam (2000) historical study on the United 
States, where he argued that social capital at that time can have its stronger impact up to 
70 years later.
A formal test for slower course of affairs (and, therefore, retarded impact) in the late 
nineteenth century with a gap o f 60 or 70 years into the future is too daring since it 
involves including not only one but the two World Wars, which implied very abrupt 
disruptions both in the society and the economy. A preliminary survey for this
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hypothesis at the international level with the information currently available does not 
give conclusive results.
4. III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The previous sections investigated the relationship between the SDI and income per se. 
This section explores the relationship between the SDI and future long run economic 
growth.
The long run growth rate is different from the annual growth rate. The annual growth 
rate is the change in GDP over one year. The long run growth rate is the overall change 
in GDP over a period longer than one year, and it is generally computed as the
t n
difference in logs on income between 2 more or less distant years. Given the long run 
character of the potential effects of social capital, it would make no sense to study the 
short run one year effect of the overall level of the SDI in a country at a given point in 
time. What makes more sense is to study the potential effect of social capital into the 
economic growth of a country over a prolonged period of time. Many studies on long 
run growth rates, including those cited in the introduction, are based on 20-25 years 
periods. For instance, Temple and Johnson (1998) use the log-difference of per capita 
GDP between 1985 and 1960 as the dependent variable in Figure II above.
The objective is to detect how much of the growth to come could have been predicted 
by just looking at the SDI at the beginning of the period. Because SDI at the beginning 
of the period is correlated with GDP at the beginning of the period, we need to control 
for this fact prior to the analysis. In general, economic theory predicts a negative 
correlation coefficient between the rate of growth and initial GDP. Countries that start 
from low levels of GDP tend to grow faster, and vice versa. This is called the “catching- 
up” effect (Abramovitz, 1986). In order to counteract the catching-up effect, we follow 
the same procedure as Temple and Johnson (1998): In a first stage, a linear regression of 
SDI on Log per capita GDP is run. Now, the resulting residuals of this regression are
7
Generally, the long run growth rate between two designated years is approximated by the log-difference 
on per capita GDP. For instance, the long run per capita growth rate for the period 1870-1890 is: 
GR187090=(PCGDP 1890-PCGDP 1870)/PCGDP1870. Notice that
GR187090=(PCDGP1890/PCGDP1870)-1 is a small positive number. Given that the logarithm is a good 
approximation of a function for any small positive number, this expression can be approximated: 
GR187090=LPCGDP1890-LPCGDP1870. This is the log-difference (difference in logarithms). Growth 
regressions literature has generally used this formulation.
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the part of SDI that is not affected by income. On a second stage, we run the regression 
we are really interested in, which is the long run rate of growth on the orthogonalised 
SDI residual. This procedure was used by Temple and Johnson (1998:972).
Long run growth rates have been calculated for the following three periods: First, the 
more recent 1960-1985 -as in Temple and Johnson (1998)- and, then, for the earlier 
chronologies, basically corresponding to the periodisation established by Morris and 
Adelman (1988), 1870-1890, 1890-1910. Then, these are plotted against the Social 
Development Index (SDI) for the initial year of each period (1960, 1870 and 1890, 
respectively) which is orthogonal to initial income. As in the previous section, this is 
done through running a first stage regression of SDI on income, and then using the 
residual in a second stage set of regressions as the part of the index that cannot be 
explained by factors simultaneously correlated with income per capita. Finally, some 
additional longer periods have been taken into account as well, mainly 40-years period, 
60-years period, etc. Future long run growth for this longer time spans have been 
calculated and contrasted with the residual of initial SDI orthogonal to per capita GDP 
at the beginning of the period. Results for the three SDI cross-sectional series available 
are presented in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, corresponding to long run potential impact of 
the general assessment of the quality of a society in 1960, 1870 and 1890, respectively.
Graph 4.10 depicts the correspondence between the long run economic growth for the 
period 1960-1985 and the SDI residual orthogonal to initial income at the beginning of 
the period. It reveals a positive association between the two. On the other hand, Graph 
4.11 corresponds to a longer time period of 40 years, accounting for accumulated 
economic growth for the period 1960-2000. The same positive association is found for 
the more prolonged time period, if not stronger. The latter would imply that the social 
mapping of the world around 1960 has a stronger correspondence with the world 
distribution of economic growth in the longer period 1960-2000 than with the shorter 
period 1960-1985. A formal statistical test for this relationship is presented in Table 4.5. 
The second stage regression of long run growth 1960-85 against the SDI component 
orthogonal to income reveals a coefficient of the magnitude of 0.298, which rises to 
0.520 when the regression is run for the longer time period 1960-2000 (both statistically 
significant at the 99 percent confidence level). This means that 1 unit increase in the 
SDI corresponds to 0.298 more units of log-difference in income for a 25 year period, 
and 0.520 more units of log-difference in income for a 40 year period. The standardised
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beta coefficients, which express the correlation between the dependent and the 
independent variables in terms of standard deviations, deliver magnitudes of 50 to 60 
percent increase of a standard deviation in accumulated economic growth for every one- 
standard deviation increase in the social index. The beta coefficient for the period 1960- 
85 is 0.527 (above 50 percent of a standard deviation increase in long run growth for 
every 1 standard deviation increase in SDI), while the beta coefficient for the period 
1960-2000 is 0.619 (above 60 percent o f a standard deviation increase in long run 
growth for every 1 standard deviation increase in SDI at the beginning o f the period).
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Graph 4.10 -  Social Development in 1960 and Economic Growth 1960-1985
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Graph 4.11 -  Social Development in 1960 and Economic Growth 1960-2000
Table 4.5 - SDI 1960 and Future Long Run Growth 
Dependent variable: Long Run Log- difference o f Per
Period 1960-1985 1960-2000
N obs. 74 72
SDI 1960 residual, 
orthogonal to 
initial GDP
29g***
(.057)
520***
(.079)
Std beta coeff. .527 .619
R-squared .278 .383
Adj R-sq .268 .374
Notes: Constant not shown. Standard deviation of coefficients 
between parentheses. Influential observations outside 2 standard 
deviations. *** Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.
Can one find similar results for the nineteenth century? The same test with the new 
nineteenth century SDI allows us to test whether a persistent relationship between social 
capital and subsequent long run growth already existed at that time. Thus, the next 
question is the following: Would a social capital proxy for the nineteenth century have
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been able to say something about subsequent economic growth? The answer is yes. 
There is some evidence for a stable relationship between nineteenth century SDI and 
subsequent long run growth. Graph 4.12 plots a pooled sample o f late nineteenth 
century SDI for all countries available against the accumulated long run growth in the 
next 20 years, corresponding with the 20 years period breaks established by Morris and 
Adelman (1988). As before, the SDI has first been cleared up of any effect that p e r  
c a p ita  income could have. Given the restricted sample of countries available for the 
nineteenth century both measures for 1870 and 1890 have been plotted together in the 
graphs. This does not seem unreasonable given the fact that social changes are slow and 
the two years, 1870 and 1890, are not too far apart in time. Furthermore, plotting them 
together gives a comparative perspective of performance. Notice, however, that SDI 
residual has been calculated independently for both years, with separate regression 
weights; this is, that every point has been calculated using their
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corresponding year, using two separate regressions for the two years. The observations 
are shown together in a unique graph as a matter o f presentation, not o f calculation. In 
any case, formal statistical tests are calculated separately for the two years and shown in 
the tables below.
Table 4.6 - SDI 1870 and Future Long Run Growth
Dependent variable: Long Run Log- difference o f Per Capita GDP
Period 1870-1890 1870-1910 1870-1928 1870-1960
N obs. 23 23 23 23
Sdl870
residual, .035 .074 214** .321*
orthogonal to 
initial GDP
(.040) (.090) (.101) (.175)
Standardised 
beta coeff. .188 .177 .420 .371
R-squared .035 .031 .176 .138
Adj R-sq -.011 -.015 .137 .097
Notes: Constant not shown. Standard deviation of coefficients between parentheses. 
** Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 4.7 - SDI 1890 and Future Long Run Growth
Dependent variable: Long Run Log- difference of Per Capita GDP
Period 
N obs. 1890-191023
1890-
1910 1890-192823
1890-
1928 1890-196023
1890-
1960
22 22 22
Sdl890
residual, .109 .143** 292*** .325*** .523*** 473***
orthogonal to 
initial GDP
(.064) (.054) (.066) (.058) (.156) (.135)
Standardised 
beta coeff .350 .509 .695 .782 .591 .618
R-squared .122 .259 .483 .611 .350 .382
M R-sq .080 .222 .459 .592 .319 .351
Notes: Constant not shown. Standard deviation o f coefficients between parentheses. Influential 
observations outside 2 standard deviations excluded in 2nd regression (Argentina for 1890-1910, 1890- 
1928; Burma for 1890-1960). ** Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
What are the findings? The late nineteenth century SDI residual orthogonal to income, 
like its twentieth century counterpart, does also show a positive correlation with future 
economic growth. This stands clear from both Graphs 4.12 and 4.13, depicting this 
relationship for the next 20 and 40 years respectively.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 summarise the results of a formal statistical analysis separately for 
the two years 1870 and 1890. The results of this analysis should be interpreted within 
the limitations that the small sample size of 23 countries imposes. There is no clear 
statistical evidence for correlation between the SDI in 1870 and future long run 
economic growth for the coming 20 or 40 years. Only when one looks at longer time 
spans does significant positive correlation arise, of the order that was discussed above 
for the twentieth century case. The coefficient of the SDI residual after orthogonalising 
to initial per capita GDP, is of the magnitude of 0.214 for a 50 years growth period and 
0.321 for a 90 years growth period, both statistically significant. The standardised beta 
coefficients run around 40 percent, comparable to 50 to 60 percent results for the 
twentieth century. More precisely, the standardised beta coefficient for the future 50 
years growth regression is 0.420, which implies that rising SDI by one standard 
deviation is associated with 42 percent increase of a standard deviation in accumulated 
long run growth.8 Finally, for a very long run period, running from the first SDI 
available corresponding to 1870 to the most recent for 1960 (adding up to a total of 90 
years accumulated growth), the beta coefficient is 0.371, quite close to the 50 years
8 Notice that 1928 GDP figures where used in the regressions instead o f 1930 in order to avoid the Great 
Depression.
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period. This invites to think that almost all the gains from social development status had 
already been realised in the five-decade period, or at least started declining somewhere 
in between.
In order to explore this idea of increasing and then declining correlation after a certain 
number of decades further, let us have a look at the results for 1890 SDI, shown in 
Table 4.7. The coefficients for the long run growth regressions start becoming 
significant earlier than for the 1870 case (for shorter, closer time periods) and then 
remain significant throughout. This fact taken together with the even shortest-period 
significance in Table 4.5 for the twentieth century reveals that correlations with 
economic growth for earlier periods take longer to appear. This makes sense if we think 
that economic progress has accelerated greatly during the course of the twentieth 
century, and things simply happen faster. The historical empirical evidence presented 
here supports this hypothesis. SDI takes 50 years to report significant coefficients for 
long run economic growth in 1870, 40 years for 1890 and 20 years for 1960. Of course, 
these numbers are subject to the arbitrariness of the time periods chosen and would need 
a lengthier and more costly exploration to underpin when is exactly the turning point at 
which the social index for a certain year turns significant for future long run economic 
growth. Given the limitation of the sample size, it makes no sense to pursue a study of 
this kind with the information available. That would be an attempt to push data too far.
Detailed regression results for 1890 are to be found in Table 4.7, which shows the 
second stage regressions, with the long run log-difference of per capita GDP as the 
dependent variable for different periods and the residual of a first stage regression of 
initial SDI against per capita GDP as the independent variable. The coefficient of the 
residual of 1890 SDI after orthogonalising to GDP runs from 0.109 when we look at its 
linear association with accumulated economic growth in the next 20 years, rises to 
0.292 when we increase the growth period to 40 years and finally reaches 0.523 when 
we look at the next 70 years (accumulated growth up to 1960), in a clear steadily 
increasing tendency. Because of the small sample size of 23 countries, results are 
especially susceptible of being affected by influential observations. In order to test for 
this, regressions for all three considered periods have been re-run excluding influential 
observations defined as being more than 2 standard deviations away from the sample 
mean. This excludes one individual from each of the regressions: Argentina for the 
nineteenth century regressions and Burma for the twentieth century ones. Re-running
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the regressions without the influential observations yields the following coefficients: 
0.143 for the regression on future 20 years accumulated economic growth, 0.325 for the 
regression on future 40 years and 0.473 for the regression on future 70 years, up to 
1960. All coefficients are statistically significant and the steadily increasing tendency of 
the slope is confirmed. So, the further into the future we project the level of social 
development the steeper the linear relationship becomes. As far as explanatory power is 
concerned, adjusted r-squares are maximum for the medium long-run period of 40 
years, reaching almost 60 percent with the residual SDI as only explanatory variable. 
The standardised beta coefficients reach its maximum in this time span too, reaching 
78.2 percent co-movement in terms of standard deviations for the period 1890-1928 
without Argentina. The average for all periods goes more on the lines of 50 to 60 
percent association, coinciding once more with the coefficients of the twentieth century 
regressions.
Overall, in all three cases, for the 1870-onwards analysis, for the 1890-onwards and for 
the 1960-onwards one, the slope of the fitted line is steeper for longer time periods. At 
the same time, it is also the true that the standardised beta coefficients first increase with 
the length of the time period accounting for accumulated economic growth, pointing at 
long run effects of social development; and then decrease after 5-6 decades when 
enough historical perspective is observable. Furthermore, the regression coefficients are 
comparable for the three SDI cross-sections under study, the earlier chronologies taking 
longer to manifest in the form of statistically significant positive association. This fact 
could have some economic meaning, implying that things simply move faster for more 
recent chronologies.
4. IV. CONCLUSION
This is an empirical investigation on the economic welfare implications of social capital 
for an international panel of countries, with special emphasis on the late-nineteenth 
century and achieving a comparative perspective with the twentieth century. This 
chapter presents some evidence pointing at a stable long run structural relationship 
between social capital and macroeconomic performance. Overall, we can conclude that 
social development is positively related to economic wellbeing, and this relationship 
already existed in the nineteenth century.
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Firstly, it is confirmed that in the post-Second World War era countries with higher 
levels of social development are associated with higher levels of income and vice versa. 
Secondly, making use of a new social development index for 1870 and 1890, it is found 
that a positive relationship between social development and log per capita income 
already existed in the late nineteenth century. At this respect, a strong positive linear 
association between the two variables is found. Regression results show coefficients 
that are significantly different from zero in all years discussed, and very similar between 
them. This upholds after controlling for foreign trade volume and structure, 
urbanisation, education, quality of institutions, political stability, government 
expenditure, population growth, and climate.
On the other hand, a statistically significant relation between the social capital proxy 
and future long run economic growth for the three social development cross-sections 
available starting in the late-nineteenth century is also found. The coefficient (or slope) 
associated with initial SDI increases when we account for longer periods of 
accumulated economic growth, suggesting that the association between social 
development and economic growth takes several decades to unfold completely. Social 
changes do not manifest its strongest impact in the economy immediately; they need 
several decades to unfold their transformations into economic outcomes. Indeed, both 
twentieth and nineteenth century statistical analysis reveal a stronger correspondence of 
the world distribution of SDI with the world distribution of income and growth for 
longer rather than shorter time horizons. The level of association seems to be reaching 
its maximum level after 5-6 decades and then starts declining again. Nevertheless, the 
maximum association horizon seems to be shrinking the closer we get to the present 
time. This suggests that events simply seem to be happening faster the closer we are to 
the present. The magnitude of the association in the maximum correlation periods 
ranges around 50 to 60 percent of a standard deviation increase in accumulated long run 
growth for every 1 standard deviation increase in SDI. This means that looking at the 
SDI at the beginning of the period would have been able to say quite a lot about the 
future world distribution of economic growth.
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Chapter 5
AN  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
INDEX INTO ECONOMIC THEORY
215
INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO CHAPTER 5:
After all attention devoted to social capital research and findings in recent years, can 
one go on without incorporating social capital into economic theory? Not any more; 
social capital should not be neglected in economic theory research any more. Chapter 5 
of the thesis provides an example of a practical application of the social capital 
indicators into a contemporary economic geography investigation.
How SDI Can Help Testing the Market Access Matters Hypothesis in
Historical Perspective
ABSTRACT
The Redding and Venables (2004) series for Market Access for 1994 are 
replicated in order to re-estimate the GDP equation with alternative 
socio-institutional measures. Using the newly created series together 
with more standard socio-institutional indicators allows testing where 
does cross-country variation in the performance of the Market Access 
index arise from. The results show that the Redding and Venables 
(2004) results are not unconditional. Poor governance undermines the 
positive benefits of geographical location. Only when a country enjoys 
high enough institutional quality can it effectively benefit from 
accessibility to markets. In a second part, Market Access is calculated 
for other benchmark years. Using the newly created series together with 
the proposed social capital proxies allows testing of the relationship 
between market access and GDP for another benchmark year. The 
results show that the relationship between access to markets and GDP 
was as strong in the mid-1960s as it has been for the mid-1990s, 
advocating no death of distance.
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5 .1. INTRODUCTION
Under increasing world economic integration, why firms do not move more production 
to low wage countries? Some factors previously studies are natural endowments or 
technology related arguments. Redding and Venables (2004) try to answer this question 
by incorporating geographical location into the analysis.
The mechanism in which they focus is distance to markets. Both distance to inputs 
(capital and intermediate goods) and distance to output (final production) markets are 
considered. Under given technology and internationally set prices (except wages), firms 
located further away from markets bear extra costs to trade that force wages downwards 
in order to remain competitive. This mechanism would explain why there are not more 
firms moving to low-wage countries.
Geographic location determines wages. Redding and Venables (2004) find statistically 
significant effects of geographical location on per capita income, after controlling for 
primary resource endowments, and a number of institutional characteristics. The 
magnitude of these effects is important. Halving a country’s distance to markets would 
result in about a 25 percent increase in per capita income (Redding and Venables, 
2004:77). But, can one generalise this result? Moving countries that are very far away 
from the main world markets into a central location can result into much larger income 
effects. For instance, performing the experiment of hypothetically moving Zimbabwe to 
central Europe results into an almost 80 percent rise in Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita 
(Redding and Venables, 2004:77). But, can one really move any country in the world to 
Europe and make it work?
This chapter explores the insights of the Redding and Venables (2004) results, and 
shows that they are non-robust and particularly sensitive to the institutional setup. An 
institutional quality threshold is established below which no matter where we are in the 
world the hypothetical rise in GDP per capita is not going to happen.
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5. II. MODEL
The theoretical framework used by Redding and Venables (2004) follows the general 
equilibrium model exposed in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), chapter 14 on 
international specialisation. This model allows for international specialisation with 
intermediate goods. The final manufactured good is also used as an input in the 
production function, thus, acting as well as an intermediate capital good. Production 
also requires an immobile (non-tradable) factor of production, which can be interpreted 
as labour.
In the exposition of the model, we follow Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), and 
introduce some notation changes to match Redding and Venables (2004) application. 
For instance, we allow for i = 1,..., R countries instead of two in the original Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (1999).
Prices of production factors are Wj for labour and Gj for the intermediate good. When 
the latter is sold directly to the consumer its price is pi. These define the indirect 
production function
Pi =  W j' 'a G “, 0<  a  <1 (1),
which is Cobb-Douglas with intermediate manufactured good share a. Equation 1 
illustrates the fact that firms set price equal to marginal cost.
In each country i, there are n firms producing n differentiated manufactured products. 
Therefore, nj is the number of varieties of the manufactured good produced in country i. 
The manufactured good enjoys a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) amongst all its 
varieties. The CES function is
o > l (2),
j =1
where TJt stands for the transportation costs from country j to country i. Firms chose to 
buy all varieties available to produce at internal price G., and the more varieties the
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better. Equally, consumers get best utility by purchasing all varieties available, and the 
more the better. Their CES utility function is
^ = [ | > , V ^ F  (3),
7 = 1
where xtJ is the amount of the manufactured good produced in country i which is
demanded by county j. In other words, xfj represents the level of exports from i to j, and
the level of internal demand in the case of j = i. Aggregating across importing countries 
we have
X  * ! /= * /  (4)>
7= 1
where xi is the aggregate level of production for a given firm-variety in country i.
How much is the expenditure of country i on manufactured goods? If we define Yj as 
income in country i and p as the share of manufactures that go to final consumption, 
then total expenditure of country i on manufactured goods, Ej is equal to the sum of 
consumers’ demand plus intermediate good’s demand on behalf of producers.
= + anip ixl (5)
In equation 5, juYi is the proportion of income that goes to direct consumption of 
manufactures and anip ixi is the proportion of total production that is devoted to the 
purchase of intermediate goods. Notice that a  is the Cobb-Douglass share of the 
tradable input and jc. represents the equilibrium level of production. Therefore, njp ixi is 
the value of production of country i, which we can denote by Xj. So,
Ei =fiYl + a X i (6)
Xjj is the value of exports from country i to country j. We will later focus on this
variable (value of exports).
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Now, we want to know the number of varieties nj. In order to simplify the model, we 
follow Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) by setting an arbitrary breakeven point of 
sales (3c)1. The breakeven point of sales is the same for every country because they 
enjoy the same technology. Then, this breakeven point determines the salaries.
* = 7 “— (7),1 - a
Choosing the breakeven point equal to —-— simplifies the calculation. Equation 7
1 - a
implies that
SO
n,Pj = (9)
and, therefore,
ni = ^ A i (10)
Pi
So, the number of varieties in every country is proportional to the real wage. The higher 
the real wage, the larger the number of industrial varieties. Likewise, the larger the 
share of the labour force in manufactures, the larger the number of industrial varieties.
In order to obtain price equations for the intermediate good, we incorporate nj and pj 
into Gj equation. First, we incorporate the resulting equation for nj, equation 10, into Gj, 
equation 2;
w . _!_
( i d
y=i Pj
1 Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) use a different notation for X  . They use q* for the level o f sales 
at the zero-profit equilibrium instead (see Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999:242). Here we choose X  
notation in order to make it match with that o f Redding and Venables (2004).
220
and, then, we incorporate the indirect production function, equation 1, determining the 
price of the consumption good, pj, as a function of the prices of inputs, Wj and Gj.
JL w ——
G. = [ V — — A,(wr“G°Tu) (12)
I - a  S i a  J  '  J  J  J 1 '  J  v  7
M w i  G j
Rearranging it renders
R
G'-” = Y  X “‘T 1-'7 (13)
'  J  J  J  J> V 7
j =1
which is the price equation for country i.
The structure of the price equation is the same as in Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 
(1999) and Redding and Venables (2004), but, unlike them, we initially allow for a 
higher number of countries, R. The referred previous models consisted of a world of 
two countries only.
On the producers’ side, firms follow a profit maximising behaviour. Profits are as 
follows:
7Ti = p ixi - w j(F + cxi) (14)
where F represents the fixed costs of production and c the variable costs, being the latter 
proportional to the quantity produced, qj. Production is given by the demand function. 
Firms take the price of the intermediate input imported from another country, Gj, as 
given, xj is equal to the proportion of total sales that go to final consumption. This 
amount is given by equation 15.
Xt = M fdY,(p,T,j r  G?-%  (15)
/=1
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Under a perfectly competitive environment, firms set price equal to marginal cost. This 
zero-profit condition gives rise to the optimal production choice for the firm, x .  
Therefore, rearranging terms, the demand function is
( i6)
7 = 1
Now we can isolate the price of the consumption good, pj
p , ° o r  ( i ? )
*  7 =  1
Elasticity of demand is a.
P i ( l - — ) = cwi (18)
(7
o r
Pi=cwt '  o  '  
o - l
(19)
Equation 19 is the pricing rule. The demand function and the pricing rule give rise to the 
wage equations. The next step is finding the wage equations. Applying the pricing rule 
to the inverse demand function found in equation 17 renders
cw;
o - l
(  u  R
£ Y y .t .'
—  j  v  
\ x  j =i
1
V
(20)
Thus, the initial wage equation is as follows:
o - l R
W ; =
CO
z - Y y .t '.
—  L - i  j  i] 
x  j =1
1-C T y^icr-l (21)
Equation 21 gives the wage at which firms in country i break even.
222
In order to simplify the calculations, we can do the following normalisations, without 
loss of generality:
F m * (22)
and
o - l
c = -------= p (23)
By setting the fixed and variable costs of manufacturing production equal to certain 
parameters of our interest, we will be able to simplify the pricing rule and the wage 
equations. Thanks to the normalisation in equation 22, the pricing rule in equation 19 
becomes
(24)
and the wage equations in 21 become
W :  = Y/roj
/
(25)
In equilibrium, the supply capacity of country i, Sj is
s, = n,p'r (26)
If we weight the internal price by the iceberg transportation costs from country i to 
country j, the resulting expression will be expressed in terms of the price of 
domestically produced goods placed at the foreign market j. Adding up over all 
countries we get the resulting supplier access of country j.
SAj = f i n,(PiTljr '  (27)
/ = ]
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Moving to the exports’ market, the market capacity of country j, mj, is defined as
mj =EjGJ-] (28)
and the corresponding market access of country i, M A j ,  is defined as the sum of all 
market accesses across countries, expressed in terms of the price once the good is 
placed in country j. i.e. weighted by the iceberg transportation cost from country i to 
country j.
M 4 = £ E j ( G j T , r '  (29)
7=1
Xjj is defined as the value of exports from county i to country j.
= n,P,x ij (30)
Then, the value of exports gives rise to the following trade equation:
n ^ x ^ n ^ X ' E j G J - '  (31)
which, in terms of the above definitions, can be written as
X ,  (32)
5. III. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS
This section goes from the theoretical model to econometric specifications; it deals with
the issue of how to approach econometric specification for empirical estimation of the
Market Access and Supplier Access indicators.
First, we take logarithms at both sides of the trade equation.
In Xy = In j. + (1 -  a)  In Ttj + In 
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(33)
Following Redding and Venables (2004), the supply capacity of the exporting country is 
estimated with exporting country characteristics ( cty;.). The importing partner market
capacity is estimated with importing country characteristics ( ptrij). The transportations
costs between the two countries are estimated with the distance between capitals ( disty)
and a common border dummy ( bordtj).
In X tj =0 + jujctyi + Xjptrij + Si In disty + S2bordij + utj (34)
In equation 34, all explanatory variables are dummy variables but distance between 
capitals; Uy is the error term. Considering that, by nature, trade data are censored at 0,
we prefer a Tobit estimation over ordinary least squares.
The Market Access and Supplier Access indicators are defined as follows:
(35)
j =1
SAi = lL T'i°si (36)
/ = ]
and, according to the econometric specification in equation 34, they are calculated as
R
In MAi = ^  (Xj ptYij + In disty + Sjbordy) (37)
j =i
R
In SAj = ^  (f i f ty f + S{ In disty + djbordy ) (3 8)
;=i
Now, the following step is to calculate the market and supplier access indicators 
empirically.
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5. IV. EMPIRICAL DATA ESTIMATION
Redding and Venables (2004) estimated the Market Access and Supplier Access 
equations using 1994 data and then contrasted them to 1996 GDP per capita. The 
NBER-UN International Trade Data on-line archive provides bilateral trade data for a 
given year since 1962 and until 2000. All bilateral trade data available for 1994 were 
extracted. This on-line archive is an updated version of the Canadian Statistics trade 
data archive. There is a change of approach in the new version. The latter compile 
information primarily from the importer side instead of from the exporter side, since 
this is supposed to be more reliable (Feenstra et al. 2005).
The Redding and Venables (2004) market access indicators for 1994 were replicated 
using their method . Full series of foreign and domestic market access and supplier 
access were generated for a cross section of countries around the world. Total market 
access is calculated by adding up foreign and domestic market access. Given that the 
interest of this paper is to account for the effects of access to markets, the focus of the 
rest of this paper is on market access rather than supplier access.
Redding and Venables (2004), actually, did not use the NBER-UN trade database in 
their calculations, but an adapted version of these data, cleaned up by the CEP. The next 
step was to get hold of the CEP database they actually used. The CEP World Trade 
Database incorporates some changes described in detail in Stewart (2001). These lead to 
the existence of two alternative datasets: on the one hand, the original UN international 
trade dataset as the NBER presents it and, on the other hand, the CEP revised version. 
Although calculations are done for the two alternative databases to check robustness, 
the CEP cleaned up version of the bilateral trade data is preferred, because of the 
refinements it incorporates and because it is the one used in the Redding and Venables’ 
study. The appendix contains the full new series created and the differences between the 
two alternative sources listed country by country. The world distribution of foreign 
market access generated by the two alternative datasets can be found in the final maps. 
Because the final impact in the results is not considerable, it is preferable to operate
2 1994 Market Access indicators are contrasted with 1996 GDP per capita in order to avoid simultaneity 
bias.
3 Thanks to Stephen Redding, who passed me the original STATA code used in Redding and Venables 
(2004).
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with just one database, the CEP one, for the reasons outlined above. However, some 
results using the NBER database can be found in the appendix.
The rest of the paper will make use of the market access series derived from the CEP 
database. GDP series are taken from the Penn World Table version 6.1 for consistency 
with Redding and Venables (2004), and geography related control variables are taken 
from their same source for the same reason.
5. V. HOW SDI CAN HELP TESTING MARKET ACCESS ROBUSTNESS IN A 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Bilateral trade data are available since 1962. It seems an interesting question to ask 
whether the relationship between Market Access as defined by Redding and Venables
(2004) and per capita income context was more robust under an earlier historical 
context. Going back to the first NBER-UN International Trade Data reporting year 
gives 3 decades of perspective, and thus could turn into an interesting exploration.
Chronologically speaking, the beginning of the bilateral trade database coincides with 
the Social Development Index created for the early 1960s. Thus, the Social 
Development Index can become a candidate for acting as a proxy for social capital at 
that point in History. The SDI attempt to capture how well a society works together as a 
whole, which could be a proxy for social capital in the absence of data sourcing from 
surveys, such as the World Value Surveys, which started being conducted only in the 
1970s. It is true that data coming from surveys, such as trust, and a compound index of 
historical statistics, such as the SDI, are not directly comparable, but they may, 
however, make reference to the same concept of social capital. Methodologically 
speaking, even the current indicators of good governance released by the World Bank
(2005) were originally calculated as an extraction of a principal components analysis of 
socio-institutional data, which is the same procedure with which the SDI was 
calculated. So, the use of the SDI as a proxy for social capital and placing it in the 
context of the socio-institutional control variable in the regressions above does seem 
reasonable. If one is willing to take the SDI as our institutional indicator for the 1960s, 
the test performed in previous sections can be repeated here for the time corresponding 
to the beginning of the bilateral trade database. Even more so if we take into account the
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explanatory power the SDI has revealed in previous chapters, which would by itself 
justify the potentiality of the results in the following econometric tests.
We performed a similar test of market access influence on GDP making use of the 
social development index available for the 1960s (Adelman and Morris, 1967) as means 
of controlling for social capital, as suggested by Temple and Johnson (1998). Luckily 
enough, the initial reporting time of the bilateral trade data coincides with that of the 
Adelman and Morris’ Social Development Index, which opens room for testing around 
this time. New series of market access indicators for the beginning of the 1960s were 
created using the Redding and Venables (2004) method. The new Market Access series 
together with the use of alternative socio-institutional indicators (the Social 
Development Index), allows testing of the economic geography theory for another 
benchmark year. We used the newly created 1965 market access series, together with 
the Adelman and Morris (1967) social development index and the falciparam malaria 
index, which is available for 1966 from the Center for International Development (CID) 
at Harvard University. Purely geographical control variables do not differ from those 
used for 1996.
5. VI. HISTORICAL DATA ESTIMATION
In previous sections, we replicated Redding and Venables (2004) market access 
indicators for 1994 using their method. Now we created new series of market access 
indicators for other benchmark years using the same method. Market access series can 
be calculated for every year between 1962 and 2000, since bilateral trade data are 
available from the NBER-UN International Trade Data for every year within this range.
The following graphs illustrate the oscillations in levels and rankings of market access 
over the years; (based on own calculations, replicating Redding and Venables 2004 
method).
228
lfma = log of foreign market access
l m a c  = log of market access MA(3), using Tobit estimation, as in Redding and 
Venables (2004)
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Ten Highest Market Access Scores for 1962 (bilateral trade data initial year)
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Ten highest Market Access Scores for 1965 (year used for testing)
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941994
Ten Highest Market Access Scores for 1994 (year used for testing by Redding and 
Venables 2004)
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□  Ifma62 
■  Ima_c62
Ten Lowest Market Access Scores for 1962 (bilateral trade data initial year)
□  Ifma65 
■  Ima_c65
Ten Lowest Market Access Scores for 1965 (year used for testing)
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■  Ima_c80
Ten Lowest Market Access Scores for 1980 (intermediate year)
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□  Ifma94 
■  Ima c94
Ten Lowest Market Access Scores for 1994 (year used for testing by Redding and 
Venables 2004)
5. VII. TESTING THE THEORY FOR ANOTHER BENCHMARK YEAR
After obtaining the Market Access indicators for several years, we can now re-test the 
theory of whether access to markets matters for GDP for alternative benchmark years 
under the context of the 1960s, for which the SDI is available4. Table 5 .15 displays the 
results.
4 Recall that the Social Development Index constructed by Adelman and Morris (1967) uses data ranking 
from 1959 to 1962. Therefore, the Index is a good indicator for the beginning of the decade of the 1960s 
starting in 1962 and also valid for contrasting with data corresponding with successive years. Testing 
should never be done retrospectively, since this could reverse the direction of causality.
? Tables in this chapter are displayed at the end because of format restrictions.
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Similar regressions to those run in Redding and Venables (2004:69) have been run 
focusing on the log of real GDP per capita in 1964 and 1965 (to test several years 
shortly after 1962). Regressions with 1964 GDP do not pass the joint significance F- 
test; this might be due to simultaneity bias. Therefore, it is preferable to run the 
regressions on 1965 GDP, which poses no statistical problem. Approximately 67 
percent of the disparities in 1965 real GDP per capita are captured in our economic 
geography regressions (only 9 percent below Redding and Venables’ explanatory power 
for the 1990s with only 2/3 of the observations). Also Redding and Venables (2004)’s 
R-squares for the 1990s diminish with sample size. For instance, our R-squares for 1965 
are 9 percent smaller of what Redding and Venables could explain with a sample size of 
91 for 1994 trade data; but slightly higher than what they could explain with a sample 
size of 69. Regarding the focus economic geography variable (Market Access), the 
regression coefficients do not reach statistical significance, which might be due to the 
limitations of the sample size. Nevertheless, the sign of the coefficient is consistently 
positive across all specifications, which suggests that better access to markets is 
positively associated with higher levels of GDP per capita.
Overall, given the data availability, the relevance of the market access indicators cannot 
be proven for 1965 as strongly as for 1994 in this section. The next section explores this 
topic further. The next question is: Which aspects of the market access indicators do 
matter? In the next section, we explore the impact of plain distance to markets thanks to 
an instrumental variables’ test.
5. VIII. DOES MARKET ACCESS MATTER THROUGH DISTANCE?
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES’ TEST
This section presents some evidence of the fact that bilateral distances may have played 
some role in the development of the World trade flows. What is the relationship 
between the Market Access indicators developed by Redding and Venables (2004) and 
distances to the main World markets? Do Market Access indicators matter just because 
they capture distance to markets? An instrumental variables test would help us answer 
this question in the two chronological setups, the 1990s and the 1960s. And more 
interestingly, it is possible to perform an equivalent distance-instrumental variables’ 
test for both periods if the use similar control variables.
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We ought to question whether distance is important directly by itself (the further away 
a country is the more unlikely it is to supply it with domestic goods and services in a 
proportional way), or indirectly through the more complex market access indicators 
(which include other aspects such as costs). If market access matters mainly through 
distance, we would be able to instrument the market access indicators with distance and 
then re-run the main regressions getting significant coefficients. Redding and Venables 
(2004) successfully instrumented their 1994 market access variables with distance to 
the centre of the main World markets, (which they considered Belgium, Japan, and the 
United States). In this section, we show that distance to the centre of the three main 
World markets can successfully instrument the complex market access indicators. We 
perform the instrumental variables (IV) test with 1994 trade data, and then check the 
robustness of the results by performing another IV test for our other benchmark year, 
1965.
The instrumental variables test takes the form of a 2-stages least squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure, where the first stage instruments the Market Access indicators 
with distance to the three main World market centres; namely USA, Belgium and Japan; 
and an extra variable which is the minimum amongst the three. The forth instrument is 
important because it captures whether being close to just one of the maim markets is 
enough to boost bilateral trade. Then, the second-stage estimation uses the Market 
Access indicators as instrumented in the first stage instead of the originals. In this way, 
it is possible to discern whether access to markets matters through distance, which does 
indeed seem to be the case according to the results presented herein. Finally, this 
procedure is repeated for the two historical benchmarks, the 1990s and the 1960s.
Table 5.2 shows the result of the instrumental variables estimation for the mid-1990s. 
Market Access data have been calculated for 1994, replicating Redding and Venables 
(2004) procedure, contrasted to 1996 log of real GDP per capita from the Penn World 
Tables as done in previous sections. Moreover, Market Access data have also been 
calculated directly for 1996, since we should not expect simultaneity bias problems with 
GDP this time because the access to markets is instrumented with purely exogenous 
variables (distances). Both alternatives are presented in Table 5.2, showing very similar 
results. The Market Access indicators consistently achieve significantly positive 
coefficients for all alternatives. Its magnitude is around 0.30 when using 1994 trade data 
(see specifications (1) and (2) in Table 5.2) and 0.29 when using 1996 trade data (see
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specifications (3) and (4) in Table 5.2), above the 0.215 achieved by Redding and 
Venables (2004:69) reproduced here in Table 5.4, specification (1). Thus, it does seem 
that when instrumenting the Market Access indicators with distance, they are able to 
explain real GDP per capita differentials across the World. In one word, location 
matters. Being far away from the potential trading partners does make things difficult.
We have been using bilateral distance between capital cities throughout (“distcap” in the 
CEPII database). Alternative distance definitions: “dist” (distance between the most 
populated cities), “distw” (arithmetic weighted average distance, weights by population 
in several cities within each country), and “distwces” (weights according to CES 
function) give similar results. For a detailed description of the four distance 
measurement alternatives, see Clair et al. (2004:4). For a discussion of advantages and 
inconveniences, see Head and Mayer (2002). Though differences in results are small, 
“distwces”, the measure preferred by Head and Mayer, brings sometimes slightly higher 
R-squares and statistical significance of the coefficients in our regressions.
The next question is whether the location matters hypothesis can also be tested for 
another benchmark year in order to gain some historical perspective. Making use of the 
bilateral trade database we can resort to the initial reporting year 1962, as done in the 
previous section, and apply the instrumental variable tests to the 1960s data. The result 
is shown in Table 5.3. Table 5.3 presents astonishingly similar results to Table 5.2. 
Again, Market Access coefficients recover statistical significance when instrumented 
by distance to main markets. Their sign is positive and their magnitudes are comparable 
to Redding and Venables (2004:69), again staying above. Using 1962 trade data gives 
rise to 0.33 significant coefficients at the 5 percent significance level; using 1965 trade 
data produces 0.31 significant coefficients at the same significance level. So, the level 
of association of access to markets instrumented via bilateral distances and real GDP 
per capita was as strong in the 1960s as it has been shown to be in the 1990s, and there 
is no sign of ‘the death of distance’ from these regressions (phrase making reference to 
the book The Tyranny o f Distance, by Geoffrey Blainey on Australian history 
(Blainey,1966)).
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5. IX. ROBUSTNESS TESTS WITH MORE STANDARD 
SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
In this section, the robustness of the effect of access to markets on GDP is explored 
further. This is done by means of replicating the results with alternative socio- 
institutional control variables.
Regression (1) in Table 5.4 corresponds to Redding and Venables (2004); regression (2) 
is my replica6. The results go in the same direction, although there are some observed 
discrepancies of unknown nature. These are the baseline equations. Regressions (3), (6) 
and (8) in Table 5.4 have been run using the two-stages least squares procedure 
described in the previous section as an alternative to the ordinary least squares 
estimation. If we run the regressions using the logarithm of the distance to the main 
world markets as done in the previous section, we will resort to the original Redding 
and Venables’ results: The coefficients of Foreign Market Access turn out to be positive 
and statistically significant, their magnitudes are of the order of 0.20 to 0.30, recovering 
the Redding and Venables’s results. So it seems that the market access indicators 
recover significance if instrumented through the exogenous variable distance. Thus, 
market access matters indirectly via distance to the main world markets, pointing at the 
hypothesis that geography still matters.
The rest of the equations in the table illustrate how changes in the choice of socio- 
institutional variables alter the sign of the key variable (access to markets) and do not 
lead to a consistently significant relationship with per capita income. The sign of 
foreign market access changes depending on whether we run the regression on risk of 
expropriation (regression 2), or property rights (regression 4). These two variables are 
conceptually opposed and therefore, should be capturing the same effect, although with 
reversed sign. The fact is that including one or the other reverses the sign of the key 
variable (foreign market access). The sample is much smaller under “risk of 
expropriation”, so the phenomenon could be due to sample selection bias. “Property 
rights” seems to be the one Redding and Venables (2004) actually used, because of the 
sample size exact coincidence. It has a wider sample than “risk of expropriation”; 
however, the latter covers the same concept and enjoys a much more detailed scale, so it
6 I show 4 significative ciphers throughout, independently of the number o f decimals. This is why, in 
some cases, equation (1) shows only 3 ciphers while the rest o f equations tend to show 4 ciphers.
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could be considered preferable if there were no sample size restrictions. Because of the 
wider sample size “property rights” is preferred.
In regressions (5), (6), (7) and (9) the risk of expropriation and property rights variables 
have been substituted by the Index of Economic Freedom, which is a wider concept that 
includes the former. This index gives strongly significant coefficients, but the sign of 
foreign market access still depends on which other socio-institutional control variables 
do we include. The truth is that the variables “socialist rule” and the war dummy 
(Redding and Venables’s choice) return non-significant coefficients in all instances. So, 
what happens if we run the same regression with more standard socio-institutional 
variables?
Regressions (7), (8) and (9) incorporate the concept of social capital into the 
regressions. This is done through the variable “trust” as it appears in Knack and Keefer 
(1997) and has been extracted from the World Value Surveys7. The use of this variable 
has been suggested by Knack and Keefer (1997) and used widely ever since. It 
measures the general feeling of trust amongst people in a certain country. Redding and 
Venables (2004:68) claim to take their control variables from Knack and Keefer (1997) 
among others, but do not make use of their social capital indicators in their regressions. 
Including these alternative indicators gives excellent results. Significance of the socio- 
institutional controls increases sharply and R-squares are between 14 and 22 percent 
higher (see Table 5.4). Incorporating the Index of Economic Freedom and trust, shows 
that the latter are strongly significant and makes the variables “socialist rule” and the 
war dummy be automatically dropped from the regression.8
The main shortcoming in using the variable trust is the narrow sample size, which 
makes it difficult to compare with the other specifications counting with a broader 
sample of countries. This could lead to sample selection bias. The important point is 
that the highest adjusted r-square is obtained when trust in included in the regression. 
Then, the socialist and war dummies are automatically dropped. This shows that the 
concept of social capital, in this case in the form of trust, should not be neglected. 
Interestingly enough, the foreign market access coefficient is reversed. So the sign of 
the coefficient is also sensitive to the selection of socio-institutional variables. However,
7 Civic engagement, another measure of social capital used in previous chapters, is not included in the 
regressions because it did not show statistical significance in a consistent way.
8 The same is true for total market access (including domestic market as well as foreign).
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we need to resort to other alternative socio-institutional control variables in order to 
explore the significance of the Market Access indicators deeper because of the short 
sample of the social capital indicator in this case. Unfortunately, the social capital 
indicator variable, trust from the World Value Surveys, does not offer the possibility to 
be explored in much more detail in a reasonable way despite its significance and high 
explanatory power due to the shortness in sample size, which would imply running out 
of degrees of freedom for any simple further manipulation of the variable. Nevertheless, 
we will come back to the usefulness of social capital related variables in the analysis 
further down in the chapter.
Another alternative (or, rather, complementary) exploration is to turn the attention to the 
widely used Governance Matters indicators gathered for recent years by the World 
Bank. The World Bank’s Governance Matters indicators include: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption9. The effects of individual Governance Matters variables 
on total market access (which incorporates the domestic market as well as foreign) are 
presented in Table 5.5. Including the Governance Matters indicators one by one in the 
regressions produces switching signs of total market too. The sign of access to markets 
alternates depending on the choice of institutional variable. For voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, the effect of 
access to markets into GDP is positive. For political stability and government 
effectiveness (the most statistically significant by far when all are included 
simultaneously), the effect of access to markets into GDP is negative10. When all of 
these variables are included simultaneously in the regression, substituting the poor 
performing “socialist rule” and war dummy, the sign of foreign and total market access 
is positive (see specification 7 in Table 5.5). It is worth noticing that only one of the 
Governance Matters variables remains statistically significant throughout: government 
effectiveness. This is why the effect of this variable as institutional control is analysed 
in a separate regression (specification 9 in Table 5.4). Including the variable 
government effectiveness from the Governance Matters V database reverses again the
9 Data and detailed explanation of each variable can be obtained from the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi, 2006).
10 Table 5.5b in the appendix repeats all the regressions in Table 5.5 using the original NBER-UN data 
instead. Once more, the sign of the market access coefficient switches from positive to negative in two 
occasions (both when we choose “voice” and when we choose “political stability” as controls) and from 
negative to positive when we include all the Governance Matters indicators simultaneously in the 
regression.
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sign of the foreign market access coefficient, leaving it still within non-significance. 
Government effectiveness turns out to be strongly significant and produces an only 
slightly positive foreign market access coefficient. Intriguingly enough, if we run the 
same regression with total market access instead of foreign market access the sign of 
market access turns negative11. The problem of working with total instead of foreign 
market access is that the number of observations is reduced drastically to almost only 
half the sample size. This is why foreign market access is the preferred market access 
indicator. Furthermore, we have shown that the sign of access to markets alternates 
depending on the choice of institutional variable. So, the effect of the Market Access 
indicator is again unclear and we have learnt that alternative socio-institutional variables 
should not be ignored and deserve deeper exploration.
Overall, the evidence shows that Redding and Venables’ results about the impact of the 
market access indicator are not always robust. The instrumental variables approach 
brings statistical significance to Market Access and the magnitude of the coefficient is 
similar to Redding and Venables (2004:69). However, the use of more standard 
institutional quality measures does not help to replicate their results, nor does the 
original NBER database. The regressions above show how sensitive the direction of the 
effect of access to markets into GDP is. Then, what is the real sign of the effect of 
access to markets? Given the impact and relevance of the paper by Redding and
Venables (2004) introducing the market access indicators, it seems worth exploring
1 ?what is driving the sensitivity of the results. We investigate the sensitivity of the 
results with the aid of partition regressions on the government effectiveness, which 
exhibits both statistical significance and wide-enough sample of countries. The next 
sections of the chapter cover this sensitivity exploration.
5. X. WHAT LEADS THE RESULTS? PARTITION REGRESSIONS
Why are the Redding and Venables (2004) results so sensitive? What is the real effect 
of access to markets? This chapter has shown how standard socio-institutional controls 
produce switching signs of the market access indicator, which turns out to be not so
11 Table 5.4b in the appendix reproduces the same results as in Table 5.4, -except regression 1 in Table
5.4, which corresponds to Redding and Venables’ published results-, but this time using the original 
NBER-UN data. It produces similar results on the market access coefficient except for the regression 
incorporating the trust variable, which switches the sign o f the market access coefficient once more. This 
may be due to the small sample available for this particular specification.
12 According to Google Scholar, Redding and Venables (2004) paper had 410 citations as o f 26/09/2008.
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robust. In other words, the Redding and Venables result on the relevance of the market 
access indicator is not unconditional. The effect of the Governance Matters indicators -  
in particular, of the most significant government effectiveness-, deserves a deeper 
exploration. In this section, the paper explores the varying degrees of intensity and 
direction of the effect of government effectiveness on foreign market access.
Government effectiveness, taken from the Governance Matters V indicators, encloses 
some valuable information to be added to the analysis of access to markets. Limao and 
Venables (2001) point out that infrastructure is an important element of the costs of 
transportation, and it takes special relevance in the inland African countries. Their 
analysis of bilateral trade flows in African countries reveals that their poor volumes of 
trade are due to poor infrastructures (Limao and Venables, 2001:467). Other authors had 
already focused on the infrastructural component of high transportation costs and 
pointed out at inappropriate policies (Amjadi and Yeats, 1995). Inappropriate transport 
policies or the lack of effectiveness in implementing them cause poorer infrastructures 
for facilitating transport and trade. So, it seems reasonable to suggest that government 
effectiveness can play a role in explaining trade volumes.
Government effectiveness is the institutional variable that shows more robustness of all 
Governance Matters indicators. Recall, it is the only one that remains statistically 
significant when simultaneously regressing on all 6 of them. Overall, it has a positive 
effect on GDP per capita. Surprisingly, it produces a negative market access coefficient 
in both cases, foreign and total market access. A negative market access coefficient 
means that the more accessibility to markets a country has the poorer it is. This is the 
contrary of what one would have expected (Redding and Venables 2004 obtain a 
positive association between access to markets and GDP using alternative institutional 
variables); and, furthermore, it is counterintuitive. Therefore, it seems interesting to 
explore what is driving this result. Recall that other variables like political stability, risk 
of expropriation, or Index of Economic Freedom together with the variable “trust” also 
return negative market access coefficients. So, it is not an isolated phenomenon. This 
section focuses on the effect of one representative institutional variable (government 
effectiveness) into foreign market access.
Now, the question is the following: Is there an institutional quality threshold that 
countries need to reach before benefiting from good access to foreign markets?
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There are a total of 181 observations for government effectiveness. The total sample of 
countries has been divided into several sub-samples according to their government 
effectiveness. Then, regressions (1) and (9) in Table 5.4 are run for each one of these 
sub-samples, corresponding to Redding and Venables’ preferred specification with 
property rights protection, socialist and war dummies as institutional variables; and the 
author’s preferred specification with property rights and government effectiveness, 
respectively. For extra robustness checks, both foreign and total market access have 
been tested, and both for NBER and CEP databases. A summary of results is presented 
in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 displays the significance of the results using Redding and Venables’ preferred
institutional controls (property rights protection, socialist past, and recent war dummy)
1 ^as in Table 5.4, equation (1) . I t  derives from the table that the upper quartile of the 
observations enjoys the most significant effect of geographical access to markets, while 
the lower 75 percent of the sample never gets a significant coefficient when analysed 
separately. Therefore, the whole sample of countries has been partitioned into 2 groups: 
those scoring highest in the government effectiveness indicator (upper quartile of the 
observations), which corresponds to .50 or above in the government effectiveness index, 
ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 approximately (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2006); and the 
rest (lower 3 quartiles). The division between the two groups of observations according 
to the government effectiveness ranking has been made effective through the creation of 
a dummy variable operating in the upper quartile of the sample. Then, an interaction 
term between market access and the government effectiveness dummy has been 
introduced in order to account for the distinctive nature of the upper sub-sample. This 
interaction term operates as a slope dummy on the market access coefficient.
Table 5.7 shows the baseline regressions, (1) and (4), augmented with the market 
access-govemment effectiveness interaction term, in (2), (3), (5) and (6)14 . Notice that 
foreign market access has a small and non-significant coefficient, while the interaction
13 If I use my preferred institutional variables (property rights and government effectiveness), as in Table
5.4, equation (6), I get non-significance throughout. This means that the market access coefficient is not 
significant, except for Redding and Venables’ choice of institutional variables.
14 Running the regressions with Foreign Market Access calculated with the NBER-UN data instead of  
with the CEP data adds a few more observations to the effective sample. Regressions have also been run 
for total market access (NBER-UN data) and results are again similar.
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term (lfmaCefhighest) enjoys a positive and highly significant coefficient of the 
magnitude of 0.05 to 0.08. Recall the interaction term is the result of multiplying the 
foreign market access index by the government effectiveness dummy operating in the 
upper quartile of the observations, and should be interpreted as extra slope for those 
observations within the upper 25 percent sub-sample. The same results are obtained 
when market access and the interaction term are instrumented with the distance to the 
main world markets (see specifications (3) and (6). In this case, the market access 
coefficient is positive but once more non-significant, but its interaction term with 
government effectiveness is taking all the significance with the magnitudes of the 
coefficient having even risen to 0.10. This result holds even if the institutional variables 
are represented by trust only, which reduces the number of observations to less than half 
the sample (see specification (6) in Table 5.7). Therefore, most of the effect captured by 
foreign market access overall is due to those observations concentrated on the upper 
government effectiveness quartile. So, institutional quality matters and there seems to 
be a threshold below which a country is not able to effectively enjoy the benefits of 
good location.
5. XI. EMPIRICAL COUNTERFACTUALS: CHANGES IN COUNTRY
CHARACTERISTICS
We know from last section that if one would perform the hypothetical experiment of 
moving Zimbabwe to Europe its potential 80 percent rise in GDP per capita would not 
be effective, because Zimbabwe is not a high government effectiveness country.
In this section, Market Access has been computed based on specific country 
characteristics instead of country dummies, so that one can evaluate the effect of a 
specific characteristic (for instance, what is the isolated effect of distance to markets?). 
I did this for foreign and domestic market access, foreign and domestic supplier access, 
and all of them using the two alternative datasets UN and CEP (the latter shown in 
tables, for consistency with Redding and Venables, 2004). The table is based on the 
preferred control variables specified by Redding and Venables, with the intention of 
getting comparable results15.
15 Redding and Venables (2004:76) demonstrated that the use o f alternative parameters for intermediate 
goods share (a) and elasticity of substitution (o) produces very small changes in predictions.
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The figures in Table 5.8 display the predicted percentage change in levels of GDP per 
capita when one does the experiment of hypothetically moving a given country to 
central Europe. Four countries have been selected for this experiment: Zaire, Sri Lanka, 
Zimbabwe, and New Zealand; ordered according to their government effectiveness 
indicator. Zaire and New Zealand represent one very low and one very high government 
effectiveness observations, respectively. The 2 middle-ranged countries are case studies 
by Redding and Venables (2004). Regressions using country characteristics where used 
to compute the changes in predicted GDP, which give a slightly negative (but not 
significant) coefficient to foreign market access16. This is why the GDP changes with no 
slope dummy are slightly negative. Columns (1) and (2) show the potential rise in GDP, 
as calculated by Redding and Venables (2004: Table 5.7). This methodology does not 
make a difference between good and bad institutions’ countries. Potential increases in 
GDP are very high, often above 100 percent (i.e. income would double) with respect to 
predicted GDP with actual distances and common borders. Columns (3) and (4) take 
into account institutional handicaps. Poor and middle-range government effectiveness 
countries below the 75 percent threshold practically do not change their GDP even after 
endowing them with European borders and distances. Slightly negative numbers are due 
to a technicality, —the slightly negative though not significant coefficient of market 
access in the regressions by country characteristics (not shown)—, but the idea is that it 
reflects a practically null change. On the contrary, should New Zealand enjoy European 
distances to markets, the predictions say that it would enjoy an increase in GDP of 
around 20 percent, which seems more reasonable. This would be once we adjust for the 
effect of good institutional health. Columns (4) and (6) show the predicted percentage 
change in GDP per capita after reversing the status of every country’s high government 
effectiveness dummy. This is, countries belonging to the low and middle government 
effectiveness scores are given high quality institutional dummy status, and countries 
with high government effectiveness are deprived from it. The overall result is that when 
countries with low and middle government effectiveness are artificially assigned to the 
high value group, their GDP doubles as when we made no institutional quality 
distinction. So, saying that if we would move a distant country to central Europe the 
GDP would almost double is an exaggeration and cannot be generalised. Redding and 
Venables’s results have been generically validated but should have taken into account 
the big difference that the detrimental effect of low quality institutions makes. Even if
16 The set o f estimations with specific country characteristics is not displayed, but can be made available 
upon request.
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we would move Zimbabwe to central Europe (as it is) its GDP would not increase by 80 
percent because it does not reach the minimum institutional quality threshold. 
Institutional quality and, in particular, government effectiveness, makes a big 
difference. Among the 4 countries studied only New Zealand belongs to the upper 
government effectiveness quartile. This is reflected in the drastic fall in GDP (above 88
17percent fall) when its privileged institutional quality is experimentally removed .
Overall, these four country cases illustrate how the possibility of a potential rise in GDP 
per capita when moving closer to markets being actually realised is very sensitive to 
institutional quality (in particular, to government effectiveness).
5. XII. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides an example of how and why social capital should not be left out 
of empirical economic theory. The inclusion of social capital proxies in the regressions 
improves the fit and opens up an alternative way of thinking about how society and the 
informal institutional setup matter for economic performance. Given the non-robustness 
of the results for the market access indicator in the mid-1990s, the Social Development 
Index (SDI) facilitates testing the theory of the relevance of access to markets for a 
different benchmark year. Testing the market-access-matters hypothesis for the mid- 
1960s, for which the SDI is available, gives the opportunity to check whether the results 
for the 1990s can be transferred to the Golden Age. The results show that the regression 
analysis gives very similar results for both periods.
The direct effect of access to markets on GDP per capita is less robust than what we 
initially thought. The original Redding and Venables (2004) results cannot be replicated 
with the NBER database, nor can they with alternative control institutional measures. 
The income regressions produce a switching sign of the coefficient depending on which 
institutional variables does one choose as controls. Repeating the analysis for an 
alternative benchmark year (1965) does not lead to more conclusive results about the 
significance of the effect of the market access indicator. Still, it reveals weakly positive
17 Changes in distances and borders have been performed both from the exporter and the importer 
perspectives. If changes as an exporter only are considered, the magnitudes o f the change in GDP per 
capita are much more moderate. For instance, Table 5.5, column (2), Zimbabwe would be 34.73 and New 
Zealand 45.52. Nevertheless, I understand changing a given country characteristics should be performed 
at both ends: both from the exporter and the importers’ perspective.
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coefficient in all income regressions, which suggests a positive association between 
market access and GDP per capita at that time.
However, results come much more strongly when we look at geographical bilateral 
distances to the main World markets, which seem to act indirectly through the Market 
Access indicators on real GDP per capita differentials. The strongly positive coefficients 
of access to markets when instrumented by distance to the main world markets suggest 
that the Market Access indicators have a positive effect on economic growth indirectly 
through distance.
The results show that access to markets mattered as much for the 1960s as it did for the 
1990s. This means that during times of increasing international trade volumes such as 
the Golden Age, the good geographic pre-disposition of the countries in terms of 
distance did matter for getting richer through international trade. It is well-known that 
commercial interactions were more intense within commercial geographical blocks (for 
instance, within the European Economic Community), and pure geographic 
characteristics (which is what Market Access captures) do seem to have been a driving 
force behind the increase in per capita incomes at that time. Of course, other factors 
such as preferential commercial agreements might have played an equally important 
role.
Having a closer look at the Market Access indicators, partition regressions show that the 
benefits of geographical access to markets operate with varying degrees of intensity, 
and sometimes negatively. So, the Redding and Venables (2004) results cannot be 
generalised. The institutional setup of a country is not neutral, and can operate as to 
enhance or deprive a country from the benefits of a good geographical positioning. 
Countries with low government effectiveness do not show an ability to benefit from a 
good geographical location, while countries with high government effectiveness (above 
the .50 threshold on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale) are more sensitive to good access to markets.
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Map 5.1-W orld
Countries by Ifma
H  11.760.000 to 14.600.000 (43)
I  11.220.000 to 11.760.000 (41) 
i  10.870.000 to 11.220.000 (43)
□  10.160.000 to 10.870.000 (45)
Note: Equal count criterion in choosing the range.
Distribution o f Log Foreign Market Access, using NBER-UN Database
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Map 5.2 -  World Distribution o f Log Foreign Market Access, using CEP Database.
Countries by IfmaCEP
■  13.110.000 to 15.380.000 (43)
1  12.710.000 to 13.110.000 (35)
H 12.470.000 to 12.710.000 (41)
□  11.670.000 to 12.470.000 (42)
Note: Equal count criterion in choosing the range.
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Table 5.1 - Real GDP per capita, Market Access (Foreign and Total), Economic Geography, and Social
Development
Log GDP pc 
Observations 
Year
( 1)
57
1964
(2)
57
1964
(3)
59
1965
(4)
59
1965
(5)
59
1965
(6)
59
1965
(7)
65
1965
(8)
65
1965
Log FMA1962 .3000
(.2400)
- - - .0770
(.1113)
- - -
Log TMA1962 “ .2995
(.2400)
“ “ “ .0773
(.1113)
“ “
Log FMA1964 “ “ .0864
(.1081)
“ “ “ -
Log TMA 1964 “ “ .0867
(.1081)
“ “ “
Log FMA 1965 “ “ “ “ ” " .0009
(.0013)
“
Log TMA 1965 “ “ “ “ “ - “ .0009
(.0013)
Log Hydroc pc -.0618* -.0618* .0262 .0261 .0265 .0264 .0256* .0256*
(.0355) (.0355) (.0156) (.0160) (.0160) (.0160) (.0147) (.0147)
Arable land -.1066 -.1064 .1193** .1193 ** .1178 ** .1178** .1042* .1042*
(.1071) (.1071) (.0522) (.0521) (.0534) (.0533) (.0524) (.0524)
N minerals -.0055 -.0055 -.0011 -.0011 -.0011 -.0011 -.0032 -.0032
(.0221) (.0221) (.0094) (.0094) (.0094) (.0094) (.0099) (.0099)
% tropics .2597 .2599 .0139 .0139 .0066 .0066 -.0007 -.0008
(.3339) (.3339) (.1389) (.1389) (.1409) (.1408) (.1264) (.1264)
Malaria 1966 -.2039 -.2042 -.1087 -.1087 -.1071 -.1070 -.0655 -.0650
(.3801) (.3802) (.1720) (.1720) (.1736) (.1736) (.1552) (.1553)
Social dev -.0934 -.0934 .5222*** .5221*** .5228*** .5228*** .5160*** .5160***
(.1720) (.1720) (.0624) (.0624) (.0623) (.0623) (.0644) (.0644)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 .1283 .1282 .6731 .6731 .6719 .6719 .6347 .6348
F(.) .97 .97 18.75 18.76 18.91 18.91 15.27 15.27
Prob>F .4642 .4650 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors. Regressions (1) and (2) with 1964 
GDP do not pass the joint F-test. This might be due to simultaneity bias. Therefore, it is preferable to run the regressions on 
1965 GDP levels, which pose no statistical problem. * Statistically significant at the 10% level. * * ’•'Statistically significant at 
the 1% level
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Table 5.2 -  1996 Real GDP per capita, Distance to Main World 
Markets, and Proxy for Social Capital (Trust)________________
Log GDP pc 
Observations 
Year
(1)
40
1996
(2)
40
1996
(3)
40
1996
(4)
40
1996
LogFMA1994 .3016**
(.1408)
- - -
LogTMA1994 “ .3021**
(.1410)
“
LogFMA1996 “ .2896**
(.1341)
~
LogTMA1996 “ “ “ .2899**
(.1342)
Loghydroc pc .0027 .0027 .0031 .0031
(.0193) (.0194) (.0194) (.0194)
Arable Land -.0139 -.0137 -.0139 -.0137
(.0709) (.0709) (.0701) (.0701)
N minerals .0027 .0027 .0035 .0034
(.0133) (.0133) (.0133) (.0133)
% Tropics -.5968 -.5963 -.6000 -.5997
(.3671) (.3671) (.3592) (.3591)
Malaria 1994 -1.640*** -1.640*** -1.606*** -1.606***
(.4393) (.4392) (.4296) (.4295)
Trust .0171** .0171** .0171*** .0171***
(.0064) (.0064) (.0063) (.0063)
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
R2 0.7509 0.7510 0.7538 0.7539
F(-) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Prob>F 20.13 20.11 20.22 20.22
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity White-robust standard errors. 
Instruments are the Log of distance capital to capital o f each country to the 
USA, Belgium, Japan and the minimum of the 3. ***Statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5.3 -  1965 Real GDP per capita, Distance to Main
World Markets, and Proxy for Social Capital (Soc Dev)
Log GDP pc 
Observations 
Year
( 1)
59
1965
(2)
59
1965
(3)
59
1965
(4)
59
1965
LogFMA1962 .3283**
(.1623)
- “
LogTMA1962 “ .3287**
(.1622)
“
'
LogFMA1965 “ “ .3052**
(.1413)
LogTMA1965 “ .3054**
(.1412)
Loghydroc pc .0192 .0192 .0203 .0203
(.0174) (.0174) (.0170) (.0170)
Arable Land .1046* .1047* .1079** .1080**
(.0547) (.0547) (.0523) (.0523)
N minerals -.0002 -.0002 .0004 .0004
(.0101) (.0101) (.0100) (.0100)
% Tropics -.0237 -.0236 -.0071 -.0070
(.1489) (.1489) (.1472) (.1472)
Malaria 1966 -.0497 -.0498 -.0530 -.0531
(.1979) (.1979) (.1952) (.1952)
Soc Dev .5165*** .5163*** .5094*** .5093***
(.0675) (.0675) (.0669) (.0669)
Estimation 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
R2 0.6328 0.6328 0.6425 0.6425
F(.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Prob>F 17.05 17.05 17.28 17.28
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity White-robust standard errors. 
Instruments are the Log of distance capital to capital o f each country to the 
USA, Belgium, Japan and the minimum o f the 3. * Statistically significant 
at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5.4 -  Log Current Price GDP per capita 1996, and Foreign Market Access
LogGDPpc ( 1)
----------------
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Observations 91 91 96 58 91 96 25 40 25
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
LogFMACEP .215** (.063) . 1281(.0835) - -,0200(. 1655) .0985 (.0683) - -,0023(.0570) - .0063 (.0703)
LogFMA - - .2433** - - .1939* - .3016** -
(.1090) ( .1011) (.1408)
Loghydroc pc .019 0402*** .0387 ** .0405** 0543*** .0515*** .0042 .0027 .0023
(.015) (.0150) (.0148) (.0193) (.0142) (.0143) (.0125) (.0193) (.01456)
Arable Land -.050 -.0462 -.0691 -.0870 -.0446 -.0632 -.0581 -.0139 -.0548
(.066) (.0500) (.0471) (.0705) (.0432) (.0431) (.0348) (.0709) (.0409)
N minerals .016** .0051 .0045 .0053 .0061 .0051 .0106 .0019 .0027 .0021
(.008) (.0108) (.0104) (.0122) (.0109) (.0120) (.0133) (.0122)
% tropics -.057 -.1901 -.1855 -.4083** -.3150 -.3272* .1375 -.5968 .1293
(.239) (.2131) (.2018) (.1870) (.2017) (.1944) (.2954) (.3671) (.3168)
Malaria 1994 -1.107** -1.159*** -1 141*** -1.315*** -.7670*** -7898*** -2.152*** -1.640*** -2.185***
(.282) (.2135) (.2163) (.2401) (.2226) (.2157) (.2555) (.4393) (.2745)
Property right -.445** -.4517*** - 4243*** - - - - - -
(.091) (.0824) (.0809)
Risk expropr - - - 2078*** - - - - -
(.0511)
Econ Free - - - - -.8216*** -.7579*** -.7680*** - -.8146**
(.1387) (.1410) (.1690) (.2890)
Socialist rule -.210(. 191) -.0995(.1739) -. 1472(. 1877) -.0419(.2690) .0097 (.1980) -,0680(.2095) (dropped) - (dropped)
War dummy -.052 (.169) -.0183(. 1614) -,0022(.1603) -.0336(.1485) -.0768(. 1737) -.0823(.1744) (dropped) - (dropped)
Trust - - - - - - .0171*** .0171** .0187*
(.0058) (.0064) (.0095)
Gvt Effective - - - - - - - - -,0435(.2231)
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
.766 .7702 .7830 .7119 .7920 .7971 .9298 .7509 .9301
F(.) 47.77 40.62 54.48 20.79 42.11 51.48 76.59 20.13 65.39
Prob>F .000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Notes: Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors in parentheses. Due to small sample properties, standard errors in 
regressions (5) and (6) have been double-checked with bootstrapping (200 replicas), giving the same significance results for regression (5); only the Index of 
Economic Freedom remains significant for regression (6). * Statistically significant at the 10% level. ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
* * * Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5.5 -  Log of current price real GDP pc 1996 (PWT 6.1), Market Access (CEP), and Governance 
Matters V
Log GDP pc 
Observations 
Year
( 1)
45
1996
(2)
45
1996
(3)
45
1996
(4)
45
1996
(5)
45
1996
(6)
44
1996
(7)
44
1996
LogTMACEP .0204 -.0066 -.0131 .0539 .0068 .0186 .0944
(.1138) (.1198) (.1208) (.1195) ( .1200) (.1377) (.1209)
Loghydroc pc .0829*** .0804*** .0750*** .0781*** .0750*** .0722*** .0631**
(.0231) (.0236) (.0220) (.0232) (.0247) (.0233) (.0291)
Arable Land -.0848 -.1229 -.0830 -.0621 -.0866 -.0483 .0565
(.1013) (.1068) (.1154) (.1108) (.1094) (.1433) (.1238)
Nminerals -.0088 .0006 -.0034 -.0061 -.0066 .0007 -.0029
(.0181) (.0180) (.0162) (.0200) (.0191) (.0176) (.0186)
%  Tropics -.2743 -.3233 -.0488 -.2969 -.3033 -.1221 .0716
(.2552) (.2855) (.2778) (.2797) (.2675) (.2728) (.3211)
Malaria 1994 - 9439*** -.9820*** -.9677*** -.8030*** -1.007*** -1.067*** -1.052***
(.2448) (.2628) (.2493) (.2676) (.2524) (.2704) (.3140)
Property right -.3603*** -.3858*** -.2498* -.2979** -.4557*** -.3168** -.1023
(.1182) (.0953) (.1243) (.1285) (.1194) (.1302) (.1508)
Voice 2594***
(.0901) - - - - -
.1192
(.2972)
Polit. stability
-
.1890**
(.0856) - - - -
.0129
(.1279)
Gvt. Effective
- -
.3955***
(.1401) - - -
.5216**
(.2124)
Regulatory
- - -
.3569*
(.1771) - -
.1920
(.2575)
Rule of Law
- - - -
.1036
(.1253) -
-.2146
(.1750)
Contrl corrup
- - - - -
.2496**
(.1193)
-.1082
(.2393)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R* .8285 .8253 .8433 .8299 .8145 .8253 .8599
F(.) 37.41 35.98 48.94 40.28 30.53 37.76 44.00
Prob>F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically 
significant at the 90% level. ** Statistically significant at the 95% level. * * * Statistically significant at the 99% level.
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Table 5.6 -  Exploring the government effectiveness threshold with several sub­
samples:
Is Market Access significant?_______ _________ _________ ________ ______
SAMPLE 10% 5% 1% also CEP
19/163 (all but upper and lower 10%) X X X No
1/45 (lower 25%) X X X No
1/135 (lower 75%) X X X No
46/181 (upper 75%) s s X No
1/90 (lower 50%) s X No
91/181 (upper 50%) s S X No
136/181 (upper 25%) S S Occasionally
1/162 (all but upper 10%) X X X No
There is a total o f 181 observations for government effectiveness. Columns represent 10, 5, and 1 
percent significant levels respectively. Results hold for both foreign and total market access. Last 
column means “Also using the CEP database?”, which has a narrower sample. “Occasionally” 
means “Yes” for Foreign Market Access at 10% only.
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Table 5.7 -  Log o f current price real GDP pc 1996 (PWT 6.1), Foreign Market Access (CEP), and partitioned 
government effectiveness
Log GDP pc ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 38
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
logFMA CEP .1323 .0337 .0311 .0114 .0035 .0288(.0839) (.0663) (.0736) (.0666) (.0639) (.1006)
LogFMA CEP .0795*** .1052*** .0505*** .0951**
effechighest (.0104) (.0350) (.0146) (.0415)
Log hydroc pc .0415*** .0543*** .0586*** .0529*** .0561*** .0501*
(.0150) (.0126) (.0143) (.0128) (.0118) (.0249)
Arable Land -.0446 -.0481 -.0465 -.0481 -.0483 -.0400(.0502) (.0388) (.0393) (.0432) (.0399) (.0703)
N minerals .0060 -.0063 -.0104 .0060 -.0015 -.0063
(.0107) (.0087) (.0112) (.0083) (.0086) (.0156)
% Tropics -.1802 .1499 .2795 .1291 .1963 .1745(.2113) (.1614) (.2217) (.1645) (.1485) (.5357)
Malaria 1994 -1.184*** -1.240*** -1.254*** -1.065*** -1.623***(.2072) (.1758) (.1713) (.1793) (.1641) (.2686)
Property rights
-.4490*** -.2253*** -.1509 -.1472* -.1376* _
(.0823) (.0773) (.1219) (.0828) (.0795)
Socialist -.0984 .0077 .0333 -
(.1748) (.1761) (.1900)
War dummy -.0126 -.0768 -.0952
_
(.1599) (.1187) (.1213) “ -
Trust - - - - - ,0073(.0070)
Gvt Effective
_ .5322*** .2996***_ _
(.0837) (.1108)
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
R2 .7753 .8487 .8407 .8437 .8605 .7954
F(-) 42.41 61.26 47.60 59.32 63.26 25.26
Prob>F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors in parentheses. In specifications (3) 
and (6), Log FMA CEP and Log FMA CEP effechighest have been instrumented with the log distance to USA, 
Belgium, Japan, and the minimum of the 3 in a first stage regression. * Statistically significant at the 90% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 95% level. * * * Statistically significant at the 99% level.
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Table 5.8 - Percentage changes in predicted levels of GDP per capita 1996
countries, (i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
from Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
less to more only of &common only of only to &common &common
government Central borders of Central Central borders of borders of
effectiveness Europe central Europe), Europe, central central
Europe Instit. Instit. Europe, Europe,
threshold threshold Instit. Instit.
considered considered 
-> Instit. 
Change
threshold
considered
thresthold 
considered 
-> Instit. 
Change
Zaire 81.59 100.51 -2.80 105.35 -2.50 103.89
Sri Lanka 103.33 132.63 -3.30 107.72 -3.39 108.15
Zimbabwe 96.91 108.96 -3.28 104.94 -2.82 102.73
New Zealand 131.22 146.02 20.83 -88.67 19.42 -88.37
Notes: Specification as suggested by Redding and Venables 2004 (Table 5.5, column 3), including 
Foreign Market and Supplier Access and control variables, with no constant and parameters constraint as 
in their equation (21), a =0.5, a=10. Market and Supplier access calculated using country characteristics 
instead o f country dummies in order to allow for specific feature effects. Calculations based on CEP 
database. Distance to central and Central Europe consist of imputing the distances (and common borders 
when specified) corresponding to Hungary. The institutional change in columns (4) and (5) consists o f  
giving value 1 when the government effectiveness dummy is 0, and giving it value 0 when it is 1 (the 
latter only for New Zealand).
254
APPENDIX 5.A 
LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE TABLES
Self constructed
lfma In of foreign market access 1994, constructed from the NBER-UN database on 
bilateral trade and the STATA code from Redding and Venables (2004)18. 
lma_c In of total market access 1994, calculated as the logarithm of the sum of 
domestic plus foreign market access19.
lfmaCEP In of foreign market access using the CEP cleaned up version of the NBER- 
UN database
lma_cCEP In of total market access using the CEP cleaned up version of the NBER- 
UN database.
lfmaccCEP In of foreign market access calculated using country characteristics instead 
of country dummies (CEP database).
lfsaccCEP In of foreign supply access calculated using country characteristics instead 
of country dummies (CEP database).
Partition variables: dummy and interaction term
Instrumental variables: minimum of the 3 log distances to the USA, Belgium and Japan
From data sources
Endogenous and control variables:
lcgdp In of current price real GDP per capita in 1996, from the Penn World Tables 6.1
land Arable land area per capita (In is used in the regressions)
lhcpc Hydrocarbons per capita (In is used in the regressions)
nminerals Number of minerals
tropicar Fraction of land in the geographical tropics
malfal Prevalence of malaria
re Risk of expropriation index. 0 to 10 scale (real numbers).
19 For domestic market access, MA(3) as in Redding and Venables (2004) is used; this is, the outcome to 
the TOBIT specification which contemplates the truncated nature of the bilateral trade data.
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pr Property rights 1996, from the Index of Economic Freedom. 1 to 5 scale (natural 
numbers).
free Score for Index of Economic Freedom 1996. 
socialst Socialist rule during 1950-1995 
wardum External war 1960-1985
voice voice and accountability 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” 
database.
polsta political stability 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” database, 
effec government effectiveness 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” 
database.
reg regulatory quality 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” database. 
RoL rule of law 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” database, 
contrl control of corruption 1996, from the World Bank “Governance Matters V” 
database.
trustkk Trust (several years) as in Knack and Keefer (1997)
Instrumental variables:
IdistcapUSA Distance to the USA, capital city to capital city, from the Centre d ‘Etudes 
Prospectives et d ’Informations Internationales (CEPII), (In used in the regressions) 
IdistcapBEL Distance to Belgium, capital city to capital city, from the Centre d ’Etudes 
Prospectives et d ’Informations Internationales (CEPII), (In used in the regressions) 
IdistcapJPN Distance to Japan, capital city to capital city, from the Centre d  ’Etudes 
Prospectives et d ’Informations Internationales (CEPII), (In used in the regressions)
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APPENDIX 5.B
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES
In alphabetical order according to the IS03 World Bank classification code:
iso3 name of country/territory
ABW ARUBA,
AFG AFGHANISTAN
AGO ANGOLA
AIA ANGUILLA
ALB ALBANIA
AND ANDORRA
ANT NETHERLANDS ANTILLES
ARE UNITED ARAB E.
ARG ARGENTINA
ARM ARMENIA
ASM AMERICAN SAMOA
ATF FRENCH SOUTHERN TERRITORIES
ATG ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
AUS AUSTRALIA
AUT AUSTRIA
AZE AZERBAIJAN
BDI BURUNDI
BEL BELGIUM
BEN BENIN
BFA BURKINA FASO
BGD BANGLADESH
BGR BULGARIA
BHR BAHRAIN
BHS BAHAMAS
BIH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BLR BELARUS
BLX BELGIUM (INCLUDES LUXEMBURG)
BLZ BELIZE
BMU BERMUDA
BOL BOLIVIA
BRA BRAZIL
BRB BARBADOS
BRN BRUNEI
BTN BHUTAN
BWA BOTSWANA
CAF CENTRAL AFR.R.
CAN CANADA
CCK COCOS (KEELING) ISLANDS
CHA CHANNEL ISLANDS
CHE SWITZERLAND
CHL CHILE
CHN CHINA
CIV IVORY COAST
CMR CAMEROON
COG CONGO
COK COOK ISLANDS
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COL COLOMBIA
COM COMOROS
CPV CAPE VERDE IS.
CRI COSTA RICA
CUB CUBA
CXR CHRISTMAS ISLAND
CYM CAYMAN ISLANDS
CYP CYPRUS
CZE CZECH REPUBLIC
CZS CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DDR GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
DEU GERMANY, WEST
DJI DJIBOUTI
DKF DENMARK (INCLUDES FAEROE ISLANDS)
DMA DOMINICA
DNK DENMARK
DOM DOMINICAN REP.
DRG GERMANY, EAST
DZA ALGERIA
ECU ECUADOR
EGY EGYPT
ERI ERITREA
ESH WESTERN SAHARA
ESP SPAIN
EST ESTONIA
ETF ETHIOPIA (INCLUDES ERITREA)
ETH ETHIOPIA
FIN FINLAND
FJI FIJI
FLK FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS)
FRA FRANCE
FRO FAEROE ISLANDS
FSM MICRONESIA
GAB GABON
GBC GUINEA-BISSAU (INCLUDES CAPE VERDE)
GBR U.K.
GEO GEORGIA
GER GERMANY
GHA GHANA
GIB GIBRALTAR
GIN GUINEA
GLP GUADELOUPE
GMB GAMBIA
GNB GUINEA-BISS
GNQ EQUATORIAL GUINEA
GPM GUADELOUPE (INCLUDES MARTINIQUE)
GRC GREECE
GRD GRENADA
GRL GREENLAND
GTM GUATEMALA
GUF FRENCH GUIANA
GUM GUAM
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GUY GUYANA
HKG HONG KONG
HND HONDURAS
HRV CROATIA
HTI HAITI
HUN HUNGARY
IDM INDONESIA (INCLUDES MACAU)
IDN INDONESIA
IND INDIA
IOM ISLE OF MAN
IOT BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY
IRL IRELAND
IRN IRAN
IRQ IRAQ
ISL ICELAND
ISR ISRAEL
ITA ITALY
JAM JAMAICA
JOR JORDAN
JPN JAPAN
KAZ KAZAKHSTAN
KEN KENYA
KGZ KYRGYZSTAN
KHM CAMBODIA
KIR KIRIBATI
KIZ KIRIBATI (INCLUDES SOLOMON ISLANDS, TONGA, TUVALU)
KNA ST.KITTS&NEVIS
KOR KOREA, REP.
KWT KUWAIT
LAO LAOS
LBN LEBANON
LBR LIBERIA
LBY LIBYA
LCA ST.LUCIA
LIE LIECHTENSTEIN
LKA SRI LANKA
LSO LESOTHO
LTU LITHUANIA
LUX LUXEMBOURG
LVA LATVIA
LWI KOSOVO
MAC MACAO
MAR MOROCCO
MAY MAYOTTE
MCO MONACO
MDA MOLDOVA
MDG MADAGASCAR
MDV MALDIVES
MEX MEXICO
MHL MARSHALL ISLANDS
MKD MACEDONIA
MLI MALI
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MLT MALTA
MMR MYANMAR
MNG MONGOLIA
MNP NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
MOZ MOZAMBIQUE
MRT MAURITANIA
MSR MONTSERRAT
MTQ MARTINIQUE
MUS MAURITIUS
MWI MALAWI
MYS MALAYSIA
NAM NAMIBIA
NCL NEW CALEDONIA
NCZ NEW CALEDONIA (INDLUDES FRENCH POLYNESIA, VANUATU)
NER NIGER
NFK NORFOLK ISLAND
NGA NIGERIA
NIC NICARAGUA
NIU NIUE
NLD NETHERLANDS
NOR NORWAY
NPL NEPAL
NRU NAURU
NZL NEW ZEALAND
OMN OMAN
PAK PAKISTAN
PAL PALESTINE
PAN PANAMA
PCI TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
PCN PITCAIRN
PER PERU
PHL PHILIPPINES
PLW PALAU
PNG PAPUA N.GUINEA
POL POLAND
PRI PUERTO RICO
PRK KOREA, DEM. REP.
PRT PORTUGAL
PRY PARAGUAY
PYF FRENCH POLYNESIA
QAT QATAR
REU REUNION
ROM ROMANIA
RUS U.S.S.R.
RWA RWANDA
SAU SAUDI ARABIA
SCG SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
SDN SUDAN
SEN SENEGAL
SER SERBIA
SGP SINGAPORE
SHN SAINT HELENA
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SLB SOLOMON IS.
SLE SIERRA LEONE
SLV EL SALVADOR
SMR SAN MARINO
SOM SOMALIA
SPM SAINT PIERRE AND MIQUELON
STP SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
SUR SURINAME
SVK SLOVAK REPUBLIC
SVN SLOVENIA
SWE SWEDEN
SWZ SWAZILAND
SYC SEYCHELLES
SYR SYRIA
TCA TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
TCD CHAD
TGO TOGO
THA THAILAND
TJK TAJIKISTAN
TKL TOKELAU
TKM TURKMENISTAN
TMP TIMOR-LESTE
TON TONGA
TTO TRINIDAD&TOBAGO
TUN TUNISIA
TUR TURKEY
TUV TUVALU
TWN TAIWAN
TZA TANZANIA
UGA UGANDA
UKR UKRAINE
URY URUGUAY
USA U.S.A.
UZB UZBEKISTAN
VCT ST. VINCENT&GRE
VEN VENEZUELA
VGB BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS
VIR VIRGIN ISLANDS (U.S.)
VNM VIET NAM
VUT VANUATU
WBG WEST BANK AND GAZA
WLF WALLIS AND FORTUNA
WSM WESTERN SAMOA
YEM YEMEN
YUG YUGOSLAVIA
ZAF SOUTH AFRICA
ZAR ZAIRE
ZMB ZAMBIA
ZWE ZIMBABWE
ZZZ OTHER TERRITORIES
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APPENDIX 5.C 
TABLES ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Table 5.4b- Log current price GDP pc 1996, and foreign market 
access (NBER-UN)_____________________________________
Log GDP pc ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observations 95 58 95 27 95
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
LogFMA 1994 .1210(.0805)
-.2772
(.1718)
.0594
(.0816)
.0155
(.0633)
.0011
(.0685)
Loghydroc pc .0382*** .0413** .0520*** .0039 .0493***(.0145) (.0179) (.0138) (.0119) (.0124)
Arable Land -.0658 -.0547 -.0581 -.0596* -.0510(.0459) (.0695) (.0422) (.0341) (.0420)
N minerals .0038 .0077 .0043 .0020 .0047(.0101) (.0112) (.0103) (.0094) (.0076)
% Tropics -.2506 -.4165*** -.4021* .1532 .0778(.2006) (.1460) (.2027) (.2655) (.1494)
Malaria 1994 -1.145*** -1.412*** -.7723*** -2.182*** -1.056***(.2156) (.2382) (.2198) (.2258) (.1833)
Property rights
-.4466***
(.0810) - - -
-.1776**
(.0823)
Risk exprop -
1973***
(.0470) - - -
Econ Free -.8120*** -.7566***(.1450) (.1695)
Socialist -.1242(.1774)
-.0575
(.2332)
-.0313
(.2060) (dropped) -
War dummy -.0377(.1585)
-.0692
(.1614)
-.1220
(.1742) (dropped) -
Trust .0167***(.0051)
Gvt Effective - - - -
.5101***
(.0862)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 .7833 .7152 .7982 .9321 .8433
F(-) 48.07 16.99 50.00 80.63 65.07
Prob>F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the 90% level. ** Statistically significant at 
the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at the 99% level.
Note: Updating the log GDP per capita from Penn World Table 6.1 to the new 
version 6.2 adds just one more observation into the operative sample. Given that 
the results are very similar in any case, the use o f Penn World Table 6.1 GDP data 
is preferred for consistency.
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Table 5.5b -  Log of current price real GDP pc 1996 (PWT 6.1), Market Access (NBER- 
UN), and Governance Matters V______________________________________________
Log GDP pc ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95 93 93
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
LogTMA 1994 .0104 .0594 .0013 .0617 .0400 .0217 -.00003f
(.0769) (.0761) (.0685) (.0790) (.0835) (.0798) (.0754)
Loghydroc pc .0542***
0463*** .0493*** .0534*** .0500*** .0461*** .0500***
(.0136) (.0135) (.0124) (.0141) (.0147) (.0130) (.0142)
Arable Land -.0683 -.0760 -.0510 -.0722 -.0734 -.0533 -.0384(.0431) (.0441) (.0420) (.0418) (.0447) (.0417) (.0400)
N minerals .0033 .0070 .0047 .0024 .0014 .0082 .0036(.0090) (.0089) (.0076) (.0100) (.0098) (.0082) (.0081)
% Tropics -.1644 -.1686 .0778 -.3200 -.2440 .0663 .1074(.1680) (.1776) (.1494) (.1673) (.1658) (.1498) (.1718)
Malaria 1994 -1.039*** -1.093*** -1.056*** -.7624*** -1.058*** -1.070*** -1 041***(.1903) (.2016)
-.3720
(.1833) (.2171) (.1966) (.1872) (.2403)
Property rights -.3235*** -.1776** -.2189** -.3658*** -.2506*** -.1344(.0831) (.0693) (.0823) (.0888) (.0815) (.0789) (.0835)
Voice
3351*** .0281
(.0790) (.1892)
Pol. stability .2377*** .0781" (.0747) “ ” “ * (.0832)
Gvt Effective .5101*** .4775***_ _ _ _ _(.0862) (.1597)
Regulatory .4965*** .0400“ “ “ (.1157) (.1872)
Rule of Law .2342** -.0133_ _ _ (.0908) (.1370)
Contrl corrup 4074*** -.0068“ “ “ " (.0762) (.1404)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 .8104 .8033 .8433 .8132 .7972 .8246 .8509
F(-) 66.13 60.06 65.09 63.97 50.66 58.11 50.61
Prob>F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
Constant not shown. Heteroskedasticity corrected White-robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically 
significant at the 90% level. **Statistically significant at the 95% level. ***Statistically significant at the 99% 
level. |5  significant ciphers instead of the regular 4 allowed.
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CONCLUSIONS
When I started this project I had many questions. Now I have many questions and some 
answers. The questions were revolving around the idea that the different ways people 
interact in different parts of the world must have influenced economic transactions. 
Civic virtues, mutual trust, voluntary work or spontaneous cooperation might arise 
spontaneously but constitute a flow and stock of a sort of abstract type of capital for the 
whole of the society, and contribute generating added value. So there must be a way to 
account for these differences, and to assign a value to the difference. There must be a 
way to measure the importance of social capital.
Later on I learnt that there was a recently coined term, social capital, which would refer 
precisely to this idea and there was a prolific literature on the subject, especially in 
political science and sociology. The new term had also had some impact in economics, 
a small stream quantifying the impact of social arrangements and, above all, trust, had 
on the economy. But my main question was how does this old idea with new 
terminology relate to the way different economies had evolved over time? Is social 
capital related and affecting the economy the same way in the past as it does now? If so, 
by how much? Are we talking about the same magnitude of relevance? In order to 
answer this question, I had first to be able to find a way to measure or capture social 
capital nowadays and in the past. And, if possible, in a way that would be directly 
comparable for both periods.
The Adelman and Morris (1967) work was illuminating. They had created an 
international Social Development Index (SDI) for the 1960s that was able to 
encapsulate the concept of the value of good social interactions and capture it indirectly 
at the same time. Not only this, but the later study of Temple and Johnson (1998) 
demonstrated that the Adelman and Morris’ Index could have predicted future economic 
growth for a cross-section of countries better than any other contemporary attempt.
The statistical technique used to compute the index, the Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA) was exceptionally appropriate for extracting hidden dimensions out of a large 
amount of highly interrelated variables. This technique was out of use in mainstream 
Economics and unknown in Economic History, but is now being re-discovered and
267
widely used and accepted for the creation of indices (see Kauffman from the World 
Bank for the aggregation of governance related variables).
Reading all the works by Adelman and Morris I found that they invested a vast amount 
of time (more than 20 years of research) in compiling a massive homogeneous 
international database for the second half of the nineteenth century and beginning of the 
twentieth with many variables referring to society and economics. The purpose of this 
database was related to development studies; they grouped all the sample in different 
groups of countries and found differentiated general paths of development, some 
countries more based on agriculture, some more on technologies, and so on. I realised 
that this database had many more possibilities and could, indeed, be of great use for my 
social development index purposes.
Then it came the painstaking work of reconstruction and updating of the database. The 
choice of some of the variables to be included, excluded or updated deserved some 
thought. It is all explained in detail in chapter 2 (database). After some time, I had a 
completely new database, which would be ready to use as a basis for calculation of the 
new social index.
I believe the new database is a contribution to Economic History by its own right. This 
database is now digital, updated, and readily available for further studies. Overall, it 
includes 73 variables referring to aspects of society, politics and economics for 23 
countries, for the period 1850-1914, some of them starting as early as 1830 (all listed in 
chapter 2). The new database has the potential to be used as a base for international 
comparative studies in Economic and Social History or related disciplines. It should be 
readily available upon request.
The next phase of the PhD was calculation of the Social Development Index (SDI). The 
selection of variables was done according to statistical adequacy criteria. 18 variables 
were included in the index (careful explanation of the variable selection process can be 
found in chapter 3). The new SDI was generated for 2 years: 1870 and 1980. And this is 
(imperfectly) comparable to the previously existing SDI for 1960. It is a pity that the 
sample of countries coinciding in both periods is small. So there is a lot more intense 
work to be done in that direction. However, this would take enormous amount of effort 
and imagination, since some of the variables cannot really be replicated again for new
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countries because the raw basic information is based on the unreleased reports of 
country experts with no detailed criteria. Of course, I do encourage going along this 
avenue of widening the sample but I would suggest strict selection of feasible variables 
for future research.
Should I recommend going in any direction at all at this respect I would suggest 
widening the time dimension. Recall we now have the SDI for 1870, 1890 and 1960. 
These are good enough to show that it is possible to add a historical dimension to social 
capital measurement. However, there are three ways to go: In the first place, one could 
widen the time horizon going backwards. This is maybe the alternative that would take 
the least effort and be less time consuming because the database starts in 1850 and thus 
most of the variables are already available for that year. SDI for 1850 was not calculated 
in this thesis because some of the variables required lags and would have needed the 
data corresponding to 1830 to be able to carry it on. Exceptionally, some variables are 
available for 1830 but these are the exception and constructing a SDI for 1830 would 
certainly prove to be an extremely difficult task due to scarcity of reliable information. 
Mitchell (1998) points out that historical statistics start to be generally reliable from the 
second half of the nineteenth century onwards.
The second alternative would be to produce a SDI for intermediate time cuts, namely 
1910 or alternatively 1914, 1930 or 1940 (options to be discussed). The first 
intermediate time cut is feasible and almost readily available, with the exception of 
variables that require forward moving information, because 1914 is the final year of the 
original Adelman and Morris (1988) database. A SDI for some arbitrary time cut 
between 1930 and 1940 is more difficult to construct because of lack of data. There is 
no clear date to assign to this proposed time cut, but I would do not encourage the 
choice of 1930 as cutting year because of the highly disruptive situation of the world 
economy (and society) during the Great Depression; in the same way the original 
database does not finish in 1910 but in 1914, just before World War I. If any, I would 
recommend some year that is already recognised in the literature as the end of the Great 
Depression or even later, but not beyond 1940. This would probably be 1939.
Finally, the third way to widen the time horizon of SDI would be to produce indices for 
the years after 1960 and all the way forward to present day. This implies some 
compilation of data, but the main advantage is that more recent times have statistics and
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other information based on surveys readily available and generally easily accessible. 
The only question here would be whether it makes sense to generate an indirect general 
index when we have more precise concepts like mutual trust reported in rounds of 
international surveys such as the World Value Surveys. It does make sense, 
nevertheless, to construct such an index for the sake of comparison with the already 
existing years.
This is all as far as the proposed chronological extensions of the SDI are concerned. 
Other avenues for future research involving the enlargement of the sample of countries 
would be more difficult to execute, because the criteria to assign a specific value to 
qualitative variables was done on a comparative basis with respect to other countries 
and the decision processes are very difficult to recreate for many of the qualitative 
variables.
The second obvious contribution of the thesis for economic historians is the new index. 
The SDI is available for two time cuts, 1870 and 1890, and for 23 countries around the 
world. These new ranking figures are mainly thought for international comparisons, 
because the index is a ranking. At this respect, we can draw parallelisms between the 
SDI and the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is an index composed of 
several variables covering different aspects that attempts at giving an indication of the 
level of human development. The HDI has been a successful index, being widely used 
in development studies. In the same way, the SDI is an index composed of several 
variables that attempts at giving an indication of the level of social development, and 
may be useful in a broad range of disciplines within the social sciences, ranging from 
political science to social anthropology, as an indicator of the quality of society or social 
development.
The third contribution of the thesis is the knowledge derived from the empirical tests on 
the relationship between social development and economic development. This 
relationship has been shown to exist in earlier studies, but now has been confirmed to 
exist in the long run as well, so it becomes a stylised fact. Moreover, the associated 
coefficients reveal similar magnitudes for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (around 
50 to 60 percent of a standard deviation increase in accumulated long run growth for 
every 1 standard deviation increase in SDI for maximum correlation periods), which 
points at the existence of a stable positive relationship between social development and
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income. More tests could be done with different benchmark years, but the results 
achieved up to now are robust enough to illustrate this point. Social capital and related 
concepts bring value to the economy.
There is one interesting finding that invites to further research, and this is the fact that 
the closer we move into the present the shortest is the lag with which SDI operates in 
the economy; it starts with 5-6 decades in the nineteenth century and seems to be 
decreasing over time. This finding seems to suggest that things move faster nowadays 
than in the past. The empirical results presented in chapter 4 go along this direction and 
are enough to make us think about this phenomenon, but are by no means sufficient to 
constitute a radical proof. Thus, it could be promising to investigate further in this 
direction.
Moving to the Economic Geography contributions, the forth contribution of the thesis is 
the new data on access to markets, starting in 1962, including maps and graphs. The 
Market Access indicator was recently designed was first presented by its developers for 
one year only, 1994 (Redding and Venables, 2004). In this thesis I calculated Market 
Access series for virtually all countries in the world starting in 1962, the initial year of 
the bilateral trade database. This can help studying the evolution of the index from the 
1960 to nowadays, and it is just the start of an ongoing research project.
The fifth and final mayor contribution of the thesis are the conclusions drawn about the 
adequacy of institutions in countries that are distant to the main world markets. Some 
countries like New Zealand are far away from the main world markets and nevertheless 
have been able to achieve a healthy wealth status. Others like Zimbabwe are equally far 
away from the main world markets and remain poor. What is the difference between 
these two? Would this change should we find a way to bring them closer to markets? 
The exploration conducted in chapter 5 brings us to the institutions’ debate. An 
institutional quality threshold is found, below which countries could not benefit from a 
favourable location. Then, the SDI helps testing the Market Access matters’ hypothesis 
in a historical perspective. The result is that the findings about the existence of a 
minimum threshold of institutional quality are confirmed. The same institutional 
impediments that are being discussed nowadays in the institutional economics literature 
seem to have been present half a century ago. These findings suggest that there is a lot 
to be done in terms of policy recommendations to change institutions the way they are
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operating in some countries because this could unleash the economic potential 
unrealised until now.
The SDI has facilitated the test of an economic geography theory for an alternative 
benchmark year. But this is just an example of the many more applications the index 
could have. The SDI can have many more applications into economic theory and other 
fields of the social sciences, apart from the purely descriptive mission of providing a 
world ranking of countries. Hopefully, future research will profit from it.
Despite the fact that this thesis does not enter into discussing the process of creation of 
social capital but only into the quantification and economic implications, policy 
recommendations regarding social capital would go along the way of encouraging 
measures that promote its emergence. In other words, measures encouraging a change of 
attitudes towards the other citizens; for instance, promoting new horizontal and 
voluntary organisations that would tighten the links within a community and between 
different groups of people.
Is economic history and the discipline of economics in general going to change its way 
of thinking and proceeding after this thesis? Certainly not, but it is true that this thesis is 
a marginal contribution towards the quantification of social capital and related variables, 
and a new idea in terms of looking at the social capital issue in historical perspective 
within economic history. This thesis is one more of the many works suggesting that the 
way people interact does matter and cannot be ignored any more in quantitative studies.
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